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ABSTRACT
This thesis comprises five chapters and a short introduction. Chapter 1 reexamines 
the "stylised facts" about cyclical fluctuations in external balances proposed by real 
business cycle economists and investigates whether technology shocks are the main 
source of fluctuations in external balances. It is found that real business cycle evidence 
is not invariant to the method of detrending and a substantial proportion of movement 
of current accounts is due to demand shocks. Furthermore, it is found tha t the single 
commodity real business cycle model cannot explain countercyclical movement of 
current accounts.
^  Chapter 2 studies the effect of anticipated inflation on economic growth in an 
endogenous growth model. Money is introduced into an endogenous growth model which 
exchange requires cash-in-advance. It is shown that the decentralized competitive 
outcome is an inefficient balanced growth equilibrium. It is also shown that efficiency 
is restorable by means of a well-known optimum money supply rule.
/  Chapter 3 extends the basic product variety endogenous growth model by introducing 
a fixed cost in research and development. It is shown that the fixed cost determines the 
ra te  of growth. By integrating with the human capital accumulation, it is shown tha t the
r
growth ra te  of output is twice the ra te  of human capital accumulation without any 
L increasing returns to scale or externality assumptions. In addition, this chapter also 
studies the effects of trade liberalization of physical goods on economic growth and 
further discuss the effect of economic integration on economic growth.
/  Chapter 4 addresses the question of whether environmental conservation adversely 
affects growth. It is shown tha t environmental control is not necessarily a depressant
i—---- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --------- -
on growth from a laissez-faire economy. Even if the economy starts  off pursuing 
optimal growth without considering environmental damage, the growth ra te  of output 
may be increased if the environment is a factor of production.
/  Chapter 5 deals with financial development in an endogenous growth model. The
2 \
model integrates theories of growth and financial intermediation. Problems of moral 
hazard d ictate  tha t an optimal loan contract must involve either ex ante or ex post 
monitoring which is costly. However, lenders can delegate the monitoring to a financial 
intermediary. It is found th a t there is a positive, two-way causal relationship between 
growth and financial development. Different economies may evolve towards different 
financial systems depending on cross-country differences in the relative costs of these 
systems. In addition, it is also shown th a t the market may choose a financial system 
which does not generate the fastest possible economic growth.
i. 3
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/INTRODUCTION
Economies grow and change over tim e. Economic growth, however, is not smooth. 
A t the core of any macroeconomic theory is an explanation of how an economy grows 
and responds to economic forces. In the past, macroeconomists used a Solow-type long- 
run growth model to study the general upward path of the economy over time. The 
growth model focuses on the amount of labour and capital th a t go into the production 
of goods. Given exogenous growth rates of technology and population of work force, the 
economy grows along a determ inistic trend. The trend can be used to measure the 
potential output that would have been produced if the economy had utilised all its 
capacity. Therefore deviations from the trend are the cyclical fluctuations of the 
economy.
Before the 80's, most macroeconomists saw potential output as evolving smoothly 
over time. They viewed the business cycle as a temporary departure from growth’s 
potential level. An im portant group of macroeconomists, the real business cycle school, 
disputes this idea. They believe tha t potential output fluctuates significantly mainly due 
to productivity shocks. Estimating the relative importance of the sources of economic 
fluctuations is crucial to the debate between the real business cycle school and the 
traditional keynesian school.
Macroeconomists estim ating the relative importance of the sources of fluctuations 
face the problem of separating output growth trends from business cycles. Since the 
Solow model does not put any restrictions on the exogenous nature of technical progress, 
it can be either determ inistic or stochastic. Different assumptions about technical 
progress - "the trend" - will give different answers to the estim ates. Chapter 1 of this 
thesis tries to illustrate the potential problems of estim ation and formulates a 
structural approach to the problem. It is found that a substantial proportion of 
fluctuations in output of the G7 countries is due to permanent shocks. Since the study
is based on reduced form equations, we may miss out some important points which lead 
to misspecification of the disturbances. One source of specification error may be due 
to the information structure problem mentioned in Hansen & Sargent (1990). If agents 
have more information than the econometrican about the nature of the disturbances, 
there will be difficulties in identifying the sources of the disturbances unless the
9
econom etrican has the same information set as the agents. A second specification error 
is the independence of transitory and permanent shocks. If technical progess is no longer 
exog|fHg)ous, it is determined by economic forces. Any demand policy disturbance may 
a ffec t the long term  potential capacity of the economy in addition to its conventional 
tem porary e ffec t on output. The remain chapters are devoted to studying the nature of 
the  perm anent component.
The productivity of most economies have advanced in the twentieth century. Some 
of the previously less industrialized countries - such as Japan and Italy - have caught 
up to the productivity levels of the world's industrial leaders, while others, such as 
Argentina, have lost substantial ground relative to the industrial core. Economies have 
not "converged" in productivity levels and standards of living over the past century.* 
Nations have not shared equally in the increase of m aterial wealth. It casts some doubts 
on Solow's growth model.
Recent work on economic growth, largely sparked by Romer (1986), tries to 
determ ine technological progress endogenously. The Romer model is similar to the 
paper of Arrow (1962) on learning by doing. In the Romer model, the productivity of a 
firm is an increasing function of aggregate investment of the economy. He argues that 
when investments take place, new knowledge will be discovered which is a public good, 
generating an externality to other firms. Accumulation of knowledge by forward- 
looking, profit maximizing agents is the driving force behind the long-run growth in his 
model. A second influential paper by Lucas (1988), emphasizes the role of human capital 
accumulation in determining long-term economic growth. The model also provides an 
explanation for migration flows of skilled and unskilled labour to high income countries.
Subsequent studies extend the Romer and Lucas models in different directions. The 
Rebelo model (1991) modifies Romer's model (1986) to be compatible with the stylised 
facts of a steady capital-output ratio and a constant share of capital and labour in total 
income. The Barro model (1990) tries to take into account the effect of fiscal policy.
* Some recen t empirical studies on cross-country data by Barro (1991) and Mankiw, 
Romer & Weil (1991) support the "convergence hypothesis" - that countries with a lower 
capital stock will grow faster than those with higher capital stocks - an implication of 
the Solow growth model. However, Quah (1993a, 1993b) illustrates the econometric 
problems of these studies.
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C hapter 2 straddles the literatures on endogenous growth and the real effect of 
an ticipated monetary policy. It is assumed that money is a medium of exchange by 
requiring agent to use it to finance transactions. Extending the analysis, we also study 
the  financing effect of money. It is shown that money affects growth through two 
independent channels: externalities in production and private transaction costs in 
exchangeJVith the results from Barro (1990), it illustrates that demand side stablization 
policies - fiscal and monetary policies - may have permanent growth effects on output 
in addition to their conventional temporary effects. This implies that the dichotomy 
between short run and long run analyse of macroeconomics may not be the right 
approach.
The new growth theory also emphasizes the role of research and development 
investm ent. Innovation is believed to be a key factor in economic growth. Recent major 
contributions to the theory are by Grossman and Helpman (1989) and Romer (1990). They 
focus on purposive activities th a t lead to technological change in the form of an 
expansion in the variety of products. A different approach is taken by Aghion and 
H ew itt (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) who model the research and 
development sector of an economy in a way that captures the Schumpeterian idea of 
creative destruction. The emphasis is on the replacement of old consumer goods by new 
consumer goods, and old methods of production by new methods of production. Both 
types of technical progress depend upon the level of research which, in turn, depends 
upon the monopoly rents available to the successful innovator. 
r  Research and development needs human capital. Models like Grossman and Helpman 
\ (1989) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) with a constant stock of human capital can 
7 sustain continuous growth in the economy through innovations. Chapter 3 questions this 
r e s u lc l t  builds on a product variety model and extends the analysis to integrate with 
human cafri^al. It is found tha t both human capital accumulation and decentralised 
research activities are essential to economic growth and tha t they are complementary 
to each o ther. It  is also shown th a t aneconomy can grow faster with coordination policy 
between decentralised research and development activities and human capital 
accumulation. In addition, it also addresses the growth effects of trade liberalization.
The relationship between growth and trade has been the subject of numerous
11
oinvestigations. The literatu re  distinguishes between three types of potential trade
effec ts  on growth. The first effect is the allocation e ffec t which refers to changes in 
sectoral output induced by changes in the allocation of basic inputs between sectors. 
Trade liberalization encourages each country to re-allocate towards that sector in which 
it enjoys a comparative advantage. The net effect on growth can be positive or negative 
depending on whether resources are diverted out of, or into the research and 
development sector. The second effect is the redundancy effec t and is confined to the 
research and development sector. Research is redundant when the same idea is 
discovered by more than one country. If closer links between economies strengthen the 
incentives to avoid the redundant research effort, then introducing trade restrictions 
will have an adverse effec t on growth.
The third effec t is the integration effec t and focuses on the links between the same 
sector in d ifferent countries. Integration between the research and development sectors 
of economies is a means of increasing the flow of ideas and the extent of knowledge- 
spillovers both of which induce more research activities. However, integration between 
the interm ediate goods sectors of economies may just have a level effect on 
productivity unless either the effect of economic integration on market size or 
specialization of some sectors generates more profit and promotes research activities. 
Chapter 3 explores the m arket size effect of economic integration. It is shown that 
trade in physical goods can induce growth even without information externalities, an 
absence of research redundancy or no change in specialization.
The environment has assumed a status as the economic problem of the 1990’s. In 
relating to my research on growth, to what extent does environmental conservation 
adversely affec t the sustainability of growth in an economy? Chapter 4 investigates 
some aspects of environmental policy and growth. Is economic development sustainable 
with environmental control? These are the foremost questions that must be addressed
O
They include Backus, Kehoe and Kehoe (1990); Feenstra (1990); Grossman and 
Helpman (1989); Krugman (1987); Quah and Rauch (1990); Stokey (1991); Rivera-Batiz 
and Romer (1991) and Young (1990).
The World Bank recently studied on exploring the possible links between economic 
development and the environment. Its results are summarized in its World Development 
Report 1992.
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as governments debate the m erits and flaws of different environmental policies. In 
Chapte r 4 ^ economic growth is determined endogenously. Two very specific channels 
through which the environment can affect growth, technology and resource constraints, 
are considered. In particular, it addresses the issue of the environment as a scarce 
factor of production in the form of a resource constraint and how such a constraint has 
major implications for the analysis of growth. In addition, it invites one to think of 
growth^ and environmental conservation as complements rather than substitutes.
The growth process is similar to the one in Chapter 3. There are several channels 
through which environmental policy (pollution control) might affect economic growth. 
One possibility is tha t it leads to a change in the input mix used in production. Another 
possibility is th a t it alters the fixed cost in an industry as capital is expended for 
pollution abatem ent equipment. A longer-term possibility is that it leads to changes in 
production processes and stim ulates the creation of new and cleaner products. Given our 
definition of growth - expanding product variety - we focus on the change in input mix 
and the creation of new products. As indicated above, new products are the result of 
research and development. Research occurs in both the environmentally friendly and 
environmentally unfriendly sectors. Since research activity is profit-motivated, any 
expected intervention in the use of dirty products will have an impact on the flow of 
f  new products and therefore an impact on growth. In general, taking care of the 
I environment is costly to growth but is welfare improving. The effects on growth depend 
on whether the economy starts  a t the second best equilibrium or the m arket equilibrium. 
Pollution control is not necessarily a depressant on growth from a m arket outcome.
( Also, if the conservation of the environment is crucial for maintaining an economy’s 
production frontier, moving away from the steady s ta te  with dirty products may be both 
welfare improvement and growth improving.
However, given the cost advantage of dirty production and research activities and 
the knowledge spillover in the research sector, the analysis here shows tha t economic 
development with clean technology may not be sustainable. It is difficult to think of any 
automatic mechanism for moving from dirty production to clean production. In 
principle, however a government that commits itself to clean up the environment and 
abandon all dirty inputs, might change the expectations of designers, such th a t research 
activity eventually becomes devoted solely to clean innovations. In the absence of this,
13
m arket type policies may not be sufficient to establish a clean environment with higher 
growth.
It is the institutional structure of an economy which provides the motivations and 
constraints on environmental control. Institutional structure also provides incentives to 
engage in education and training, and research and development. Economies with similar 
endowments, similar technologies and similar knowledge may exhibit dissimilar rates of 
growth because of differences in institutional arrangements which affect growth 
incentives. Chapter 5 of this thesis is devoted to the study of the development of one
type of institution - financial intermediation.
The m otivation of this last chapter is the view that cross-country convergence (or 
divergence) in growth rates has as much as to do with similarities (or differences) in 
national institutions as it has with the distribution of human capital and technology 
across countries. Any single economy may experience changes in its growth rate over 
tim e according to developments in its own institutions, in particular the financial 
system.
Modern accounts of the relationship between growth and financial development 
emphasize the role of financial intermediation in improving the allocation of resources.
In Bencivenga and Smith (1991), financial intermediation allows agents to pool 
idiosyncratic liquidity risk. This has the effect of stimulating capital accumulation and 
growth through an improvement in the allocation of saving between risky (illiquid and 
high expected return) investment projects and safe (liquid and low expected return) 
deposits. In Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), allocations are distorted because of 
im perfect information arising from an unobservable shock. Growth performance is 
improved by the establishment of a financial intermediary which conducts research on 
the shock and sells its information to agents. Saint-Paul (1992) considers the case in 
which improvements in growth require the use of more specialized and riskier 
technologies. Financial development allows this to occur by expanding the opportunities 
for diversification. A basic insight of this literature is that the relationship between 
growth and financial development is two-way causal: growth is both encouraged by, and / 
encourages, financial m arket participation and innovation. /
Chapter 5 presents a study of the role of delegated monitoring of financial 
interm ediation, as developed by Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson
14
(1986). The efficient financial arrangement through financial intermediation minimizes 
the cost due to the incentive problems between potential creditors and potential debtors 
which lowers the cost of capital for research and development investments. 
Diversification within the financial intermediary is the key to understanding why 
delegated monitoring can have a net cost advantage over direct monitoring. The chapter 
contains a description of alternative optimal financial arrangements - direct or 
delegated monitoring, ex ante or ex post monitoring. Each one corresponds to a balanced 
growth equilibrium. It is proved tha t different economies may evolve towards different 
financial systems depending on cross-country differences in the relative cost of these 
system  and the resource endowment. It is also shown tha t the decentralised market may 
choose a financial system which does not generates the fastest growth.
This thesis is organised as follows. The next chapter reexamines the stylised facts 
of business cycles and estim ates the relative importance of the sources of external 
balance fluctuations. Chapter 2 studies the effect of money in an endogenous growth 
model. Chapter 3 discusses how research and development coordinated with human 
capital accumulation a ffec t economic growth. Chapter 4 analyses the impacts of 
environmental policy on growth. The final chapter develops a theory about growth and 
financial development.
15
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CHAPTER 1 SOURCES OF EXTERNAL BALANCE FLUCTUATIONS
A b s t r a c t :
T h is  s t u d y  f o c u s  on t h r e e  q u e s t i o n s :  ( i )  A re  th e  "s t y l i s e d  f a c t s ” a b o u t c y c l i c a l  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  on e x t e r n a l  b a la n c e s  p r o p o s e d  b y  R e a l B u s in e s s  C y c le  (RBC) 
e c o n o m is t s  r o b u s t?  ( i i )  A re  te c h n o lo g y  s h o c k s  th e  m ain  s o u r c e  o f  f l u c t u a t i o n s  o f  
e x t e r n a l  b a la n c e s .  ( H i )  A re  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t f l u c t u a t i o n s  e x p la in e d  b y  a s im p le  
i n t e r t e m p o r a l  e f f e c t ?  F i r s t / we f i n d  t h a t  RBC e v id e n c e  a r e  n o t  i n v a r i a n t  t o  th e  
m e th o d  o f  d e t r e n d i n g .  S e c o n d , jwe f i n d  t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l  p r o p o r t io n  o f  m ovem ent 
o f  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n ts  i s  d u e  t o  dem and s h o c k s . T h ir d  we f i n d  th a t  th e  s i n g l e  
c o m m o d ity  RBC m o d el c a n n o t e x p l a i n  c o u n t e r c y c l i c a l  m ovem ent o f  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n ts .
I. Introduction:
What are the sources of balance payments fluctuations? Similar to the question of the 
sources of business cycle fluctuations, different theories give different answers to the 
question. D ifferent answers have different policy implications. The essence of Keynesian 
theories is th a t in the short run, the output level is determined by demand factors, such as, 
investm ent animal spirits, government cyclical fiscal policy and monetary policy. Increased 
output will induce more consumption, increasing imports which generates the variations in 
the current account. The main sources of external balance fluctuations are these temporary 
demand disturbances. On the other hand, classical and new classical theories assume market 
clearing, changes in output are caused by some permanent disturbances e.g. permanent 
distortionary tax changes, technology shocks and preference shocks. These permanent 
disturbances will increase import consumption and investment which in turn, generate the 
fluctuations in external balances. Identifying the sources of fluctuations are crucial for any 
policy recommendation. This paper tries to introduce a way to estim ate the relative 
importance of the sources of external balance fluctuations.
There are several ways to uncover the properties of aggregate time series, in
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particu lar the relationship between different macroeconomic variables. Regression 
analysis* is the most popular approach. However, in the absence of any knowledge about 
the  structu ral relationship between aggregate variables, it is problematic to draw 
inferences from the reduced form regression results. There are two other approaches in 
analyzing the properties of aggregate tim e series. The first one is mainly used by Real 
Business Cycle (we denoted RBC hereafter) economists. Their main objective is to study 
the regularities of business cycles. The second approach focuses on underlying data 
generation processes without imposing too many structural restrictions, with its main 
concern being the sources of business cycle fluctuations. Our paper follows this approach.
This study is an outgrowth of recent work on the sources of business cycles by
Stockman (1988), Shapiro and Watson (1988) and Blanchard and Quah (1989). Stockman
decomposes the quarterly and annual growth ra te  of industrial production of the
m anufacturing sector in seven European countries and the US, into country specific shocks,
industry specific shocks and idiosyncratic shocks. He found that most macroeconomic
fluctuations can be ascribed substantially both to industry specific shocks and country
specific shocks. He interprets the country-specific disturbances as policy shocks th a t affect
most industries in the economy; however, we have some doubt on this interpretation.
Subject to his univarate tim e series decomposition, he assumes away the intertemporal and
intr a temporal substitution demand by consumers outlined by Long and Plosser (1983).
Shapiro and Watson (1988) and Blanchard and Quah (1989) take a m ulti-variate approach and
apply on US data. By ignoring the industry specific effects, they decompose the variations
of output into demand and supply disturbances. They find th a t demand disturbances make
oa substantial contribution to output fluctuations a t short-and medium-term horizons . This 
paper tries to extend their work to a sample of more countries, to see whether the US 
experience can be applied to other industrial m arket economies. We focus on three
* The more sophisticated regression analysis of tim e series is co-integration analysis 
proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1988).
2 Their results are not very robust with alternative specifications e.g. break and trend 
of unemployment, determ inistic or stochastic trend of labour supply.
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questions: (i) Are the "stylised facts" about cyclical fluctuations of the external balances 
proposed by RBC economists robust? (ii) Are technology shocks (permanent shocks) the 
main source of fluctuations of the external balances? (iii) Are current account fluctuations 
explained by a 'simple intertem poral substitution' effect?
Our approach is quite different from that of RBC economists, they focus on the 
regularity  of business cycles, e.g. Prescott (1990) and Backus and Kehoe's paper (1990b). 
We will review some stylized facts proposed by RBC economists and illustrate some 
potential bias in their interpretation in the following section. In section III, we discuss our 
methodology and re la te  it to recent tim e series analysis on macroeconomic data. In Section 
IV, we sketch a small open economy model and explain Blanchard and Quah's representation 
and estim ation method. We present our findings about the sources of current account 
variations, compare our findings with RBC "stylised" facts in section V, and offer 
concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. Cycle Properties of External Balance Fluctuations:
Almost all aggregate tim e-series are non-stationary. To avoid spurious correlation, it 
is necessary to decompose the macroeconomic time-series into a non-stationary one and 
stationary one before studying their cross relation. Before the 80's, macroeconomists 
assume th a t the non-stationary part is a linear trend. Like other economists, Lucas (1977, 
p.9) defined the business cycle phenomena as the recurrent fluctuations of output about the 
linear trend and co-movements among other aggregate time series. Therefore business 
cycle fluctuations are by definition deviations from a linear trend. However, his definition 
of business cycles does not restric t to a linear trend. It holds no m atter how the "trend" has 
been defined.
It is well known th a t the underlying ra te  of technological change was not constant 
during the post war period. Nelson and Plosser (1982) questioned the conventional linear 
trend representation of the non-stationary part. Since then there have been many studies
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on variable trends both by economists and econometricans . In his 1986 paper, P rescott 
adopted the variable trend idea by using a filter to eliminate the non-stationary part of the 
tim e series. We call it the Hodrick-Prescott filter^, a computational procedure used to fit 
the smoothed curve through a single series. He denoted the smoothed curve as the "trend”. 
The smoothing procedure deals with logarithms of a variable because we are only interested 
in th e  patterns of percentage deviations of the aggregate time series. The "trend" 
component, denoted as xt , for t=l,2,...,T , is the one that minimizes
S* ■ X > r * ,)2 + * E K ^ . i - * , M W i ) ] 2. ( ,L I )
r=l t=2
where A. is arbitrarily chosen. Kydland and Prescott pick A. = 1600, so the procedure can be 
interpreted as a high pass filter, eliminating all frequencies of 32 periods or greater. As 
A. -  *>, the Hodrick and Prescott filter gives a constant linear trend.
There are several studies on business cycles that apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter to 
aggregate tim e-series: Backus and Kehoe (1990a, 1990b) study the historical properties of 
business cycles and the general properties of business cycles of different countries. Another 
two similar studies, one by Blackburn and Ravn (1991b) on the UK business cycles, and the 
other by Kydland and P resco tt (1990) on US business cycles, both use the same filtering 
method. Beside their interesting findings of a counter-cyclical movement of the price level, 
they also look into the properties of external balance fluctuations. All studies found a 
strong counter-cyclical movement of net exports. In Backus and Kehoe's paper (1990a, p.l), 
they state:
We s h o w  f i r s t  th a t  th e  sh a re  o f  o u tp u t  d e v o te d  to  n e t  e x p o r ts  is  n e g a t iv e ly  
c o r r e la te d  w ith  o u tp u t  in e v e r y  c o u n tr y  w e  ex a m in e , an d  in m a n y  c o u n tr ie s  th is  
in v e r s e  c o r r e la t io n  is  q u ite  s tro n g .
Those interested in the topic can find detailed references from Stock and Watson
(1988).
^ This method was introduced in an unpublished paper by Hodrick and Prescott (1980).
The findings are quiet difficult to f it into a simple RBC model, which predicts pro-cyclical 
m ovem ent of current accounts by the consumption smoothing argument. Although they also 
find some inter-country correlation between output, each country still has a substantial 
idiosyncratic component to its own business cycles. With the well-known puzzle of high 
correlation  between the savings and investment ra te  amongst OECD countries"*, RBC 
theorists find it difficult to explain these three stylised facts in a coherent model. In the 
following, we shall re-examine the two stylised facts, found by RBC studies: (i) counter­
cyclical movement of the external balances; (ii) the inter-country correlation of outputs, 
by using a d ifferent detrend method. Since our main concerns are the fluctuations in the 
curren t accounts, we apply the detrending procedure on the current account surplus ratios, 
instead of net exports. We pick the seven OECD countries: Canada, France, Italy, Japan, 
Germany, UK and US as our sample of countries, because they are the largest industrial 
economies in the world. Besides, they also dominate world trade, and the capital of these 
countries can easily access international financial markets. Our sample period is from 1970 
firs t quarter to 1990 first quarter. You can find a more detailed data description in the 
appendix.
In Table 1, we report the correlation between current account ratios and the change 
of industrial production, with different assumptions about the trend. In the "stochastic 
trend" case, we assume tha t industrial output yt  can decompose into a random walk and a 
stationary part:
yt = y u + y *
y u  = P + > V i + “ < (!l2>
y2) = C(L)u,
i 9where ut  is i.i.d., C(L) = S°°i=Q cj L , c q  = 1 and £°°i=o c j <  «. The stochastic trend is just 
y j t and the correlation is between detrend part (y2>t)and the ratio  of the current account 
surplus to y j t . For the "variable trend" case, we filter the real GNP level and industrial 
production index by a HP filter with the same X. The current account ratio, is the ratio of
e
The puzzle of a high correlation between saving rate and investment ra te  was first 
documented by Feldstein and Horioka (1980).
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the real current account to "trend" value of real GNP, calculated from the filtering 
m ethod. The correlation is calculated from the ratios of the current account to trend GNP 
and the detrended value of industrial output. In the column of the "linear trend", we assume 
the real GNP and industrial output as trend-stationary
y t = a + p (T -t) + A (L )e t (II.3)
O
w here et  is i.i.d. and 2 °°j_q a j<  ». Results show: in the case of a "stochastic trend", we 
find th a t the correlations between current account ratios and industrial production are 
ra th e r  low and there are four positive correlation estimates out of our seven countries. In 
the case of a "variable trend" and a "linear trend", the estim ates support the claims by 
RBC economists of countercyclical external balances in all seven countries.
Table 2a-2c contain the inter-country correlation statistics of the fluctuations of 
output - the deviations from trends. It shows high positive correlations amongst output 
fluctuations in the case of a "variable trend" and a "linear trend". However, in table 2b you 
will notice th a t some correlations are very low, and even negative; particularly in the case 
of th e  US and UK.
We find th a t the "stylised facts" are not robust, in particular the countercyclical 
movement of the trade  balance. In Table 4 of Backus and Kehoe's paper (1990b), the 
correlation statis tics of net export ratios and output are different from what we find. In 
the  case of a "stochastic trend", some correlations are positive. However, the results on 
the  cross correlation of output are quite similar and their cross correlations of detrended 
output m atch our results of "variable trend" case quite well. This means that their results 
are quite sensitive to the assumption of the trend.
We have some scepticism  about the filtering procedure, as there are two fundamental 
problems to Hodrick and Prescott's method. Firstly whether it eliminates some important 
information about the fluctuations. Although Kydland and Prescott (1990) point out th a t 
the  decomposition into a smooth curve and fluctuations is just a representation of the data, 
they have not put up convenient arguments in support of their representation and their 
chosen value for A.. Also similar studies following their procedure do not come out with any 
explanations.
Cogley (1990) studies the relative stability of long term  growth for nine OECD 
countries . He found th a t on average, the variations of output due to cycles with 
frequencies more than 10 years is 25%. France has the largest variation of 40%, Denmark 
has the lowest with 16% and the US has 22%. It is clear tha t the spectral density functions 
of output for d ifferent countries are quite different. It will therefore be inappropriate to 
use the  same A. for all countries, and it isimportant to have an idea about the relative 
im portance of the long wave cycle in each variable before filtering the data.
Another problem is related  to the RBC theory. Most of the RBC models are based on 
neo-classical growth models. They all derive the business cycle phenomena as the 
adjustm ent to a steady s ta te  given the structure of the model ; so all variables are in 
term s of deviations from the steady sta te . Most studies calibrate the moment from their 
theoretical models, and compare the theoretical moment with the sample moment from the 
detrended data. RBC theorists claim that their models can mimic business cycles, and is 
m ore or less summarized in P resco tt’s statem ent (1986):
W e h a v e  c o m p u te d  th e  c o m p e t i t i v e  eq u ilib r iu m  s to c h a s t ic  p r o c e s s  f o r  v a r ia n ts  o f  th e  
c o n s ta n t  e l a s t i c i t y , s to c h a s t ic  g r o w th  m o d e l . . . .  The fin d in g  th a t  w hen u n c e r ta in ty  
in  th e  r a t e  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a l  ch a n g e is  in c o r p o r a te d  in to  th e  g ro w th  m o d e l  i t  d isp la y s  
th e  b u s in e ss  c y c l e  p h en o m e n a  w as b o th  d r a m a tic  an d  u n a n tic ip a ted .
Their models assume balanced growth along the steady state. In comparing their calibration 
results with the data, they neglect the growth properties of their models. The ’’trend” does 
not satisfy any balanced growth model prediction. Eventhough we accept the filtering 
procedure, claiming th a t RBC theories can explain the properties of business cycles is very 
misleading. We do not see any justification to explain only the stationary part of time-
The sample countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, 
Sweden, U.K. and U.S..
7
The propagation mechanism of RBC models is related to the production processes 
and consumers' intertem poral allocation of consumption and leisure.
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series data but not the non-stationary part. We understand tha t it may be too demanding 
in the  beginning of a research programme, but RBC theories must tackle this problem in
Q
the fu ture .
Can we find out more about the external fluctuations besides the "stylised” facts from 
RBC studies? Unless we impose some structure to the data generation processes, we cannot 
get m ore from the data. In what follows, we restric t the model with some assumptions 
which are "generally" accepted, in order to allow us to identify the nature of the shocks. 
A fterw ards, we can use the results to discover whether external fluctuations are driven by 
growth effects  (permanent shocks) or short run effects (transitory shocks). It enables us to 
find out whether the countercyclical movement of external balances is due to demand side 
e ffec ts  or supply side effects. By examining the inter-country correlation of the permanent 
and transitory shocks, we shall be able to understand the spillover effects between business 
cycles across countries. As a result, we may decover whether inter country correlations of 
outputs are generated by correlated disturbances or magnified by the propagation 
mechanism.
III. Methodology:
Our methodology is originated from Sims’ vector autoregressive (denoted VAR 
hereafter) reduced form approach. Sims (1980) used this method to analyze the relative 
im portance of monetary policy on interwar and postwar business cycles. Following Sims, 
there  have been many studies using similar methods try to te s t the alternative explanations 
of the money-income relationship e.g. King (1986) and Benanke (1986). There have been a 
lot of discussions about Sims’ VAR methodology, Pagan (1990) provides a comprehensive 
review on Sims' methodology and compares it with Hendry and Learner’s methodology.
® There are two ways to tackle the problem: (i) to study cycle and trend together e.g. 
King and Rebelo (1988) and King and Robson (1989) incorporate stochastic growth into RBC 
models; (ii) by putting balanced growth restrictions on the Hodrick and Prescott filter, and 
comparing the filtered series moment with the simulated data moment from RBC models; 
my colleague and I are working in this direction.
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Those in terested  in the econometrics methodology should read Pagan’s paper directly. Here, 
we just summ arize some of Pagan’s arguments about VAR methodology.
Sims’ methodology has four steps: (i) Transform the data to such a form that a VAR 
can fitted  to it; (ii) Choose as large as possible an order and determine the number of 
variables of the VAR system; (iii) Try to simplify the VAR by reducing the order of the 
system; and (iv) use the orthogonalised innovations representations to address the question. 
Beside the problem of non-stationarity of macro tim e series and the selection problem of 
th e  order and dimensionality of the system, it is rather ad hoc to tre a t the residuals of 
VAR as orthogonalised innovations and interpret as structural innovations.
Subsequent VAR studies, like Blanchard and Watson (1984) and Benanke (1986), try to 
modify the system  to get around the criticism. They assume the dynamic behaviour of Xt , 
a n x 1 vector of macroeconomic variables, observed at time t  is governed by the following 
model:
X, = E  + A u, (IU.1)
i=l
where ut  is so called ’’structural disturbances.’’ ut  is serially uncorrelated and E(ut ut ')= S, 
a diagonal m atrix  and A * I, but with normalized diagonal elements of one. The model 
improves upon the conventional method of orthogonalization ( based on the Choleski 
decomposition) by restricting A with relevant economic theory. Therefore the 
interpretations to the innovations are related to the underlying theory. Moreover, the use 
of orthogonalised innovations for variance decomposition and impulse response functions 
will be subject to what prior restrictions are imposed upon the causal structure on A.
Following the method of imposing restrictions on the VAR system, our approach uses 
the long run m ultiplier effects of the innovations to characterize the system. Our work 
differs from the studies of persistence of macroeconomic tim e series, e.g. Campbell and 
Mankiw (1987) and Cochrane (1988) which focus on the long run response of macroeconomic 
variable such as GNP to a shock. Quah (1988) has shown that ’’persistence ” turns out to be 
logically distinct from whether permanent disturbance are important. Similar views have 
been made by Campbell and Mankiw (1987), Cochrane (1988) and West (1988b). A recent
26
paper by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1989) question the idea of trying to discriminate 
betw een a unit root process and a trend-stationary process in order to measure the 
persistence. Their results suggests tha t the implications of a wide range of dynamic 
macroeconom ic models are indifferent to whether the forcing variables in an agent’s 
inform ation se t are modelled as trend or difference stationary. They think macroeconomists 
should be concerned more about the relative importance of permanent and temporary 
shocks ra th er than the degree of persistence.
f
IV. Model and Estimation:
Although macroeconomists may disagree on the neutrality of monetary or fiscal policy 
in the short run, most of them will agree that monetary and fiscal policy are neutral to 
output in the long run^. By using the long run neutrality property of most linear macro 
models, we assume th a t
In th e  lo n g  run, g iv e n  th e  c o n s ta n t  su p p ly  o f  la b o u r  in p u t, th e  le v e l  o f  o u tp u t is  o n ly  
d e te r m in e d  b y  te c h n o lo g ic a l  sh o c k s  (or b y  d e f in itio n , a p e r m a n e n t e f f e c t) .
We adopted the same restriction, made by Blanchard and Quah (1989), in order to identify 
the demand disturbances and supply disturbances (we interchange the words ’’demand 
disturbances” with ’’transitory disturbances” and ’’supply disturbances” with "permanent 
disturbances” throughout the paper). There are several other studies following the same 
approach, e.g. Shapiro and Watson (1988) and Ghosh (1990). The assumption does not 
exclude any demand side effects or temporary shocks nor impose any specific frequency 
restrictions on the movement in macroeconomic variables in RBC studies. It only eliminates 
the possibility of any perm anent e ffect on the level of output from demand or transitory
Q
Beside the famous Tobin effect, monetary and fiscal policies may affect the long run 
level of output in endogenous growth models e.g. Bean (1989) and Blackburn and Hung 
(1991) and multi-equilibria rational expectations models e.g. Diamond & Fudenberg (1989).
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disturbances. Blanchard and Quah (1989) use an IS-LM model to relate  transitory shocks 
as demand disturbances and permanent shocks as supply disturbances. As they mention, 
interpreting the shocks in small dimensional systems as "structural” disturbances due to 
supply and demand shocks, is always perilous. However for illustrative purposes, as well as 
to focus further estim ation and discussion below, we provide a simple model which gives 
sim ilar implications. We will come back to discuss the interpretation in section VI.
The model is a simple linear model of an open economy with:
y t = (1 -Q)qt + 0wf. (III. 2)
9, = V(PrE,-iP) + s,- (III. 3)
(III.4)
-  W, = -Y (1 -P )E  p '
i=l
The variables yt , qt , wt , pt , st  and mt  denote the log of income, domestic output, foreign 
assets, price level, productivity and money supply respectively. Equation (III.2) states that 
to ta l income is the sum of the income from domestic production and the income from 
foreign assets, where 0 is the steady s ta te  proportion of income from foreign assets 
holding. Equation (III.3) is the Lucas supply curve with an additional term  for productivity: 
increased productivity will raise domestic output. Although st  can also be interpreted as 
external demand or cost disturbances, we restric t the interpretation to supply disturbances 
here. Equation (III.4) is just the aggregate demand for real balances. Finally, the last 
equation (III.5) is the foreign asset accumulation equation derived from the Permanent 
Income H ypothesis^: dissaving anticipates rising income and saving anticipates falling 
income, where p is the discount factor and y is the marginal propensity to consume out of 
perm anent income. It is assumed th a t the steady s ta te  proportion of wealth in foreign
^  One can find a similar expression of equation (III.5) in Campbell (1987).
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assets is constant and labour income is proportional to domestic production.
We need to specify how exogenous variables mt  and st  evolve. Let us assume th a t they 
follow:
m t  =  m t-1  +  e t
■*. = s,-x + e t
(III.6)
where e t t  and e^t  are serially uncorrelated and pairwise orthogonal demand and supply 
disturbances. By solving the model, we can express the change of domestic output and 
foreign asset holding in term s of demand and supply disturbances:
X , = A (0)et + A (  l)e,_, + ... = ' £ A 0 X - r  Var^  = I- (III. 7)
where Xt  is the vector of [Awt+ j, Aqt ]’ and et  is the vector of [e^ e^ lL W e normalise the 
variance to 1, so I is an identity matrix. The coefficients of a jj(j), a ^ j ) ,  a210) and a22(j) 
are the elem ents of 2x2 m atrices A(j), which are the functions of the structural param eters 
0, P and y * *. You can see th a t the sum of the m atrices, A(j)'s lower left hand entry, 
S°°j=oa2 lU^ equals zero. Due to misperceived demand disturbances: the unanticipated 
changes in money supply have short run effects on output, but their effects disappear over 
tim e. In the long run, only the technology shocks m atter here. If we drop rational
11 The function of a ^ j ) ,  a^O*), a2l0) a°d a22^ J^  are
a n (0) = PY
1+(1-0)P
(1 -6 ) P y
1+(1-0)P
anU) = “nO) = 0 fi>r 7 = 1,2,..
1+(1~0)P
P
7=0
7=1
1
1+(1-0)P 
0 y=2,3...
1+(1-0)P
( l -B )P
7=0
7=1l +( l - 6 ) p  
0 7=2,3...
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expectations but include some learning mechanism in a more general setting, Xt  = 2 °°j=o
A(j) e t  will still hold. Since Xt  is stationary, it has a Wold-moving average 
12representation  :
99
X, = v( -  C (l)vt_, + ... = Y, C<f>v'-r Varty) = (IlW
The Wold moving-average representation is unique. It can be obtained by first estimating 
the VAR coefficients, and then invert to get the moving average representation of Xt .
From the se t up , we know vt  = A(0) et  and A(j) = C(j)A(0). Thus knowledge of A(0) 
allows us to recover et  from vt , we can identify A(0) by the conditions: (i) A(0) A(0)f = Q 
and (ii) Given S “j_Q C(j), the 2xlth  element of matrix S “j_q A(j) is zero, where 2 “j_q A(j) 
= E°°j_o C(j) A(0), which is the condition of absence of the long run effect of demand 
disturbances on output.
We estim ated the bivariate autoregressive regression of current accounts to gnp ratio 
Yt and change of production Zt , using the same data set mentioned above.
k k
Y  = 0Cn,+yr oc .T .+r  B.,Z -+K.t 0,1 2Lf i,l t-i L s  K/,l r-i f
i=1 1=1 (IIL9)k k
z, = ao^ +E  «uy«-i+E p«z<-.+vi=l i*l
We use the Akaike Information Criterion (denoted as AIC) to identify the orders of the
^  Recently, Lippi and Reichlin (1990) argued that there are other representation 
besides the Wold representation used in Blanchard and Quah (1989)’s paper. In general 
economic theory does not provide sufficient information to identify the position of the 
roots (inside or outside the unit circle). They show that by choosing alternative 
representations the importance of demand shocks is considerably reduced.
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1 3VAR system  . Table 3 presents the AIC statistics, by minimizing the AIC statistics, we 
pick the order of VAR models of Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Germany, UK and US to be 
9, 10, 8, 5, 2, 2 and 1 respectively.
V. Sources of External Fluctuations:
Table 4a and 4b give our VAR estimation results. In the last row of Table 4b, we report
the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test for output. Only the US output is rejected at
5%. If we drop either the first year's observations or last year's observations from the US
sample, we can not re jec t the presence of unit root. We do not apply the ADF tests on the
current account ratios, but one can notice that the sum of lag coefficients of current
account regressions are close to 0.9 except for France and Italy. Some may suggest the
possibility of presence of unit roots, but we doubt whether it makes sense to perform the
te s t  for current account ratios, given that they are bounded. One may argue tha t the
current account ratios can behave like an integrated process inside the bounds. Eventhough
this is true, the available unit root tests are not based on this complicated processes, so
it would be inappropriate to apply them here.
We also report the normality tests (although it is not quite necessary) and LM tests for
serial disturbances. In the current account ratio equations, both tests do not reject this
possibility a t the 5% significance level. Whereas in the output equations, UK and US results
re jec t both tests  a t the 5% level. By imposing two impulse dummies in the UK output
equation a t the first quarter of 1972 and 1974, the statistics of normality tests and the LM
te s t are .02 and .56 respectively, and do not reject both tests. Similarly for the US, with
o
a tim e dummy at 1975, the tests become insignificant. Given the R statistics, it should 
13 AIC sta tistics are defined as
AIC(k) = N log D(k) + 2n2k,
where k is the order of the VAR system, N is the sample size, n is the dimensionality of 
the system and D(k) is the determ inant of the covariance m atrix of the residuals of the 
VAR model.
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be noted th a t the explanatory power of the regressors for the German and UK output 
equation are very low.
By expressing VAR models in terms of infinite sum of moving averages, we can 
calcu late the sum of moving average coefficients 2°°j=o C(j) for the seven countries. By 
applying the above identification restrictions on estim ated Q and 2°°j_g C(j), we can 
estim ate  the  A(0) m atrices. We report the estim ates and estim ated standard errors in Table 
5. From  the estim ated m atrix A(0), we can calculate the impulse response function of 
output and current account ratios with respect to demand and supply shocks.
The dynamic effects of demand (or transitory) and supply (or permanent) shocks on the 
curren t account ratios of the sample countries are plotted in Figures la - lf . We find that 
both perm anent and transitory shocks have persistence effects on current accounts. 
However, the dynamic structures are quite different in different countries. Firstly, the 
responses of Japan and UK current accounts decline much faster than others. Secondly, the 
magnitude of the initial responses of the shocks on current accounts are different in 
d ifferent countries, ranging in magnitude from .2% to 2%. Thirdly, the timing of the 
maximum im pact of the shocks are also different. Most of them have their maximum 
impacts in the initial period except the responses to transitory shocks of Canada, France 
and Japan and the response to permanent shocks of the US.
The m ost interesting thing we found is that initial responses of current accounts to a 
positive demand shocks, or transitory shocks, of all our sample countries except US, are 
opposite to those of outputs. It means tha t current accounts will be worsened when there 
are positive tem porary shocks affecting their outputs, similar to the variable trend 
correlation in Table 1 (consistence with the RBC stylised facts). However, this is 
contradicted by the consumption smoothing argument of the model given above, where 
ajj(O) > 0 (However it is quite similar to RBC correlation in Table 1). By the Permanent 
Income Hypothesis, consumption is equal to permanent income. When there is a temporary 
increase in current income, one will anticipate a lower average future income, inducing 
agents to save up most of the increase in income; thus current accounts will improve when 
there  are tem porary shocks. One possible explanation for ajj(O) < 0 is the intertemporal 
price effect. Suppose there is a temporary decrease in exportable good prices in this period,
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the price will be likely go up in the next period. The real interest ra te  in terms of 
consumption will decrease, and one will substitute future consumption with current 
consumption. However, the price decrease will increase the real wealth, and future 
consumption will rise. As a whole, current consumption may rise if intertemporal elasticity 
is large enough. Besides, a price decrease will stim ulate demand, raise investment and 
output. As long as the wealth effect is small, the current account will decrease.
We also find a positive effect of permanent shocks on the current account: a ^ O )  > 0 
for all sample countries except US. According to the Permanent Income Hypothesis, a 
perm anent increase in income can stim ulate less saving or more saving depending whether 
the increase is positively serially correlated. For example: the supply shock st  = st _j + ePt - 
<t>ePt _i, then a ^ O )  = yM* ~ p(l-0)/[l+(l-0)|J]}. Without analyzing the process of permanent 
disturbances, it seems nothing wrong with positive and negative estim ates of a ^ O )  from 
our sample.
In Figures 2a-2f, we show the dynamic responses of output. Similar to current 
accounts, both shocks have persistent effects on output. But some of the responses are 
oscillated, whereas some of them are exponentially declining. The maximum impacts of 
demand or transitory shocks on output of all countries was reached within the first 6 
periods (I5 years). However, the relative instantaneous responses to supply and demand 
shocks are quite different: France, Germany, UK and US outputs respond more to supply 
shocks, but Canada, Italy and Japan have similar responses to both shocks. Besides, all 
countries adjusted faster to the steady s ta te  than the US.
Having shown the dynamic effects of each type of shocks, we assess their relative 
contributions to fluctuations of current accounts and outputs. We do this by examining 
variances decompositions of current account ratios and outputs in transitory and permanent 
disturbances a t various horizons. But first we examine the "demand” or the transitory 
components and the "supply" or the permanent components of the current account ratios 
and outputs. With our estim ation result of the joint processes for the current account ratios 
and outputs, and the estim ated A(0) m atrices, we can form transitory components by 
setting the perm anent disturbance to zero and vice versa. Besides, we assume that the 
mean of the transitory component is zero. The time-series for these components are
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constructed and shown in Figures 3a-3f and 4a-4f.
By examining into Figures 3a-3f, one can see that the UK has small variations in her 
perm anent component of current accounts, whereas Canada and France have the biggest 
swings. Of the transitory components, Canada and the US have smaller swings than the 
others. Increasing Canadian, UK and US external deficits in the 80?s is mainly due to 
deteriorating position in transitory components. It seems to me tha t different countries 
have experienced different types of sources of shocks in their current accounts during the 
70*s and 80's. Canada, France, Italy and the US have equally been affected by transitory 
and perm anent disturbances, whereas Japan, Germany and the UK were more affected by 
"demand" shocks. Lastly we also find th a t the decreases in transitory components of the 
Canadian, French, UK and US current accounts in the 80fs are corresponding to the 
increases in current account surpluses in J apanese and German transitory components. This 
supports the intuitive understanding of the close link between the seven industrial 
economies.
We abstract the permanent component of outputs from the "trend" components of 
outputs by the Hodrick and P rescott filter, and plot them with Hodrick and Prescott's 
detrended components, named "RBC detrended components", and our transitory 
components. As a result, the sum of permanent and transitory will equal the RBC detrended 
component. With the diagrams, one can see that in all countries neither the transitory nor 
the perm anent components dominated the output fluctuations over the whole sample 
period. Any simple correlations amongst macro variables may induce biased interpretations. 
For example: consumption c t  = - a ut t  and income yt  = u^t  + but t , 1 > a,b > 0 where u^t
and u ^  are technology and demand disturbances respectively. The correlation of ct  and yt 
is less than one if the variances of u^j. and ut t are equal. One may try  to build a model to 
explain this "stylised" facts. Only French and US permanent components match quite well 
with the "cycles" obtained from the RBC detrended series. We found that Canadian, Italian, 
J apanese, German and the UK "cycles" are mainly due to transitory components during the 
70's and 80's. One can also check with the variance decompositions, which estim ates the 
percentage of variance of output fluctuations due to transitory disturbances. We reported 
them in Table 6a and 6b.
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Tables 5a and 5b have the following interpretation. Define the j quarter-ahead forecast 
error in the current account ratio/output as the difference between the actual value of the 
curren t account/output and its forecast from equation (III.9) in the j quarter earlier. This 
forecast error is due to both unanticipated transitory and permanent shocks in the last j 
quarters. The number in the tables gives the percentage of variance of the j-ahead forecast 
error due to transitory  shocks. The numbers in Italic  are the estimated confidence 
intervals. Table 6a shows th a t "demand" disturbances have relative large contributions to 
current account fluctuations for all economies in the short run and long run, except 
Canada, which has a relatively small short run fluctuations due to "demand" disturbances. 
However, the relative contribution varies with the tim e horizon.
In Table 6b, our estim ate of US output fluctuations due to "demand" shocks is only 5%, 
which contradicts the findings of Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Shapiro and Watson 
(1988)^. The differences may be due to the choices of output. We use an industrial 
production index whereas their studies use GNP series. With a counter-cyclical mark up, 
value added will be lower when economy is hit by a positive demand side shock. Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1989) give a similar story. Since industrial output index is measured with 
value-added approach, using GNP as output is more easy to capture the "demand" side 
e ffec t than the industrial output index. Besides, other countries' relative contribution of 
"demand" disturbances on output fluctuations are much greater, a t a four quarters horizon, 
than the US. Canada has 70%, France has 6%, Italy has 63%, Japan has 61%, Germany has 
19% and the UK has 27%.
In Table 7, we calculate the correlation of different components of current account 
ratios and outputs. In the first row, we have the correlation between the permanent 
components and the change of those in outputs. The UK has the largest estim ates and 
France has the sm allest estim ates. In the second row, we report the correlation between
^  Blanchard and Quah (1989) found that 40% of output fluctuations are due to 
"demand" disturbances in a one-year horizon in the case of no trend in unemployment, and 
no break in constant growth ra te  (p.667 Table 2C). Shapiro and Watson (1988) found that 
28% of output fluctuations are due to "demand" disturbances in a one-year horizon in a 
case of a stochastic trend in hours of work supplied (p. 128 Table 2).
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the transitory  components of the current account ratios and the level of those of outputs 
because the transitory components are stationary. We find large correlations in most of the 
sample countries except France, with only US giving a negative correlation coefficient. 
Comparing this with the "stylised facts" of cyclical regularity in RBC studies in section II, 
the counter-cyclical current account is only apparent in the US, not in other countries if 
we In terpret the transitory components as the cycle component. Furthermore, we examine 
again the  another "stylised" fact of RBC: the counter-cyclical price movement; we find 
th a t the US and France give no support to the stylised fact. Besides, it also do not support 
our m onetary interpretation of the transitory disturbances. In followings, we look into the 
cross-country effects of the sources of business cycles.
Given the results from section III, we can calculate the cross-country correlation of 
the perm anent and transitory disturbances. We can also examine the spillover effects of 
the shocks between countries. F irst from the A(0). m atrices we estimated, we can 
decompose the residuals from the VAR regression into permanent and temporary 
disturbances by vt  = A(0) e t , where vt  is the residual vector of VAR regressions and et  = 
[et t ,ePt ]’,where et t and ePt  are transitory and permanent disturbances respectively.
Tables 8a and 8b report the cross country contemporary correlation between transitory 
and perm anent disturbances for the whole sample. One will notice that there is not much 
cross effects  of transitory and permanent disturbances across countries. The highest 
correlations are the ones between Japan and Italy's permanent shocks and Japan and 
Germany's transitory shocks. Those high correlation coefficients may be due to some 
common factors, it would be wrong to interpret any causal relations from the results. Our 
findings do not support much co-movements between transitory or permanent components 
of outputs across countries. If one interprets transitory shocks as stabilization policy 
shocks, this will not show supporting evidence for international policy coordinations. If one 
in terprets perm anent shocks as technology shocks, not much support will be found on 
technology spillover in our studies.
VI. Conclusions:
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We have reexamined two "stylised" facts proposed by RBC studies: (i) the counter­
cyclical movement of external balances (ii) the cross country correlation of output changes 
in th is section. Firstly, we find th a t the result of counter-cyclical movement of current 
accounts is very sensitive to the filtering method. Secondly, we find that a substantial 
proportion of movement of current accounts is due to demand disturbances (transitory 
disturbances). Thirdly, US counter-cyclical movements of the current accounts are mainly 
due to  "supply" or perm anent shocks, but we cannot find this in other countries. Lastly we 
find th a t the high correlation of output changes are not due to common "supply" or 
technology shocks. There is no evidence to support the conventional spillover effect of 
m onetary and fiscal policies across countries.
Our study is only based on reduced form equations, we may miss out some important 
s truc tu re  which may lead us to misidentify the disturbances as Hansen and Sargent (1990) 
mention. If agents have more information than the econometrician about the structure of 
the disturbances, there will be no way for us to identify the sources of fluctuations unless 
we have the same information set as the agents. It is the common problem of reduced form 
analysis. Unless we are quite satisfied with structural assumptions to identify the model, 
it seems th a t we have to live with these defects.
In our study, we find tha t the correlation between the transitory components of 
current accounts and output changes is negative in all sample countries except the US. The 
model above can not give appropriate explanations to the findings. One of the reasons may 
be due to the wrong interpretation of the transitory shocks as money shocks. In the same 
way, a single commodity RBC model cannot explain this puzzle either. If one views the 
demand side as a tem porary preference shift from one good to others, it will generate some 
intertem poral price effects, which may enable us to explain the findings. The future 
research may have to focus more on the identifications of transitory disturbances. We 
suspects th a t RBC economists may have to incorporate more trade effects in their models 
in order to explain the properties of the external fluctuations.
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DATA DESCRIPTION APPENDIX
All series are from DATASTREAM and are quarterly data except stated.
SA: Seasonally Adjusted.
NSA: Non-seasonally Adjusted.
AN: Annual Rate.
Q : Quarter
Canada: Sample: 1969 Q1 - 1990 Q4.
Current Account Balance: SA, in mil. Canada $.
GDP: SA, in mil Canada $, AN.
GDP Deflator: SA, (1985=100).
Industrial Production: SA, (1985=100).
Current Account Ratio (%): 4*100*Current Account Balance/GDP.
Output Change (%): 100*[log(Industrial Production)-
log(Industrial Production{-1})].
Real GNP: GDP/GDP Deflator/4.
Real Current Account: Current Account Balance/GDP Deflator.
France: Sample: 1973 Q1 - 1990 Q3.
Current Account Balance: NSA, in mil. FrF.
GDP: SA, in bil FrF, AN.
GDP Deflator: SA, (1980=100).
Industrial Production: SA, (1985=100).
Current Account Ratio (%): 4*100*Seasonally Adjusted Current Account
Balance/GDP/1000.
Output Change (%): 1 00*[log(Industrial Production)-
log(Industrial Production{-1})].
Real GDP: GDP/GDP Deflator/4.
Real Current Account: Seasonally Adjusted Current Account Balance/GDP
Deflator/1000.
Notes: we use seasonal dummies for adjusting the current account series.
Italy: Sample: 1969 Q1 - 1990 Q2.
Current Account Balance: NSA, in bin. Lit.
GDP: SA, in bil Lit, AN.
GDP Deflator: SA, (1985=100).
Industrial Production: SA, (1985=100).
Current Account Ratio (%): 4*100*Seasonally Adjusted Current Account Balance/GDP. 
Output Change (%): 1 00*[log(Industrial Production)-
log(Industrial Production{-1})].
Real GDP: GDP/GDP Deflator/4.
Real Current Account: Seasonally Adjusted Current Account Balance/GDP
Deflator.
Notes: we use seasonal dummies for adjusting the current account series.
Japan: Sample: 1970 Q1 - 1990 Q4.
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Average Exchange Rate: Yen/US$.
Current Account Balance: SA, in mil. US$.
GNP: SA, in bil Yen, AN.
GNP Deflator: SA, (1985=100).
Industrial Production: SA, (1985=100).
Current Account Ratio (%): 4*100*Current Account Balance*
Average Exchange Rate/GNP/1000.
Output Change (%): 100*[log(Industrial Production)-
log(Industrial Production{-1})].
Real GNP: GNP/GNP Deflator/4.
Real Current Account: Current Account Balance*Average Exchange Rate/GNP
Deflator/1000.
West Germany: Sample: 1970 Q1 - 1990 Q4.
Current Account Balance: SA, in bil. DM.
GNP: SA, in bil DM, AN.
GNP Deflator: SA, (1985=100).
Industrial Production: SA, (1985=100).
Current Account Ratio (%): 4*100*Current Account Balance/GNP.
Output Change (%): 100*[log(Industrial Production)-
log(Industrial Production{-1})].
Real GNP: GNP/GNP Deflator/4.
Real Current Account: Current Account Balance/GNP Deflator.
United Kingdom: Sample: 1970 Q1 - 1990 Q4 
Current Account Balance: SA, in mil. £.
GDP: SA, in mil. £, AN.
GDP Deflator: SA, (1985=100).
Industrial Production: SA, (1985=100).
Current Account Ratio (%): 4*100*Current Account Balance/GDP.
Output Change (%): 4*100*[log(Industrial Production)-
log(Industrial Production{-1})].
Real GDP: GDP/GDP Deflator/4.
Real Current Account: Current Account Balance/GDP Deflator.
United States: Sample: 1970 Q1 - 1990 Q3.
Current Account Balance: SA, in mil. US$.
GNP: SA, in bil US$, AN.
GNP Deflator: SA, (1985=100).
Industrial Production: SA, (1985=100).
Current Account Ratio (%): 4*100*Current Account/GNP/1000.
Output Change (%): 4*100*[log(Industrial Production)-
log(Industrial Production{-1})].
Real GNP: GNP/GNP Deflator/4.
Real Current Account: 4*Current Account Balance/GNP Deflator.
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Table 1: Correlations between Current Account Ratios and 
Fluctuations of Industrial Production
Country Stochastic Trend Variable Trend Linear Trend
Canada .174 -.340 -.595
France -.010 -.204 -.113
Italy -.003 -.286 -.280
Japan .162 -.275 -.300
Germany .098 -.061 -.036
UK .034 -.293 -.514
US -.185 -.138 -.086
Notes: CN:Canada, FRrFrance, IT:Italy, JP:Japan, BD:Germany, UK:United
Kingdom, US:United States.
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Table 2a: Cross-country Correlations in
Fluctuations of Industrial Production
(Variable Trend)
FR BD UKCN US
CN
FR .47
.76.57
.70.74.60
.83.67.64 .77BD
.33 .53.60 .60UK .23
.26 .26.13 .23.27US .18
Notes: CN:Canada, FR:France, IT:Italy, JP: Japan, BD:Germany, UK:United
Kingdom, US:United States
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Table 2b: Cross-country Correlations in
Fluctuations of Industrial Production
(Stochastic Trend)
USCN FR BD UK
CN
.29FR
.45.33
.49 .47.41
.46.53 .34.24BD
.22 .14.30 .37-.09UK
.08-.06 .09 -.04 -.03-.07US
Notes: CN:Canada, FR:France, IT:Italy, JP:Japan, BD:Germany, UK:United
Kingdom, US:United States.
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Table 2c: Cross-country Correlations in
Fluctuations of Industrial Production
(Linear Trend)
USCN FR BD UK
CN
.48FR
.81.60
.68 .61.36
.76 .75.83.66BD
.37 .44.56 .65UK .49
.35 .46.34 .45 .30US .31
Notes: CN:Canada, FR:France, IT:Italy, JP: Japan, BD:Germany, UK:United
Kingdom, US:United States
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Table 3: Identifications of the Order of Vector
Autoregressive Processes of G7 Current
Account GNP Ratios and Output Changes
Order CN FR IT JP BD UK US
k Akaike Information Criterion AIC(k)
1 - 110.2 223 -1342 -30.5 -1468 -1370 -91.2
2 - 102.6 224 -1352 -25.5 -1469 -1374 -85.0
3 -96.1 229 -1382 -20.7 -1465 -1367 -80.6
4 -98.3 228 -1387 -30.9 -1459 -1367 -75.1
5 -93.0 224 -1390 -36.7 -1455 -1364 -68.6
6 -84.1 219 -1389 -32.1 -1453 -1355 -71.6
7 -92.4 205 -1394 -28.7 -1449 -1350 -76.0
8 -95.0 197 -1397 -29.9 -1444 -1360 -79.2
9 -110.7 194 -1389 -28.8 -1437 -1364 -72.2
10 -104.8 190 -1387 -21.5 -1431 -1362 -64.6
Notes: CNrCanada, FR:France, IT:Italy, JP:Japan, BD:Germany, UK:United
Kingdom, US:United States
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Table 4a: VAR Regressions of G7 Current Account GNP Ratios
CN FR IT JP BD UK US
constant .37 - 1.12 -.10 .17 .14 -.02 -.03
1.77 -2.13 -.65 1.93 1.10 -.17 -.69
Sum of .92 .33 .62 .94 .92 .87 .96
CAR(j) .00 .00 .00 .00 .05 .00 .00
Sum of -.58 3.24 .13 -.10 .01 -.14 -.04
DLQ(j) .07 .23 .33 .02 .77 .17 .05
DW 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.9
RBAR2 .75 .53 .66 .90 .81 .72 .94
k 9 10 8 5 2 2 1
Normality
Test
.99 .89 .90 .09 .22 1.76 .08
LM-Test .10 .17 .43 .26 .80 .53 .22
NOTES: Numbers in italics are the t-sta tistics for the constant and signif. level of F -test
for the te st of the sum of coefficients; LM(9,n) tests for order 9 of serial 
correlations of residuals except FR with order 7, where the n=41 for CN, n=25 
for FR, n=42 for IT, n=49 for JP, n=58 for BD and UK, and n=60 for US; k is the 
order of VAR.
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Table 4b: VAR Regressions of the Changes of G7 Outputs
CN FR IT JP BD UK US
constant .73 .56 1.38 .48 .27 .34 .31
2.87 2.38 3.42 1.93 1.08 1.28 1.34
Sum of .18 .06 .88 .17 .06 .14 -.05
CAR(j) ,21 .49 .03 .13 .05 .02 .73
Sum of .30 -.28 -1.18 .32 .18 -.04 .47
DLQ(j) .00 .37 .14 .00 .42 .96 .00
DW 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.87 2.1 2.1 1.8
RBAR2 .36 .15 .25 .49 .04 .05 .21
k 9 10 8 5 2 2 1
Normality
Test
.57 .30 .98 .75 1.92 17.0 29.7
LM-Test .35 .31 .88 .61 .92 1.62 1.90
ADF(k)
Test
-2.8 -2.1 -2.3 -2.5 -1.9 -2.7 -3.5
NOTES: Numbers in italics  are the t-sta tistics for the constant and signif. level of F -test
for the te st of the sum of coefficients; LM(9,n) tests for order 9 of serial 
correlations of residuals except FR with order 7, where the n=41 for CN, n=25 
for FR, n=42 for IT, n=49 for JP, n=58 for BD and UK, and n=60 for US; ADF is 
an augmented Dickey-Fuller te st where k is the number of lags and the order of 
VAR.
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Table 5: Estim ated A(0) Matrices
CN FR IT JP BD UK US
aj^O) -.23 -2.1 -.76 -.36 -.71 -.95 .30
.03 .20 .06 .03 .07 .08 .03
a l 2(0) .49 .50 .45 .30 .38 .44 -.13
.05 .30 .10 .05 .16 .12 .05
a21 (0) .54 .18 1.7 .94 .56 1.0 .38
.05 .03 .16 .09 .11 .12 .19
a22(0) .37 1.0 1.4 .95 1.5 2.0 1.6
.07 .10 .25 .15 .15 .20 .14
NOTE: Numbers in italics are estim ated standard error.
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\Table 6a: Variance Decomposition of G7 
Current Account GNP Ratios
Percentage of Variance 
Due to Transitory Disturbances
Country CN FR IT JP BD UK US
Horizon
Q uarter
0 18.8 94.8 74.0 58.6 77.7 82.5 84.2
9,35 70,99 46,92 34,82 40,99 58,96 55,99
1 25.0 93.6 74.9 76.3 75.0 86.8 75.7
13,35 68,99 48,92 52,92 38,99 64,97 47,96
2 35.7 84.3 73.3 81.3 75.6 90.1 70.2
20,43 57,96 46,91 58,95 38,99 70,98 41,93
3 44.7 75.8 75.5 83.0 75.6 91.6 66.5
27,65 48,91 49,92 60,96 38,99 72,98 38,91
4 50.2 71.6 76.7 84.3 75.7 92.4 64.1
31,70 44,89 50,93 61,96 38,99 74,98 36,89
10 58.7 59.4 69.3 87.6 75.9 93.8 58.9
39,75 35,80 44,88 66,98 38,99 77,99 31,86
20 67.2 55.9 67.3 87.9 76.0 94.1 56.5
49,79 35,73 47,80 66,98 38,99 77,99 30,85
40 67.3 55.7 67.2 87.9 76.0 94.1 55.6
51,78 35,73 46,80 67,98 38,99 77,99 29,84
80 67.3 55.7 67.2 87.9 76.0 94.1 55.4
51,78 35,73 46,80 67,98 38,99 77,99 29,84
NOTE: Numbers in italics are estim ated confidence intervals.
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Table 6b: Variance Decomposition of 
the Changes in G7 Outputs
Percentage of Variance 
Due to Transitory Disturbances
Country CN FR IT JP BD UK US
Horizon
Q uarter
0 67.1 3.1 60.1 49.4 11.7 21.7 5.1
59,78 2,4 53,71 44,57 6,15 20,22 0,13
1 66.4 4.5 59.1 48.9 18.0 25.5 4.9
64,83 4,5 52,70 43,57 18,18 24,29 0,13
2 71.9 4.9 59.9 47.8 18.2 26.6 4.8
65,84 4,6 53,71 42,56 18,19 24,31 0,13
3 72.6 5.2 62.7 48.4 18.2 26.7 4.8
63,81 4,7 55,75 43,57 18,19 24,31 0,13
4 70.1 5.9 62.8 48.9 18.3 27.0 4.8
63,81 5,8 55,75 42,59 18,19 24,32 0,13
10 69.5 15.5 68.0 60.5 18.5 27.8 4.8
62,80 10,26 58,81 52,72 18,20 25,33 0,13
20 67.5 15.4 66.6 61.4 18.8 28.0 4.9
60,78 9,26 56,81 53,73 18,20 25,34 0,13
40 67.8 15.8 66.6 61.5 18.8 28.0 4.9
61,78 10,27 56,81 53,73 18,21 25,34 0,13
80 67.8 15.8 66.6 61.5 18.8 28.0 5.0
61,78 10,27 56,81 53,73 18,21 25,34 0,13
NOTE: Numbers in italics are estim ated confidence intervals.
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Table 7: Correlation of the D ifferent Components of 
G7 Current Account GNP Ratios and Outputs
CN FR IT JP BD UK US
p(CAp,AQp) .58 .18 .36 .72 .46 .80 -.25
piCA1^ ) -.90 -.17 -.85 -.81 -.95 -.98 .98
piP^Q 1) -.38 .00 -.16 -.28 -.19 -.40 .19
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Table 8a: Cross-country Correlations of 
the Permanent Disturbances
UK USCN FR BD
CN
-.01FR
.04-.15
-.29-.04
.00.12BD
.03 .27-.08 .26UK
.03-.02 -.11 -.11.18 -.17US
Table 8b: Cross-country Correlations of 
the Transitory Disturbances
UK USBDCN FR
CN
- .12FR
.08.03
.08.07-.08
.26.21-.12.03BD
-.08.00 -.03 .06-.18UK
.07.15 .20 .17.16-.22US
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Figure l.a: Dynamic Responses of Current Account Ratio to Shocks
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Figure l.b: Dynamic Responses of Current Account Ratio to Shocks
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Figure lc: Dynamic Responses of Current Account Ratio to Shocks
G E R M A N Y
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
( 0 .6)
(0.8)
90 10070 8050 6020 30 40100
Transitory
Components
Permanent
Components
c-
Per iods  af ter  the Shock
Figure l.d: Dynamic Responses of Current Account Ratio to Shocks
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Figure l.e: Dynamic Responses of Current Account Ratio to Shocks
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Figure If: Dynamic Responses of Current Account Ratio to Shocks
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Figure l.g: Dynamic Responses of Current Account Ratio to Shocks
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Figure 2.a: Dynamic Responses of Output to Shocks
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Figure 2.b: Dynamic Responses of output to Shocks
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Figure 2.c: Dynamic Responses of Output to Shocks
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Figure 2.d: Dynamic Responses of Output to Shocks
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Figure 2.e: Dynamic Responses of Output to Shocks
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Figure 2.f: Dynamic Responses of Output to Shocks
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Figure 2„g: Dynamic Responses of Output to Shocks
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Figure 3.a: Permanent and Transitory Components of Current Account
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Figure 3.b: Permanent and Tranitory Components of Current Account
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Figure 3.c: Permanent and Transitory Components of Current Account
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Figure 3*d: Permanent and Transitory Components of Current Account
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Figure 3*e: Permanent and Transitory Components of Current Account
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Figure 3-f: Permanent and Transitory Components of Current Account
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Figure 3.g: Permanent and Tranistory Components of Current Account
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Figure 4.a: Permanent and Transitory Components of Output
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Figure 4.b: Permanent and Transitory Components of Output
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Figure 4.c: Permanent and Transitory Components of Output
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Figure 4 .d: Permanent and Transitory Components of Output
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Figure 4.e: Permanent and Transitory Components of Output
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Figure 4.f: Permanent and Transitory Components of Output
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Figure 4.g: Permanent and Transitory Components of Output
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CHAPTER 2 MONEY, INFLATION AND GROWTH
A b s t r a c t
M oney i s  i n t r o d u c e d  i n t o  an en d o g e n o u s  g ro w th  m odel  w h ich  ex c h a n g e  r e q u i r e s  
c a s h - i n - a d v a n c e .  We sh o w  t h a t  t h e  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  c o m p e t i t i v e  o u tco m e  i s  an 
i n e f f i c i e n t  b a l a n c e d  g r o w th  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  which  m oney a f f e c t s  g ro w th  th ro u g h  
tw o  i n d e p e n d e n t  c h a n n e l s :  e x t e r n a l i t y  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  p r i v a t e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  
c o s t  i n  e x c h a n g e .  We c o m p u te  t h e  g ro w th  (an d  w e l f a r e )  m a x im iz in g  m o n e ta r y  
p o l i c y  w h ich  t r a d e s  o f f  t h e s e  tw o e f f e c t s .  We a l s o  sh ow  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  
o f  t h e  e x t e r n a l i t y ,  e f f i c i e n c y  i s  r e s t o r a b l e  b y  m eans o f  a w e l l -k n o w n  optimum  
m oney s u p p l y  r u l e .
I. Introduction
The "Neutrality of Money" is always a popular topic in macroeconomics. Of the 
many literatu re  surveys on this topic, those of Gale (1982), Hoover (1988) and Blanchard 
(1990) are amongst the best. Over the years, different economists have addressed the 
question "Does money m atter?" in different ways. In this chapter we are interested in 
whether money m atters for growth.
We consider two ways of introducing money into an economy: The first is through 
lump sum transfers to households. The second is through the financing of a government 
service used in production. Even within the context of rational expectations models. 
Eventhough with this restric ted  context, there are many different mechanisms through 
which monetary policy can affec t output. These occur in Lucas’s (1972) signal extraction 
model, Taylor (1980) and Fischer's (1977) staggered contract model, Mankiw (1985) and 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki’s (1987) menu cost model and Caplin and Leahy's (1991) buffer- 
stock model. All of these models focus on the temporary real effect of money. In 
contrast, we focus on the permanent real effect of anticipated inflation (the money 
growth rate). The most relevant of the established potential real effects of anticipated 
inflation is the effec t on the steady s ta te  capital stock. This effect can be positive 
(Fischer (1979) and Tobin (1965)), zero (Sidrauski's model (1967)) or negative (Stockman
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(1981)) depending on how money is introduced into the economy* and whether there is 
price rigidity in the model. However the literature has not mentioned how money relates 
to growth.
This paper straddles the literatures on endogenous growth, the real effects of 
anticipated inflation and the optimal quantity of money. The simplest device for 
generating endogenous growth is a linear production technology with physical capital as 
the only input Rebelo model (1991). This is a special case of Romer model (1986) model 
where the mechanism for growth is through a private sector externality. Other 
mechanisms considered in the recent endogenous growth literature include human 
capital accumulation (King and Rebelo 1990, Lucas 1988), fertility choices (Barro and 
Becker 1988 and 1989) and research and development (Grossman and Helpman 1989; 
Romer 1990; Aghion and Hewitt 1992). Nowhere in the literature does money appear and 
relatively little  attention is given to policy issues.
We develop a simple model in which money m atters for growth. We model money 
as a medium of exchange by requiring agent to use it to finance transactions. This is the 
simplest of transaction technologies and is represented by a cash-in-advance constraint.
o
The implication is that money (inflation) jand growth are inversely related. This 
accords with the^well-established fact that inflation and growth are negatively 
correlated. Extending the analysis, we modify the model along the line with Barro 
(1990) by introducing a publicly-provided input to production. Since the government 
finances this input through the issue of money and study the financing effect of money, 
the modification this time is that money and growth may be positively related.
According to the original statem ent of the optimum quantity of money (Friedman 
1969),^ the ra te  of inflation should be set equal to the negative of the real ra te  of
1 The effect is positive in portfolio balance models, zero in (separable) money-in-
the utility models and negative in transactions cost models.
//o
It is possible to conjecture other ways in which inflation could affect growth (e.g. 
by reducing the efficiency of the exchange mechanism and by creating uncertainty).
/
 ^ See, for example, Fischer (1991).
/
^ This makes the private cost of holding money (the nominal rate of interest) equal 
to zero which is the social opportunity cost of supplying money.
S l>
interest so th a t the opportunity cost of holding money (the nominal ra te  of interest) is 
equal to the social opportunity cost of supplying it(which is zero). This was later 
challenged on the basis of public finance (optimal taxation) considerations (Phelps 1973) 
and has since been the subject of further re-evaluation (Drazen 1979; Weiss 1980; 
Benhabib and Bull 1983; Kimbrough 1986).^ The externality in our model precludes a 
money supply rule which is capable of delivering the social optimum. The rule which 
maximizes growth (and also welfare) is the one which trades off the negative and 
positive effects of money or growth alluded to above. In the absence of the externality, 
however, efficiency is restorable by means of the traditional optimum quantity of 
money rule.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II sets out the Rebelo model with a cash- 
in-advance constraint. In section III, we show that the market outcome is inefficient and 
growth is inversely related to money growth. In section IV, we introduce the public input 
to production and obtain the solutions for the decentralised and centralised equilibria 
of the model. Section V contains a discussion of the properties of these equilibria. The 
conclusion is in section VI.
II. Rebelofs Model with Money
We consider an artificial economy which is populated by a large number of 
infinitely-lived identical agents. Each agent produces and consumes a single storable 
commodity. The decision problem for the representative producer-consumer is
max (1 + p) *w(cf) s.t. ^.1)
f=o
Mt + Bt M . +x (1+R aB .)
■ ? . ♦ - ££ - 1 + — > y* = A k , (n-2)
t t
c
The public finance argument is th a t inflation should be chosen optimally like any 
other distortionary tax by equating the marginal distortion of the last unit of tax 
revenue across different tax bases.
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where ct  is consumption, yt  is the total output, it  is investment, kt  is the (beginning of 
period t) capital stock, Mt  denotes (end of period t) nominal money balances, Bt  denotes 
(end of period t) nominal private loans, is a (beginning of period t) lump sum 
monetary transfer, Pt  is the price level and Rt is the nominal ra te  of interest.
Equation (II. 1) is the intertemporal utility function which depends on life tim e 
consumption. The param eter p £ 0 is the subjective ra te  of tim e preference. We assume 
th a t the momentary utility  function, u(ct ), possesses the usual curvature properties and 
satisfies the Inada conditions.
Equation (II.2) is the budget constraint which defines the feasible allocations of total 
real resources between consumption and savings. The term  Akt  is the constant-returns- 
to-capital (and constant-returns-to-scale) production function, where A > 0 is a 
technological shift param eter. Equation (II.3) defines investment, or capital 
accumulation, where 6 e  (0,1) is the ra te  of depreciation.
Equation (II.4) specifies the transactions technology which is the key ingredient of 
the model. For the analysis in the text, we assume a cash-in-advance constraint which 
requires th a t purchases of consumption and investment goods be financed by post­
transfer money holdings a t the beginning of the period. The assumption that money must
be used in both consumption and capital transaction is essential for our results. In the 
appendix we generalise the analysis to the case of a more flexible transactions
Y )
technology.
The economy as a whole is subject to^tfiree equilibrium conditions. Equilibrium in 
the (private) loan m arket implies Bt  = 0 for all t. Equilibrium in the money m arket is
given by Mt  = Ht  for all t, where Ht  denotes nominal money supply. Assuming that 
monetary transfer are issued at the ra te  p, it follows that q
/  k * 0
M t = (1 + \  P j l f  (n‘5)
Equilibrium in the goods markets is given by
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cf+ if = Akt (II.6)
for all t, which is merely the aggregate resource constraint.
III. The Balanced Growth Equilibrium
The first-order conditions for the representative agent's optimization problem are
u'(c,) = \ t + (n u )
( l + p r ' ^ + i - s ) ^ ,  + ( l+ p r 'd - f t )* , . ,  = + <t>, (m-2)
( U p r ' t ^ 1 * (1>,<1] = ^  (in.3)
P Pr t+1 r t
a + p r V i + i y ^ ,  x, (in.4)
. + x, M. . + x. .
$ , [ - ^ 7 — 1 -  c, -  g  i  o, <|>, i  o, — •- - c , - i , ± o .  (in-5)
" t  t
where A.t is the multiplier on the budget constraint and <j>f is the multiplier on the
<—  ■ —     1
liquidity constraint. Equation (III. 1) sta tes tha t the marginal utility of consumption is
equal to the marginal cost of consumption (which is the marginal value of an additional
unit of money). Equation (III.2) states th a t the marginal value of an additional unit of
capital (which is the value of output it produces next period plus the value of having 1-6
units leftover afte r next period) is equal to the marginal cost of that additional unit.
Equation (III.3) (equation (III.4)) states th a t the marginal value of an additional unit of
money (loans) a t the beginning of the next period is equal to the marginal cost of that
additional unit. Equation (III.5) gives the complementary slackness conditions for the
liquidity constraint.
To solve for the balanced growth equilibrium of the economy, we proceed as follows. 
From equations (III.3) and (III.4), we obtain <J>t+ j = R ^t+1 which shows tha t the cash-in-
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advance constraint is binding if Rt  > 0. Assuming this to be the case, equations (III. 1)-
(III.3) may be w ritten more compactly as
u'(c) = v , (m .r>
(l + p)-1( l - 8 )v (>1 + ( l+ p r '^ x , . ,  = v , o n .2 ’)
( l + p r S . ,  x ,
P Pt*l r t
011.3')
where = Xt  + (j)^ from equation (III. 1f), we have u'{ct )/u'{ct +i) = vt /vt+ j. For
simplicity, le t u(ct ) = log(ct ) and define (1+y) = c ^ i /c t - as the (gross) growth ra te  of
consumption. Then (1+y) = v t /v t+]. Similarly, define (1+ir) = Pt.+1/P f as the gross rate '** '** -
of inflation. Together with (1+y) = vt /v t+ j and (III.31), we obtain A.t /v t  as the constant
A l = [(l + pXl+yXl+Tt)]-1
v t
which may be substituted with (1+y) = vt /v t+ j into equation (III.2’) to arrive a t
( 1 + y )  =  (1  + p)"1L4[(1 + p )(1+y)(1+ic)]“1 + 1 -  8) J  (ra -6)
To determ ine the ra te  of inflation, observe that equilibrium money balances satisfy the 
quantity theory: Mt /P t = Akt . This follows from equation (II.2) with Bt  = 0 and (Mt _j + 
Tt )/Pt = ct  + it  in equilibrium. Equation (II.6) and the production function, Akt , may be 
used to verify tha t capital, output and consumption all grow at the same steady sta te  
ra te  of 1+y. The economy is always on this balanced growth path and all variables are 
determined once the initial value of capital is known. It follows from equation (II.5) and 
the quantity theory equation th a t (1+rc) = (l+pHl+y)"^. Our basic result - the 
com petitive equilibrium endogenous growth ra te  of the economy - is obtained by 
combining (1+tc) = (l+p)(l+y)~* with equation (III.6):
[ " ( l + Y )  = (1 + p)-1 ( ^ [ ( l  + p H l+ n H -M -S )  )  (m’7>
There are two important properties of this equilibrium. The first is that real growth y 
is inversely related to money growth p, dy/dp < 0. The second is that the equilibrium
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is inefficient, the efficient outcome being given by (1+y ) = (1 + p) [A + 1 - 6] > 1+y.
The inverse relationship between real growth and nominal growth is explained as 
follows. A higher ra te  of monetary expansion leads to a higher rate of inflation which 
induce agents to economize on money balances. Since money is used to purchase both 
consumption and investment goods, there is a fall in investment and a fall in the steady 
sta te  growth rate. In short, inflation acts like a tax on both money^and capital. The 
implied negative correlation between inflation and growth is recognized as one of the 
most stylized facts in the business cycle and growth literature.^
The difference between the competitive and socially-optimal equilibria depends 
solely on the term [(l + p)(l + p.)]~*. The difference is eliminated by setting (1 + p) = l /( l  + p) 
which implies (1+tt) = [A+l-6]”* and Rt = 0. This is our re-statem ent of the traditional 
optimum quantity of money rule: set the rate of monetary growth equal to the negative 
of the ra te  of time preference so that the real rate of interest is equal to zero.
As indicated earlier, the essential, but trivial, requirement for our results is that 
money must be used to finance capital (as well as consumption) expenditure. We have 
modelled this in the simplest possible way by imposing a cash-in-advance constraint. We 
have no reason to believe that more general transactions technologies would not deliver 
similar results and we provide support for this presumption in the Appendix. In the 
following section, we introduce a public input to production and study how "money 
finance" affects the growth.
IV. Money Finance in an Endogenous Growth Model
Following Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990), we introduce government 
expenditure as input to production. Output is yt  = AF(kt-,gt ) = Af(kt /g t )gt ,where A > 0 
is a technological shift param eter. Production depends on privately-owned capital and
o
a complementary public service. These inputs exhibit constant returns jointly and
® This is obtained as the solution to the problem of maximizing (II. 1) subject to 
(II.3) and (II.6).
•n
See, for examples, Prescott (1990) and Fischer (1991).
Q
For a discussion of this, see Barro (1990).
decreasing returns separately. A Cobb-Douglas representation is F(.) = ktagt *"a or f(.)
= (kt /g t f*. For the special case of a linear technology without the public service, a  = 1 
and F(.) = kt or f(.) = kt /g t .The government in this economy finances its expenditure by 
issuing money. Its budget constraint is gt  = (Ht  - Ht _j)/Pt , where Ht denotes nominal 
money supply.
The equilibrium is similar to the one in section III: the loan market, the money 
m arket and the goods m arket are in equilibrium when imply Bt  = 0, Mt  = Ht  and ct  + it  
+ gt  = yt . Together with the private sector’s and government’s budget constraints, these 
define the aggregate consistency conditions. As usual, they are linearly dependent so 
tha t one of them may be ignored.
It is legitim ate to study the economy along the balanced growth path. Since there 
are no transitional dynamics, the economy is always on this path. Thus, all variables 
s ta r t a t some initial value depending on the initial capital stock and grow thereafter at 
a common constant rate. We compute the steady s ta te  growth equilibrium of the 
decentralized economy through the optimization of the representative household. The 
first-order conditions for the stand-in-agent's optimization problems are (III.l), (III.3),
(III.4) and
(i + P) - W ( — ) + i-6]X„1+(i + P)-*(i-s)(t>„x = v<t>, (rvj)
St*i
= 0 , 4>, > 0, * 0 . (iv.2)
“ t t
where A.t  and <|)t are the multipliers. Equations (III.l), (III.3), (III.4), (IV. 1) and (IV.2) can 
be interpreted similarly to equations (III.lM ill.5) respectively. Following the argument 
in section III, if the liquidity constraint is binding, then Rt  > 0. We can rew rite equations 
(III.l), (III.3), (III.4), (IV.l) and (IV.2) as (III.l’), (III.3’) and
d +p)-i ( i - 6 ) v „ 1 + Q + p r ^ / c — - v , <IV-1' )
8<+1
where v t  = + <j>t . From equation (IV.l’), we have u H c^ /u ^c^ j) = vt/v t+l* *r° r
simplicity, le t u(ct ) = log(ct ) and so (1+y) = ct+ j /c t (where y is the growth ra te  defined 
in section III). Then (1+y) = v t /v t+ j. At steady sta te , ct+ j/c t = y t+ i/y tr  ^ t + l^ t = * t+ l^t
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= g t+ i/g t= A fter some substitution, we obtain a similar equation to (III.6):
(1+Y) = ( l + p ) ' 1 ( A / ( - ^ i - ) [ ( l  + p ) ( l + Y ) ( l + n ) ] ‘ 1 + 1 -  8 }  (1V.3)
8t+l
To determ ine the ra te  of inflation, we use the credit m arket equilibrium: Bt = 0, the 
quantity equation Mt /P t = yt  and the assumption that money is issued a t the ra te  of p.. 
We obtain (1+tc) = (l+p.)(l+Y)”*.
To determ ine the steady s ta te  ratio  kt+ j/g t+ j= k/g, use equation yt = Af(k/g)gt  and 
yt  = Mt /P t in conjunction with gt  = p>Mt _ j/P t  (from government budget constraint gt  = 
(Ht  - Ht _ j)/P t and money m arket equilibrium Ht  = Mt ):
A - / “‘ [ lU * ]  (IV.4)
8
Substituting equation (IV.4) and (1+jt) = (1+(i)(I+y) into equation (IV.3) gives us our 
basic result
(1 + Y ) = (1 + p ) - 1 {(1 + P ) -U /[T ‘( J ^ - ) ]  + 1 -6 )  (IV.5)
which is the com petitive equilibrium balanced growth rate . A useful alternative 
representation is
( 4 / ( - ) - l ) / ( - )
(1 + y) = (l + p r 'K l  + p)"1----- -----------—  +1 -  6] (IV.6)
A k
8
In either of the above expressions, the term  in the bracket measures the private 
marginal return to capital.
The social optimum of the model is the equilibrium tha t would be chosen by a 
central planner. The planner maximizes equation (II. 1) subject to yt = Af(kt /g t )gt ,(II.3) 
and the resource constraint, ct  + it  + gt  = yt . It is straightforward to show that the 
solution is
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(1+Y*) = ( l  + p ) - W ( - )  + l - 8] (IV.7)
g
A W - ) - - A - ) ]  = 1 (IV.8)
g g g
Equation (IV.7) defines the socially optimal steady s ta te  growth rate. The term  in [.] is 
the social return  to capital. Equation (IV.8) is the condition for productive efficiency.
V. Effects of Inflation with the Public Externality
com petitive equilibrium is inefficient. The reason is that the private return to capital 
is less than the social return to capital. The public externality provides part, but not the 
whole, of the explanation for this. As we shall see shortly, the inefficiency remains in 
the absence of the externality. Under such circumstances, decentralized choices
The e ffec t of money on growth in the competitive equilibrium is ambiguous. Money 
has both negative and positive effects on growth, from equation (IV.5), we find
which has the following interpretation. The first term  on the right-hand-side is positive 
and reflects  the negative effec t of money on growth. This operates through the
r
transactions cost mechanism and allude to in the previous section. A higher ra te  of 
monetary expansion leads to higher inflation which induces agents to economize on 
A money holdings, lower capital stock and growth. In this way, inflation acts like a tax on 
1 both money and capital. The second term on the right-hand-side is negative and reflects 
the positive effec t of money on growth. This operates through the production 
technology. The engine of growth in the economy is the money-financed public service 
which affects production. Higher monetary growth implies more of this service and
3|C
A straightforw ard comparison of equation (IV.6) and (IV.7) reveals that y > y: the
continue to deliver a non-Pareto optimal equilibrium as the solution to a second-best 
problem.
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higher real growth. It will be useful to express the above condition in an alternative 
form:
= 0 -  A [ A - )  -  - / ( - ) ]  = l. 
d\i < 8 g g >
For the Cobb-Douglas technology, this implies tha t dy/dp > 0, if and only if p < ( l-a ) /a .  
In case of p = ( l- a ) /a ,  dy/dp = 0. The condition is equivalent to g/y < 1-a. As in Barro 
(1990), therefore, the effect of government action on growth depends on the size of the 
government. A positive e ffect is more likely if the government is small than if the 
government is large.
Given the above, it is possible to say something about optimal monetary policy. A 
growth maximizing government will trade off the negative and positive effects of 
money and growth such tha t the right-hand side of either of the above condition holds 
with equality. This implies dy/dp = 0. For the Cobb-Douglas technology, the optimal 
monetary policy is to set p = ( l-a ) /a .  Equivalently, g/y = 1-a which states that the 
government should se t its share of output equal to the share that it would obtain if the 
public service was supplied competitively. Of course, there is no reason for a benevolent 
government to maximize growth. What it should maximize is the welfare of the 
representative household. In this model, however, the two problems are equivalent. To 
see this, w rite equation (IV.6) as 1+y = (l + p)“^[(l+p)~^p"*(gt /k t ) + 1 - 6 ]  and the 
resource constraint as p~*(gt /k t ) = ct /k t + (1-y) - (1- 6).9 Combine these expressions and 
set t =0 to obtain an initial value for consumption,
= [l -  g ( i  + p)~2](1 + v) -  ( l + p n i - a q  + p r ^ q - d )  ,
0 a  (l + p)"2
Substitute this into the intertemporal utility  function, U = 2 “t _Q(l+p)” u[(l+y)t c ], and 
observe th a t U is increasing in y. Hence, anything which maximizes growth also 
maximizes welfare.
It is of in terest to compare the results above with those obtained when money 
affects growth solely through the transactions technology and not also through the
9 Use f'(kt /g t )/f(kt /g t )= a(gt /k t )and gt  = pMt _1/P t = p(yt -gt )= p[Af(kt /g t )] - l]gt .
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production technology. In this case, as in section II, there is no public input to
production which depends linearly on capital alone. ^  As before, we have shown that 
$1+y < 1+y due the presence of liquidity constraint. Thus, the competitive equilibrium 
remains inefficient even in the absence of the public externality. In section III, dy/dp 
< 0 unambiguously which is different from here. This follows immediately from the fact 
tha t money affects growth solely through the exchange mechanism. This result 
illustrates the fact that whether monetary policy can promote growth depends on how 
the government uses its seigniorage. If the government uses it to finance a service 
which is not complementary to production, it may adversely affect the output level and 
may even alter its trend.
VI. Conclusions
There is a strong presumption that macroeconomic policies m atter for economic 
growth. This presumption is supported by an overwhelming body of empirical evidence 
but has received relatively attention at the theoretical level. ^  A particularly notable 
feature of the new growth theory, to date, has been the absence of money and, with it, 
the absence of monetary policy considerations. The purpose of the present paper has 
been tow ill this gap^by constructing a simple model economy in which money and
monetary policy do, indeed, m atter for growth. Q  |
Of the assumptions that kept the analysis tightly-focused, we may single out three '  
for further consideration. The first is the assumption that the only means of government 
finance is money. A potentially rewarding avenue for future research would be to 
explore the implications of other means of finance. Of particular interest would be the 
introduction of government borrowing and the relationship between debt, deficits and , j
development. What m atters for our own results is that at least some government 
revenue is raised through seigniorage. The second important assumption is that we treat 
the money supply as exogenous. Relaxing this assumption would almost certainly change ^  
-------------------------------------------
As in section II, this is the simplest way of generating endogenous growth. Since 
jrnment expenditure are now wasteful, we assume that gt = 0. Agents are assumed ^
eceive money in the form of lump-sum transfer.
^  For a review of the evidence, see Barro (1991) and Fischer (1991). ^  ^
12our results and com plicate the analysis. The third assumption is that agents must 
have cash-in-advance of transacting in both consumption and investment goods, We have 
no reason to believe th a t our results would be significantly altered by adopting a more 
general transactions technology, like the one in the appendix. Provided only th a t capital 
cannot be traded without cost, there is potential for money to affect capital 
accumulation and growth. This transactions cost effect is independent of the public 
externality e ffec t in production. Even in the absence of this externality, there is still 
a mechanism through which money can affect growth.
12 Buiter (1982) has shown that increases in government expenditure through money 
financing will have a tem porary effect on output even in a zero effect model like 
Sidrauski's model.
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Appendix
We present a generalization of the analysis in the tex t to the case of a more flexible 
transactions technology according to which money is a means of freeing a scarce 
resource (time) which must be used in transacting. This version of the model has the 
additional implication of an inverse relationship between money growth and velocity.
The decision problem of the representative agent is
Equation (A.l) defines intertemporal utility which now depends on lifetime consumption 
and leisure lt . We assume that u(ct ,lt ) possesses the usual curvature properties and 
satisfies the Inada conditions. We also demand tha t u(ct ,lt )be such as to generate no
v(lt ). For simplicity, we choose the la tter. Equations (A.2) and (A.3) are the same as 
equation (11.2) and (II.3). Equation (A.4) defines the time constraint which s ta tes that 
to tal tim e (normalised to unity) is allocated between leisure and tim e spent transacting 
(st ). The transaction technology is given in equation (A.5) and states th a t the 
transactions tim e required for each unit of consumption and investment depends on the 
ratio  of money holdings to nominal expenditure. We make the standard assumptions,
% }|c ^
s ’(mt ) ^ 0 for mt  < m and s'(mt ) £ 0 for mt  > m where m < *>, s”(mt ) £ 0, s ’(0) = -<» 
and s'(m ) = 0. In this version of the model, it is essential for our result that tim e must 
be spent on transacting in both consumption and capital goods. The equilibrium
max (l + p)~t u ( c t , l t ) s . t . ( A . 1 )
t-o
( A . 2 )
i-t = *e*i" <1_6> k t ( A . 3 )
a t + l c = 1 ( A . 4 )
s t = s (mt ) ; mt = ( A . 5)
long-run trend in lt . This require either u(ct ,lt:)= [ct *-°/(l-o )] v(lt ) or u fc j.,!^  log(ct ) +
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conditions for the economy as a whole are given by Bt  = 0 and equations (II.5) and (II.6). 
The first-order conditions for the above problem are
u'(c+) + -------- r—— - = (A.6)
t  r *  +  7 c
C c +  J. ^
V* ( l t) s*i | r --------- ------r-i— £
c  C+ + l  +
(A.7)
~ i = JLe (a .8)
pc
(1 + p) (1 +-Rt ) = (A g)
•^ e+i
where i|rt  is the multiplier on the budget constraint. Equation (A.6) defines the marginal 
utility of consumption which is the sum of two components - the direct (positive) effect 
on utility of an additional unit of consumption and the indirect (negative) effect on 
utility of extra expenditure which increases transactions time. Equation (A.7) states 
tha t the marginal benefit of an additional unit of capital (which is the marginal value 
of output it produces next period plus the marginal direct and indirect values of having 
1-6 units leftover a fter next period) is equal to the marginal cost of th a t additional unit 
(which is the marginal utility cost of foregone current consumption plus the marginal 
cost of currently transacting in capital). Equation (A.8) states that the marginal benefit 
of an additional unit of money (which includes the marginal value of a reduction in 
current transactions time) is equal to the marginal cost of that additional unit. Equation 
(A.9) gives the equalisation of the marginal benefit and marginal cost of an additional 
unit of loans.
Using u(ct ) = log (ct ), c t  + it  = Akt  and ct /Akt = (A - y  - 6)/A (where y is the net 
growth rate), equations (A.6)-(A.8) can be rew ritten as
A+ s 1 (mt ) mt (A-y-6) = A z e (A.10)
(1 + p) _1 [Azm - v ' { l t+x) s 1 (A-y-5)] = (1+y) (1 + n ) A z c (A.12)
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(1 + p) " 1 [A U + y-6) zt+1 - (1-6) v7 (it+1) s* (m ^ ) mt+x (A-y - 6) ] = . m(1+Y) [ A z ^ v *  { l t ) s* {mt )
where zt  = i|rt  c t  and 1 + tz = Pt+ j /P t . Along the balanced growth path, lt  = lt+ i = 1 and 
st  = st+ l = s- From equation (A.5), therefore, s(mt+ j)/s(mt )= 1 with mt = Mt _j/(P t Akt ). 
Hence, a t the steady s ta te  where we have (1+it) = (l+p,)(l+Y)”* and zt  = zt+j.
Substituting these results into equations (A.10MA.12) delivers
A + v  (1 ) s ' (m)  m ( A -y-6) = A z (A.1 3)
v ' ( l )  s (m)  m ( A - y - 6 ) [ ( 1 + 6) - (1 + p) -1 (1-6)] = (A 1 4)[(l + y) - (l + p) -1 (A + l-6)] A z
(1 + p) _1 v* (1 ) s ' {m)  ( A -y-6) = [ (1 + p) ~x- (1 + p) ] A z (A.1 5)
Equations (A. 13) and (A. 15) may each be combined with equation (A. 14) to produce two 
loci in (m,y) space:
v * [ l - s ( m ) ]  s ' (m)  m = (1 + P) tl + V* - U-H-6) (A.1 6)
A - y - o
m =  (1 + Y) (1 *P)- (At-1-6)___ 1?)[1 -(l + p) (l + p)] [ ( 1 + Y) (1 + P)-(1-6)] * '
Together, these relationships determ ine the equilibrium growth ra te  (y) and the velocity 
(m) as shown in Figure A l. The Figure is drawn on the assumption th a t s'(m) + m s"(m) 
> 0 which is a sufficient condition for the schedule defined by equation (A. 16) to be 
upward sloping. The schedule defined by equation (A. 17) is unambiguously downward 
sloping. This schedule shifts to the le ft as p. is increased. Hence, an increase in the rate 
of monetary expansion reduce both the growth ra te  and velocity.
jjc ^ 1
The socially optimal growth ra te  is again given by (1+y ) = (l+p)- (A+l-6 ). This is 
obtained as the solution to the problem of maximizing equation (A.l) subject to (A.3)- 
(A.5) and (II.6). A property of the solution is tha t s'(m) = 0: intuitively, a social planner 
will generate tha t level of transactions balances a t which the marginal reduction in 
transactions cost is equal to zero. Inspection of equation (A.16) and (A. 17) reveals that 
the inefficiency of the decentralized equilibrium is removed as before by setting (1 + 
|i) = (1 + p)"*, implying s'(m) = 0, (1 + it) = (A + 1 - 6 )"* and Rt  = 0.
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(A16)
(A17)
7
Figure A.l: Growth and Real Balances
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CHAPTER 3 GROWTH, HUMAN CAPITAL, R&D AND TRADE
A b s t r a c t
T h is  c h a p t e r  d e v e l o p s  an en d o g en o u s g ro w th  m odel in  w hich  g ro w th  i s  d r i v e n  b y  
e x p a n d in g  p r o d u c t  v a r i e t y  an d  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  R&D a c t i v i t i e s .  The m ain r e s u l t  i s  
t h a t  th e  s t o c k  o f  human c a p i t a l  an d  th e  f i x e d  c o s t  o f  R&D d e te r m in e  th e  r a t e  o f  
g r o w th  i n  th e  m edium  r u n . We a l s o  sh ow  t h a t  e v e n  w i th o u t  te c h n o lo g y  s p i l l o v e r s  
a n d  n o  r e s e a r c h  r e d u n d a n c y , t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  can  a f f e c t  th e  lo n g  te rm  g ro w th  
r a t e  in  t h e  m edium  r u n . In  th e  lo n g  r u n, g ro w th  i s  d e te r m in e d  b y  human c a p i t a l  
a c c u m u la tio n  an d  o n ly  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  m a t te r s  f o r  g r o w th .
I. Introduction
Many economists believe tha t increased trade across countries has tended to increase 
the long-run ra te  of economic growth. Some would suggest that prospects for growth would 
be enhanced if trade barriers were eliminated. They would also predict that the free flow 
of goods would move developing countries out of stagnation. The success of many Asian 
countries has often been attributed directly to their increased trade and communication 
with the re s t of the world. Not only have they expanded their overseas markets (through 
vigorous export policies), but they have also taken advantage of knowledge spillovers from 
developed countries.
Historical analysis shows that the creation and transmission of ideas have been 
extrem ely im portant in the development processes of most of industrialized economies. 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) used the ideas of information externalities and human 
capital formation to stim ulate the new theories of endogenous growth. Their arguments are 
very sim ilar to the endogenous growth literature that existed in the 60fs. The essential 
feature of Romer and Lucas' models is the inefficiency of the decentralised competitive 
equilibrium. By showing tha t the m arket economy may induce sub-optimal outcomes, they
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drew attention to the potentially positive role of government intervention.
This paper builds on some recent major contributions to the new theories of 
endogenous growth - in particular, the contributions by Grossman and Helpman (1989,
1991b) and Romer (1990). These authors focus on purposive activities that lead to 
technological change in the form of an expansion in the variety of products. They extend 
their analysis to consider the role of international linkages in determining the ra te  of 
technological progress (hence, the long term  ra te  of growth). A different approach is taken 
by Aghion and Hewitt (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 1991b) who model the 
research and development sector of an economy in a way that captures the Schumpeterian 
idea of creative destruction. The emphasis is on the replacement of old consumer goods by 
new consumer goods, and old methods of production by new methods of production. This 
process of creative destruction depends upon the level of research which, in turn, depends 
upon the monopoly rents available to the successful innovator.
These analyses stress the roles of knowledge spillovers, the adoption of new 
technologies and the replacem ent of old methods of production in generating growth. 
However, Adam Smith's analysis of the pin factory illustrates the potential importance of / 
fixed costs and the extent of the m arket in determining growth of an economy. It is these w, 
two factors th a t we wish to focus on in this paper and which distinguishes our analysis from i u / tJ  
the exiting literature. We showed tha t m arket size and fixed costs are important in 
determining whether an economy can sustain its growth forever. Extending our analysis, 
we study the effects of trade liberalization on growth.
The potential for trade to a ffect growth has often been talked about in the past but it 
is only recently tha t economists have developed growth theory into a discipline that is 
capable of providing the invaluable check against ill-defined concepts and poorly- 
formulated arguments.* Several authors have now constructed models in which trade 
effects on growth are both present and explicit (Backus, Kehoe and Kehoe (1990); Freenstra 
(1990); Grossman and Helpman (1989,1991a&b); Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a,1991b);
Young (1991)). These effects are (i) the contemporary or intertemporal knowledge spillover
* For a review of the new growth theory, see Romer (1989) and Sala-i-Martin (1990).
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effec t and (ii) the resource allocation effect between the R&D sector and manufacturing 
sector. Very little  mentions have been mentioned on the m arket size effect due to trade.
R&D needs human capital. Models like Grossman and Helpman (1989a) and Rivera-Batiz 
and Romer (199la , 199lb) feature a constant stock of human capital but can sustain 
continuous growth in the economy through innovations. Our paper questions this result. With 
decentralised R&D and a minimum human capital requirement for R&D activities^we show 
th a t unless there is human capital accumulation, growth will vanish. In the long run, 
economic growth is generated through human capital accumulation and innovations 
together.
The paper is organised as follows. In section II, we present the model as a closed 
economy. In section III we analyze the effects of trade liberalization on growth. In section 
IV, we study the limit of growth with a constant stock of human capital and solve for the 
steady s ta te  with human capital accumulation in section IV. Concluding remarks are 
contained in section V.
II. The Closed Economy Model
In this section, we specify the model as a closed economy. We believe that it is useful 
to explain some basic ingredients of the model before any discussion about the e ffec t on 
growth from trade liberalization. Although the model is very similar to Judd's model (1985), 
Romer's model (1990) and Grossman and Helpman's model (1989), we modify their models 
by introducing a fixed cost in the R&D sector. This enables us to generate different results 
about the effects of trade liberalization and to study the relationship between growth and 
the size of the m arket. '
1. Production Side
There are three sectors of production in this model: a final goods sector, a producer 
goods sector and a research and development sector. Basic inputs to the production of final 
goods are human capital, interm ediate producer goods and an index of the level of 
technology. Both final goods Y  and producer goods x(i) are non-durable goods, where / is
an index. In order to simplify the notation, we leave out the time subscript. The set of 
possible producer goods is {/|/ e [0, M], where M e 9t+) where dt+ is the non-negative real 
line. One can interpret M as the range of producer goods available for current production. 
We adopt Romer's se t up (1990) where product variety generates an efficiency gain in 
production. We formulate the efficiency gain in terms of the range and level of the inputs. 
In order to simplify the computation of the equilibrium, we assume away labour services 
as inputs. The simplest functional form of final goods production is the Cobb-Douglas 
technology:
employ all available inputs tha t could enter into production to achieve the highest 
efficiency. H y  is the amount of human capital services employed in the final goods sector. 
Since the production of final goods exhibits constant return to scale, we can assume that 
there is a representative firm in the final goods sector. Let all prices be expressed in terms 
of the price of the final good. The representative aggregate firm maximizes its profit by 
taking the prices of producer goods p(i), the wage ra te  w and the number of existing 
producer goods M as given:
o
where x(j) is the quantity of the /"^interm ediate input in final goods production. Firms will
M M
max II =  J  x(i)a Hy~a di -  wHy -  j* p(i)x(i)di (112)
o 0
Given the firm ’s maximization problem, we can solve for the derived demands for human 
capital services H y  and each of the inputs x(i) as
Each firm j  in the interm ediate goods sector requires t] units of the final good to 
produce one unit of the producer good. In addition, the production requires the acquisition 
of a perm it from the owner of the design of the product. Once the right has been granted, 
the firm  can produce whatever amount they desire during the period. Let q(j) denote the 
price of the perm it. We express the profit of the firm 7Uj(j) as
k /D  = P(j)*(j) “ T)x(j) -  q(j) (II. 4)
where x(j) is the derived demand given above. We assume that the intermediate goods firms
set prices to maximize their profits, taking q(j) as given. If M is large enough or the share
of each firm in to tal demand is measure zero, we can neglect any feedback effects from 
P. It follows th a t the Bertrand equilibrium is characterized by the constant mark up pricing 
rule: p(j) = q /a .
Given the symmetry in the model, the price of each input is the same: p(j) = p. With 
the same price p, the demand for each input from the final goods sector will also be the 
same: x(j) = x. As a result, to tal final goods output Y  can be written as M y, where y  = x a 
Hy^~a. Moreover, constant mark up pricing implies that the profit of each firm is equal 
to
n(f) = (1 -a)px -  q(j) = tt(1~ct>y  -  q ( j )  (II.5)
M
Given the free entry assumption in the intermediate goods sector, firms will compete 
for the right to produce. In our model, we exclude any collusion amongst firms in the 
interm ediate goods sector and assume competition patent holders of the designs. As a 
result, the price of the perm it q(j) will be bid up until all the profits of the intermediate 
goods sector firm have been extracted. Since all the firms have the same revenue excluding
variable cost, therefore all q(j) are equal and given by q = (l-a)aY/M.
The mechanism of growth is the accumulation of new designs M. In each period there 
are N  firms engaged in research activities. There is no contemporaneous knowledge 
spillover in the research sector. A research firm will experience innovations with a 
probability of X(.) at the end of the current period. The probability is a function of its 
current efficiency unit of input v in its research activities. Both private knowledge and 
public knowledge can improve the effectiveness of research activities. Following Romer’s 
(1990) arguments, anyone engaged in research can freely access the entire stock of 
knowledge because it is a public and nonrival good. Hence, all researchers can take 
advantage of the entire stock of knowledge at the same time. We assume that the stock 
of knowledge is related to the stock of designs M^. Since human capital is a rival and 
excludable input, it  can not be shared with another R&D firm. Given the externality 
associated with the knowledge spillover, we assume that the /c^R&D firm, which employs 
hft(k) units of human capital, will hav^Mp^hp^(k) ynits of efficiency input. Observe that 
having a product is not the same~as~havTn^lcnowledge^about TheT product because the 
product can be designed, manufactured in foreign countries and imported for production. 
Despite this, M^  will equal M in a closed economy.
There is also free entry into the R&D sector. We assume that every firm will use up
y amount of final goods during their research activity in every period, no m atter how much 
human capital they employ. This can be interpreted as some fixed cost for engaging in R&D 
activities. Once the firm has the new design, they can start to auction the right to produce 
the product in the next period. Thus, the R&D firm will expect to collect the revenue from 
next period onwards. As shown above, the price of the production license of each design 
is the same in equilibrium (i.e. q(k) = q). It follows that the present value of future revenue 
will be 1/(1+r) S°°^=q q/(l+r) . Each R&D firm k takes its future revenue as given, and
maximizes the discounted sum of its expected profit
nd hft(k) are respectively, the value of the firm, the efficiency unit of
inputs and the amount of human employed by the R&D firm. At the margin, each R&D 
firm will equalise its expected marginal profit and marginal to tal cost. Given free entry 
into the R&D sector, together with the assumption of symmetry, the discounted sum of 
expected profit will be zero a t equilibrium.
M \'(v )q  = w
T (II.7)
X(v)q .* = wrt, + v
r *
/ In contrast to Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1989), we do not assume a 
constant marginal product of for a given M in the R&D sectorJ~A~linear production^? 
new designs (or a proportional e ffec t of human capital employed on the arrival ra te  of 
innovations) can not determine the number of R&D firms in equilibrium. In the models of 
Aghion and Hewitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a), R&D activities are treated 
as a F^St^n process. By applying the law of large number, they can eliminate the 
idiosyncratic risk of the individual firm. We believe that it is essential to determine 
whether the number of R&D firms will grow at the same ra te  as the steady s ta te  growth 
ra te . If the number of R&D firms grows with the economy, a growing mature economy will 
have much lower aggregate risk than a stagnant economy. In addition, since the probability 
of having a new design is bounded, the constant returns to scale technology does not seem 
appropriate. The diminishing returns to scale technology emphasizes the problem of the 
centralisation of R&D activities. As human capital or knowledge accumulates, if R&D 
activities remain concentrated amongst a fixed number of firms, the growth ra te  of the 
economy will eventually go to zero. Moreover, by adding the fixed cost, we can separate \ 
the human capital sectoral allocation condition of human capital resources amongst 
different sectors from the zero profit condition of R&D firms. The later condition relates 
to the balanced growth condition and will be returned to shortly. To complete the 
description of the model, it remains to specify preferences and endowments.
2. Household Side
Assume th a t there is a representative individual with a fixed level of human capital
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endowment h K Assume th a t the individual has the intertem poral utility function:
'  '  °  1 f n r  n  f t  ^  (H .8 )f / =  E  (1+P)"'   f°r o e[0,<»).
So l - o
where Ct denotes consumption of the final good. The param eter p  is the subjective ra te  of 
tim e preference and the quantity 1/a  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The 
individual's budget constraint is
w,Hl * ( U r , )A ,  = C, + A,.r  0L9)
where wt, r t  and At are the wage rate , interest ra te  and wealth respectively. Households 
make saving and consumption decisions taking the interest ra te  and wage ra te  as given. 
Along the optimal consumption path, the marginal ra te  of intertemporal substitution is 
equal to the in terest ra te  minus the subjective discount rate, i.e.
HLv0 = *+ P => 0 Q m r . -  o (11.10)
(T ^ r ° = T 7 T "  -  ° * «  ~ -  p
1 + r t+1   |
where gc is the growth ra te  of consumption.
3. Balanced Growth Equilibrium
The equilibrium for this model will be paths for prices and quantities such th a t (i) the 
supply of human capital is equal to the to tal demands from the final goods sector and the 
R&D sector; (ii) the supply of each good is equal to the demand for each good; (iii) to tal 
savings is equal to to ta l investment; and (iv) there is a common growth rate g  for all these 
variables
-  .  .  = M  .  A M  .  M  ( i i .w
s  Sc Y  M  N
Since every firm in the R&D sector is the same, we can denote the efficiency unit of 
R&D inputs as v = M /N H r . From the marginal condition of R&D activities, we can
find out the demand for human capital from the R&D sector. Given equilibrium in the
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human capital m arket (H * = H y  + H r ) ,  and the demand for human capital from the final
goods sector ( H y  = (l-a )Y /w ), we can determine the amount of human capital services in 
the R&D sector. The marginal willingness to pay an additional unit of human capital in an
the marginal willingness to pay will equal the m arket wage rate in equilibrium, therefore 
w = a ( l-a )A rY/r. Given equilibrium in the capital market, where the interest ra te  can be 
expressed as ag + p , the allocation of human capital must satisfy the following condition:
firm to innovate can obtain the patent, so that the optimal strategy of each R&D firm is 
to operate a t different kinds of research. One can interpret N/M  as the ratio of the 
potential flow of new designs to the stock of existing designs. The greater the number of 
firms engaged in R&D activities, the greater the competition for human capital services. 
This bids up the wage ra te  and induces more human capital to the research sector. 
However, with decreasing returns to scale, each individual R&D firm will employ less 
human capital.
Given th a t each firm ’s probability of success is independent of all others, the expected 
flow of new designs AM  is equal to AN. At the steady state, output per unit design y  is 
determined so tha t output grows with M. With A Y /Y  = AM/M, the steady s ta te  growth rate 
g  is equal to AN/M. By substitution into (11.12), we obtain
Combining the zero expected profit condition and marginal conditions in the R&D sector,
With constant marginal cost in the interm ediate goods sector and constant mark up pricing,
R&D firm equals M A'q/r and the price of production permit equals to a(l-a)Y /M . Since
One can observe a trade-off between M /N  and H#. In this product variety model, the first
- H r
(11.13)
a A/(v)
(11.14)
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the ratio  of inputs x(i) to human capital is fixed, so that the growth adjusted wage ra te  is 
independent of the distribution of human capital across sectors (This remains true when one 
modifies the producer goods technology to the same form as the final goods production 
technology. The proof is contained in the appendix). As a result, the fixed cost y  
determ ines the efficiency level of inputs v in equation (11.14). Once v has been determined, 
the ratio  of N/M  can be calculated from (11.13) and = vN/M. The economy wide 
expected growth ra te  is then given by g  = XN/M.
$
Proposition 1: With X ' > 0, X" < 0, X > X 'v , C > 0 and v < v j, where y =
sjc $  )fc sfc sfc
w (a,rj)[X(v )-X'(v )v J/X(v ) and aH X'(vj) = p, 3 a steady s ta te  
growth ra te  g > 0.
(shown in Appendix)
The underlying source of growth in our model is through the increasing number of firms 
engaged in R&D activities. As the economy grows, the concentration of research activities 
amongst a constant number of firms will induce more and more inefficiency in R&D 
production. In order to reduce the inefficiency, it is essential that research activities are 
diversified. As the economy grows and more resources become available to finance new 
research activities, the economy can maintain a constant growth ra te  of designs by 
splitting the human capital between the N  R&D firms. In Romer’s model, there is no 
constraint on growth. In our model, a constraint can be added by imposing a minimum 
requirem ent of human capital in any single research project. As the economy reaches this 
binding constraint, sustained growth will be dictated by the growth of human capital rather 
than the innovation in R&D. We will discuss this further in section IV.
Abstracting from the minimum requirement on human capital in this section, there are 
two types of resource constraints in the economy: the first relates to the allocation of 
human capital between the final goods and R&D sectors; the other concerns the generation 
of sufficient savings to achieve balanced growth equilibrium. Both Romer's model (1990) 
and Grossman and Helpman's model (1989), automatically satisfy the balanced growth
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condition where savings equals investments. But since human capital demand is determined
to amount of resources generated, it is difficult to see why the human capital allocation 
condition and the balanced growth condition should, in fact, be automatically satisfied. 
In the following, we identify what particular features of other models tha t could make
th a t output may be w ritten in the following two ways, depending on whether one adapts an 
expenditure approach or a valued-added approach:
where I y  and Ir  are investmer . . „ 4  ion and R&D activities
respectively. Since the investment on final production is equal to the current production 
of producer goods, I y  = q M x. In addition, since R&D investment is equal to the to tal fixed 
cost plus the hiring cost, Ir  = N y + w r . By combining these results with the household 
budget constraint (11.10), we obtain
With no other asset in the economy, the to ta l wealth of the economy equals the present 
value of claims on the patent right, A = Mq/r. By definition, saving equals the change in 
asset holdings. In the steady state, the ra te  of change of the asset A  will equal g  because 
q and r  are constant, i.e. g = S/A. As a result, balanced growth requires
Using g  = XN/M , and dividing both side by N, we obtain the zero profit condition. Hence, 
the balanced growth condition is related only to the zero profit condition and not the 
marginal condition of R&D production. Only in the case of a linear R&D technology does 
condition for the m arket allocation of human capital coincide with the zero profit 
condition. With this special assumption, the size of the market does not affect growth. We
by the marginal condition of the firm, and the balance of saving and investment is related
the human capital allocation and balanced growth conditions the same. To do this we note
(11.15)
S = N y + wHr + (rA-Mq). (11.16)
g = --------------- ; where A =
Ny + wHr Mq (II17)
r.
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return  to discuss the e ffec t of the size of the m arket in next section. Despite these 
differences, our model can generate some results that are similar to those in Romer’s paper 
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman’s paper (1989):
Corollary 1: (i) Higher //, lower p and lower o implies higher g  and higher (ii) Higher 
y  implies lower g  and, with A" < 0, implies lower H#.
(shown in Appendix)
It is common in the endogenous growth literature, to compare the m arket equilibrium with 
the socially optimal equilibrium. Since we do not propose to do any welfare analysis, we 
just outline the conditions of the balanced growth social optimum in the appendix.
The model gives some interesting policy implications which do not appear in Romer's 
and Grossman and Helpman’s model. Suppose that the government was to subside equally 
all sectors employing human capital. Although this has no initial impact on the human 
capital m arket, it makes existing R&D firms begin to operate a t a positive expected profit 
level. This encourages more firms to enter the R&D sector. Competition between the final 
goods sector and R&D sector, and also between R&D firms, results in a greater number of 
R&D firms with each R&D firm operating on a smaller scale. In equilibrium, the economy 
experiences a higher growth rate. Trade liberalization policy is similar to this subsidy 
policy. In the following section, we will use the model to study the effects on growth when 
an economy opens itself to trade.
III. Trade Liberalization Between Identical Economies
There are different kinds of gains from trade liberalization: (i) Trade can produce a 
s ta tic  gain from production comparative advantage (the conventional type of gain); (ii) 
Trade can increase m arket size and so encourage entrepreneurs to pursue new ideas and 
designs; and (iii) Trade can induce communication between countries which facilitates the 
transmission of technical information which increases efficiency both in the production 
sector and R&D sector; There are two distinct mechanisms by which trade liberalization
can affect the long run growth performance in our model. The first is through the 
integration of producer goods markets. The second is through technology spillovers. The 
effects  of knowledge spillover have already received considerable attention. Those 
interested can find the main results in Rivera-Batiz and Romer's paper (1991a, 1991b) and 
Helpman and Grossman (1991b)'s book. This section focuses on the trade liberalization 
policy result of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a) and Helpman and Grossman (1991b). That 
resu lt is as follows:
In the specific  model outline here (Knowledge-Driven Model, Romer 1990), free  
trade in goods can a ffe c t the level o f output and can therefore a ffec t welfare, but 
it  does not a ffe c t long run growth rates.
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a, QJE pp.544)
I f  there happens to be no research redundancy in the equilibrium without trade, the 
integration o f  product markets will have no e ffe c t on the long-run growth rate in 
either countries.
Helpman and Grossman (1991b, pp.245)
Our objective in this section is to show that even without technology spillover and no 
research redundancy, trade liberalization can affect long term  growth.
Both of the above papers present the argument for no growth effect of trade 
liberalization based on the competition for the underlying resources. In Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer's model, as an economy opens up its market, the profits that the holder of each 
paten t can ex trac t increases because the m arket size for the goods increases. This profit 
opportunity return  tends to encourage more R&D activities. However this effect is exactly 
offset by the increase in the wage rate, due to the upsurge in the marginal productivity of 
human capital in final goods sector resulting from the expanding varieties of interm ediate 
goods from imports. As a result, there is no change in the allocation of human capital 
between different sectors and so no effect on growth.
In Helpman and Grossman's model, as new products are being developed in each of the
trading economies, the extra demand th a t each producer enjoys in a larger world market 
exactly matches the loss of sales tha t each suffers due to the expansion in the number of 
competing varieties. The underlying mechanism is the same as Rivera-Batiz and Romer’s 
model (1991a), since increasing product varieties reduces the marginal willingness to pay 
of the representative household for each unit of product or it decrease the demand for the 
product. However the loss of sales is matched with the increase in demand from the outside 
world. As a result, there is no extra demand for human capital from the R&D sector and
A
so no change in steady s ta te  growth rate . u .
\  ^  V
As we mentioned in last section, the assumption of a linear R&D technology makes the \
marginal condition and the zero profit condition the same. In what follows, we seek to /  ^  JL
fy?9* y
illustrate how trade liberalization can promote growth by separating the two conditions. . ^
Let us suppose tha t there are L identical economies which have the same human capital
1 Gendowment H  and the same number of interm ediate goods M, and the same production 
technologies. Thus each country has the same Cobb-Douglas function and the same X(.) 
function with the same param eters a, rj and y. In addition, they also have same type of 
u tility  function and same preference param eters p  and a.
As noted in section II, all interm ediate product firms will have the same revenue 
excluding variable cost. With complete trade liberalization, no knowledge spillover (v =
Mhft) and no redundant products, the revenue excluding variable cost is equal to (l-a )a  
( Z l- lL Yl }/{ When economies are allowed to trade, every country's the final
goods sector imports interm ediate goods, so tha t the varieties of inputs increases. This 
improves productivity. In equilibrium, output of country 1 {Yjl equals =q " M^ yj. Since 
we assume identical economies, the equilibrium price of the permit q^  equals (l-a)aLy. 
Without any transfer of knowledge between countries, the conditions for the optimal scale 
of R&D activities and free entry can be expressed as
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MX'(v)qL
-------------  = w
r (III.l)
MV)#I w  = — v + v
r M
Since the to tal number of interm ediate inputs is ML, with Cobb-Douglas production 
function, the demand for human capital services from the final goods sector is H y  = (1- 
a)MLy/w. Thus, the m arket equilibrium condition for human capital, the balanced growth 
condition and the capital m arket equilibrium condition can be w ritten as
g  =
M
o g  + P = r
(III. 2)
a A/(v)
A.(v) -  V(v)v ( w \  I
V(v) I ML) ’ 1 ’
The equilibrium condition for human capital market is exactly the same as the one in the 
closed economy. This is exactly what Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a) and Helpman and 
Grossman (1991b): both marginal willingness to pay by the R&D sector and the marginal 
willingness to pay by the final sector increases by the same amount. As a result, there is 
no change in the m arket clearing condition for human capital. Now, we have argued before 
, tha t the growth adjusted wage ra te  is independent of the allocation of human capital 
across sectors. Therefore we have
Proposition 2: Suppose there are L identical economies, no redundant interm ediate
products, all grow at the ra te  gg*. A fter open trade between 
economies, the growth ra te  increases, i.e. Ag*/AL > 0.
Proof:
SfC 3fC
From the second equation of (III.2), v = ifrfy/fw L)J is derived, and w * w/ML & ifr  ^ < 0.
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7 $ $Since the function m  = m (v,o ,p ,H  ) remains the same, and dg /dv < 0. So g  for L > 1 is
sfe sfc
greater than gg for L - l  and A g /A L  > 0. Q.E.D.
The explanation is th a t when economies open themselves to trade, the m arket becomes 
larger so th a t R&D firms begins to operate a t positive profit. This induces more firms to 
engage in R&D activities. As the to tal number of firms in the R&D sector increases, the
sector and increases the number of firms. But as competition between R&D firms 
intensifies, the scale of R&D activities of each firm decreases. However, in this model 
decentralised research is always bette r than concentrated research activities. It results in 
a higher ra te  of success in innovations on average so tha t a hif ;rowth ra te
Corollary 2: Suppose there are L identical economies, no redundant interm ediate products.
The explanation is similar to proposition 2. The reason why economies are trapped in 
stagnation is simple. It is because the fixed cost is too high. The economy can not generate 
enough savings to sustain the increasing number of R&D firms in the steady s ta te . Even 
without any increase in the human capital endowment, economies can pull themselves out 
of stagnation by just opening up markets to each other. As the number of free trade 
partners increases, the size of the potential market is greater so tha t firm ’s expected 
profit increases. As a result, increasing research activities becomes more sustainable.
to ta l demand for human capital increases. More human capital shifts towards to the R&D
is obtained.
£
If initially all of them in a s ta te  of stagnation: g  = 0, as number of free 
trade partners increases, economies can get out of stagnation.
Proof:
j|( jjc
For a economy to have zero growth in our model (g = 0): v = i/r[(y/(w L)]> v j,  where a
7 ^X'(v}) H  = p. As L increases, since ifr  ^< 0. It implies that 3 L j  , V L > L j, i.e. ijr[y/(w Lj)]
£ v j,  which g  (L) > 0. Q.E.D.
It is not difficult to see th a t the results in section II and III are dependent on the 
absence of a minimum requirem ent of human capital in R&D. As the economy grows, 
without any human capital accumulation, the economy will eventually stop growing as long 
as the minimum requirem ent is not zero. This is because R&D firms can no longer reduce 
their scale to balance the diminishing returns to R&D activities (X%) £ 0). In the next 
section, we introduce human capital accumulation. We show how the expanding R&D 
activities is constrained by the ra te  of growth of human capital. Furthermore, we illustrate 
how the growth ra te  of human capital and ra te  of innovation are determined simultaneously 
in the steady s ta te  growth ra te  equilibrium.
IV. The Limit to  Growth
In the last section, the growth is due solely to an increase in the number of available 
interm ediate inputs. However, in previous section v (the efficiency unit of input in the 
R&D sector) is constant along steady s ta te  growth path. This implies th a t the expected rate 
of success of each activity is constant at X(v). With v * MH^/N, as M  grows, the amount 
of human capital employed by each R&D firm Hj^/N  decreases. The critical assumption is 
th a t the model allows Hj^/N  to go to zero.
1. Bottle-N eck Constraint in the R&D Sector
Suppose th a t there is a minimum requirement of human capital h for each R&D 
project. Once h g  decreases to h, there is no longer any variable factor consequently, R&D 
firms can not reduce their demand for human capital to increase efficiency and balance the 
rising cost. When the economy grows, the cost of doing R&D is increasing, but the expected 
profit increases only gradually (due to the productivity increase of interm ediate goods 
caused by the increase of human capital employed by the final goods sector, the
O
interm ediate goods sector, and the probability X). As a result, less R&D firms enter and
o
As one may notice th a t X(v) increase at a decreasing rate . Given that X(v) is 
bounded and X ’ > 0, X -> constant.
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the ra te  of innovation eventually decreases to zero. We can formulate the following 
proposition:
Proposition 3: Given the constraint hp  2  h, if human capital grows at the ra te  gp, \ \ f
growth ra te  of design in the steady s ta te  is gjp = gp. j  j  *
J j M
Proof:
(i)
sfc sfc 1 1 sjc
Suppose there is a steady s ta te  with constant m  , X(v ), H p /H  , H y/H  andg^j but ^
sfc sfc sfc jfc
g p  > g \ f  • Since g p  > g ^ j , it must be true that g p  > g p  (because m is constant), ^ ^
* * ('V .iX
so hp  ^ h is not binding after some time. v is given by y = w (a,rj) [X(v )- y
sfc jfc sjc 1 \
X f(v )v J / X f(v ). But gi\4  is increasing with dm/dH < 0. This is not a steady sta te  « 
equilibrium.
sfc sfc 1 1
(ii) Suppose there is a steady s ta te  with constant m , X(v ), H p/H  , H y/H  , and g ^
but g p  < gfof . This means th a t hp  z h is binding after some time. With binding 
3
constraint we have
ay
M v) [ — —- ]  = + Y
r+ 8 a  (IV. 1)
H 1 -  n K  =  H y  +  H .  =  M y  
r  '  ( l+ o ) w
r  = °(gh+ g'ii) + P
Since M  increases and X(.) is bounded, with X ' > 0 & X" < 0, it must be true tha t X 
-  constant X in the long run. By combining the three equations, AM/M  can be 
expressed as
3
The first equation is the zero-profit condition, the second is the human capital 
m arket equilibrium and the last one is the capital market equilibrium.
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ijc jfc
When M  -  <», unless g jj  = g^f , AM /M  is not a constant. Q.E.D.
2. Human Capital Accumulation
Obviously, if consumers can choose the ra te  of human capital accumulation, then g jj 
also depends on g ^ .  F irst let us model the human capital accumulation. We follow the 
Lucas model (1988) and assume th a t households take the g^  path as given. The 
representative household decision problem is the following:
oo ^  1 ”* O J
max. U=  £  (l + p)'1 —;  for o e[0,»)
C, H, A , H, r=o l - o
s.t. A' = W'H) + rtAt -  Ct = + rtAl -  C,
H, = - 8  H, (IV.3)
H, = H] +
M
M  = 8u
1 2where H  and H  are human capital devoted to working and schooling. With the assumption 
<p > S + p  (which makes it both viable and worthwhile for the economy to have a positive 
ra te  of human capital accumulation even when g^f = 0), we got ogQ + p  =• r, g jj  = [(<j>-6-p) 
+ gM(l-o )] /o  and g Q = &H + &M in steady s ta te .4 Hence, dgH/dgjy = (l-o )/o  > 0 (for o < 
1). This means th a t if the intertem poral elasticity is greater than one (cr < 2), one 
percentage increase in the growth ra te  of innovations g ^  induces less than one percentage 
change in the in terest ra te . Thus, the gain from an increase in human capital level in the
Reminding w is constant.
next period is positive (even taking into account the increase in the discount rate) a t the 
margin. So when g^j increases, g fj  increases.
3. Steady S ta te  Equilibrium
Given proposition 2, gjy  = g jj  and g fj = [(<i>-6-p) + g^j(l-o)]/a . we may compute the 
steady s ta te  growth equilibrium as follows
Sh = <t>~ d " P f°r ® > 1/2
.  _ (IV.4)
8ht 8hr &h
8c ~ &y ~ &a ~ 2-Sh
The necessary and sufficient conditions to have a stable positive ra te  of growth are - 6 -
p  > 0 and ( l-a ) /a  < 1 ** a > .5. If these conditions are not satisfied, the only possible
e:
solution is zero growth.
The steady s ta te  equilibrium above is a competitive equilibrium. Both households and 
firms take g ^  and g fj  as given respectively. They do not internalize the effects of the 
accumulation of human capital and innovations on each other. The model looks as if it has 
increasing returns to human capital but the driving force is actually the coordination 
problem between households and R&D firms. In a coordinated equilibrium, households would 
incorporate the effec t on innovation (releasing the constraint on the R&D sector through 
their human capital accumulation). In this case, the household maximization problem would 
be similar except tha t it would take g^j = g ^  instead of taking g ^  as given. The solution 
would be g fj  = [2(<p-6)-pJ/a which is greater than that of the competitive equilibrium when 
a €  12/3,1J. However the growth ra te  is lower in the case of a < 2/3 or a > 1. Consumer 
welfare would always be higher in the coordinated equilibrium. Given these results, it is 
possible to obtain different implications about the effects of economic integration and 
trade on growth.
c 2
The ra te  of growth cannot explode to infinity because H  is bounded to be less H. 
The proof is in a subsequent paper by Hung, Pozzolo & Blackburn (1992).
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V. Economic Integration, Trade and Growth
Our model has different implications concerning trade, research and growth from the 
models of Grossman and Helpman (1991b) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a&b). In the 
absence of the constraint on human capital in R&D sector, the model demonstrates other 
mechanisms for growth. In addition to the knowledge spillover effect, redundancy effect, 
allocation e ffec t and economic integration effect (all mentioned in Grossman and Helpman 
(1991b) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991 a&b)), we emphasize the market size effect. The 
crucial fac tor is the fixed cost. Although the literature does refer to fixed costs, what is 
actually modelled are variable costs in the R&D sector. In the model presented here, we 
found that, when introducing the real fixed cost, the m arket size can influence the growth 
of the economy.
If we allow a bottle-neck in R&D activities, the growth ra te  is determined by the 
growth of human capital. Through this constraint, we are able to link up human capital 
accumulation and technological progress. Any knowledge spillovers, redundancy in R&D 
activities and reallocation of human capital across sectors can have only a temporary 
e ffec t on growth. For identical economies, economic integration and trade liberalization 
through increasing the size of H  and M  have no permanent effect on growth.
In the case of non-identical economies with different ra te  of human capital 
accumulation, the e ffec t of economic integration and free trade on growth is not zero. 
Assume th a t there are two countries A and B where A has a higher ra te  of growth of 
human capital. In order to avoid corner solutions, suppose that there is no capital flows 
across countries. Country A, with the higher ra te  of growth of human capital will also have 
the higher growth ra te  of interm ediate products. Once trade is open, country B, with the 
lower ra te  of human capital accumulation, will find that its final goods sector will be 
dominated by the imported inputs from country A. Therefore, h f i  will grow a t the rate
® Given a t the steady sta te , X -* X, any exogenous increase in M will not m atter. 
Similarly the growth of R&D sector ultimately depends on the growth ra te  of human not 
the relative size of allocation across sector.
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and output will grow at the ra te  g ^ f j  + g ^ f j  which is higher than 2 gP fj without 
trade liberalization. Economic integration means merging the human capital resources 
together, so th a t human capital grows a t the weighted average of g ^ f j  and g ^ f f  (the weight 
depends on the population size). As a result, the faster growing economy will suffer while 
the slower growing economy will gain. A detailed study can be found in Hung, Pozzolo and 
Blackburn (1992).
The results of the paper are very model-specific. By introducing some fixed cost and 
the constraint on human capital accumulation, some of the results of Grossman and 
Helpman (1991b) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a&b) have been challenged, In addition, 
the model implies th a t policy on education and industrial policy on R&D should be 
considered together. Future research should be directed towards specifying on more general 
type of human capital accumulation. This will no doubt yielded more insights into the 
effects of government policies directed towards growth, trade and education.
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Appendix
A. Constant Growth Adjusted Wage Rate:
In the tex t paper, we use constant marginal cost in the interm ediate goods sector in 
order to  simplify the model. Suppose now we let the interm ediate goods have the same 
production technology as the final goods sector:
M
z(j) = f  x ( i j f  h fyy-'d i, je [0M \ (AJ>
0
where z(j), x(i,j) and hj(j) are the to tal production of interm ediate goods /, the demand for
f~hinputs /  and human capital input from j  producer goods industry respectively. A fter some 
tedious algebra, we can find th a t the marginal cost c(j) equals
M  a_
c(f) = Kw1_a[ / p (0 1_a where k = ------- -^------
o a “( l - a ) 1_a (A.2)
= je lO M
where P  is the same as in (II.3) With constant return to scale production, the average 
variable cost will equal the marginal cost. The profit of the producer goods firm itj(j) can 
be w ritten as
« //)  = p (j)z(j)  -  -  q(J)
m (A, 3)
where z(j) = x(j) + j* x(j,i) di
o
z(j) is just the to tal demand for inputs j  which is equal to the sum of the demand from final 
goods sector x(j) and demands from all available producer/goods industries /  x(j,i) dj. The 
to tal demand for inputs, from final goods sector and interm ediate goods sectors can be 
w ritten as
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M
z(j) = x(J) + |  *(/,*) di 
o
 i_
= x (j) + -----aK(—)1_aJ *(0 di
P P 0
By substituting x//) with
64.4;
_i_
l-a 64.5;
we can get
l
x(J) = [ a .Y  * aK (^ )1-  X ] &>--  ■* , wAere X = f  x(i) di <A'6)
so th a t can be expressed as a function of aY, w, P, X  andp(j). If M is large enough or 
the share of each industry in the to tal demand X  is measure zero, we can assume away the 
feedback effects from P  and X. With price competition amongst firms, and with take w, 
Y, P  and X  taken as given, we can obtain the constant standard mark up pricing
P(f) = (A' 7)
a P a
With symm etric arguments, all price and demands from the final goods sector are equal: 
p(i) = p> x(i) -  x  V i. As a result, w/Mp = (a /K )^^~ aK Since the price ratio is constant, 
there is a constant inputs ratio  between x(i) and H y  a t equilibrium. As a result, the growth 
adjusted wage ra te  w/M, which is related to the inputs ratio, will be independent of the 
allocation of human capital a t steady state .
B. Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1
Let m = M/Ny multiply both side of (11.13) by m  and express m  in terms of v:
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 v A/(v) a  + a A.(v)tn = ------------------------ (A.8)
a Xf(y)H l -  p
as long as when v -» 0, a X 'H^ > p  with X" < 0, 3  v j  i.e. a X '(vj)  H* = p. With X" < 0, V v  
< v j  =* m  > 0 & m '(v) > 0. Since v X f -* 0, y  -  w*(a,r\) [X(v*)-X'(v*)v*]/ X '(v *), v* >
0. With v* < Vj, so g* = X(v*)/m(v*) > 0.
With m = m (v ,o ,p ,H l ), v = v ( y ) ,  
> 0 ; ma > 0 ; mp > 0 ; mH < 0 .
(A.9)
Since g  = X(v)/m(v), g  a < 0, g  p < 0 and g  j j > 0. And Hr  = v/m, so
dHR SHI
— -  <  0; — -  <  0; 
da dp
I *
dH1
> 0. (A. 10)
With
dg  = 
dv
a (aX  H -  p) +
[ a ( ^ )  + a ]2
< . 0 . (A. 11)
4c 4c
and v > 0, it implies g  < 0. Given X" < 0, such that m v" > 0 and
with m(Q) = 0, m j v ( m 3mN ^ n dHR— - = — (---------- ) < 0, so   < 0.
dv m2 v dv dy
(A. 12)
C. Conditions of the  Balanced Growth Social Optimum
To derive the necessary conditions for the social optimization problem, we modify the 
model such tha t the current production of intermediate goods are used for next period 
production. Let &t+l = f o ^  0x (j) dj, so K ^ jc a n  be interpreted as the amount of foregone 
output for capital instalm ent in next period. If the social planner only concentrates R&D 
activities in a fixed number of plants, the steady sta te  growth ra te  will eventually be zero.
128
We specify here a decentralised social planning problem for which the number of plants 
engaging in R&D activities is a choice variable with a stock capital H. It can be written 
as:
oo j
max 52 (1+P)’' ------
co l - o
sx  -  C, -  N,y (A l3)
M H r
-  NM - ~ )
H  ^  H y j  +  Hgj  .
Therefore the Lagrangian of the social optimization can be expressed as:
oo ^  1 - <7 ^  J
max a  = X  (U p)" + |iu [ -  C, -<=o l-o •M,’!
1 * p2, t  -  J#M l>
the choice variables are Np /Ct+ p  H a  p Ct  and Mt+j.  The first order conditions are:
c ; °  -  i*u  -  < ^ r ) °  = ( i ^ t)° =
-  (1+P)
*"f+l I1]r 1 »*l,f+l
*(V,) -  v . ^ v ;  =
V P ^
P u
At steady s ta te , g t  = g  , with following conditions,
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M».l _ >.(v) <A -I6>
T\-‘ (H -H lt)i -'‘ka = c + y/«  + kg ■
the steady s ta te  values of k  » K/M, m  ■ A//N, v ■ (M H #)/N  and c » C/A/ can be solved.
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CHAPTER 4 ENDOGENOUS GROWTH and ENVIRONMENT
A b s t r a c t
I n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  we ex a m in e  how e n v ir o n m e n ta l  c o n s e r v a t io n  a f f e c t s  p r o d u c t io n  
c o s t s  a d v e r s e l y  a n d  a n a ly z e  t h i s  im p a c t  on g r o w th . G row th i s  d r i v e n  b y  e x p a n d in g  
p r o d u c t  v a r i e t y .  We f i n d  t h a t  econom y may b e  s t u c k  w i th  d i r t y  te c h n o lo g y  i f  th e y  
d o  n o t  c a r e  a b o u t  th e  e n v ir o n m e n t in  th e  b e g in n in g .  In  m o s t c a s e s , p o l l u t i o n  
c o n t r o l  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a d e p r e s s a n t  on g ro w th  fro m  a m a rk e t o u tc o m e . E ven i f  
t h e  eco n o m y s t a r t s  o f f  p u r s u in g  o p t im a l  g ro w th  w i th o u t  c o n s id e r in g  e n v ir o n m e n ta l  
dam age, i t  m ay s t i l l  p o s s i b l e  i n c r e a s e  i t s  g ro w th  r a t e  b y  ta k in g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  o f  
th e  e n v ir o n m e n t.
I. Introduction
To what ex ten t does environmental conservation adversely affect the sustainability of 
growth in an economy? Is economic development sustainable with environmental control?* 
These are the foremost questions th a t must be addressed as governments debate the merits 
and flaws of different environmental policies. Although recent developments in growth 
theory improved our understanding and forecasting of the growth rates of different 
economies, we have yet to fully incorporate environmental concerns into our models. 
Consumers are making decisions about the trade-offs between consumption and 
environmental conservation. That the degradation of the environment does, indeed, lead to 
consumer dissatisfaction must be taken into consideration as we discuss growth and 
welfare. Does environmental protection necessarily foreshadow dire consequences for the 
sustainability of growth? If it does, are there policies which the government can 
implement not only to ensure environmental conservation but also to maintain a steady
* World Bank recently has a study on exploring the possible links between economic 
development and the environment. Their results are summarized in its World Development 
Report 1992.
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growth of output per capita?
A recent study by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) focused on the relationship between 
pollution abatem ent costs and economic growth. It was found that, over the period 1974- 
1985, environmental controls has a definite adverse effect in the U.S.. The estimated costs 
of environmental regulation were a .19% decline in the annual growth ra te  of U.S. and a 
2.59% decline in the level of gross national product. A drawback of this study is that it was 
based on a Solow-type growth model in which growth occurs exogenously. In the present 
chapter, we model growth endogenously and look at two very specific channels, technology 
and resources constraints, through which the environment can affect growth. In particular, 
we address the issue of the environment as a scarce factor of production in the form of a 
resource constraint. The existence of such a constraint has major implications for the 
analysis of growth. To be sure, it invites one to think, growth and environmental 
conservation as complements rather than substitutes. Environmental degradation may 
ultim ately limit the growth of an economy as the stock of this factor of production is 
depleted. We study the potential growth effects of environmental conservation using an 
endogenous growth model of the type found in Romer (1990), Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991) and Hung (1993). We isolate one particular aspect of environmental damage, namely 
th a t of pollution. We assume tha t there are two different sets of interm ediate inputs used 
in final production: a se t of environmentally friendly (or clean) inputs and environmentally 
unfriendly (or dirty) inputs. Each input within each set is manufactured using a design (or 
blueprint) created from using research and development. Environmentally unfriendly inputs 
lead to higher levels of pollution and a degradation of the environment. If pollution is 
damaging to consumers, there is a negative externality which may impose a net cost on the 
economy. The m arket solution is inefficient because of a failure to price pollution and so 
a failure to take account of the externality. Environmental policy has the potential to 
improve the m arket outcomes by altering the relative production costs of clean and dirty 
inputs. In doing so, it has the potential to affect growth as well.
We model the growth process as an expansion in the number of differentiated 
interm ediate inputs which raises the productivity of other inputs in final production. There 
are several channels through which environmental policy (pollution control) might affect
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this process. One possibility is that it leads to a change in the input mix used in production. 
For example, a firm  may choose to use natural gas as opposed to coal. Another possibility 
is th a t it a lters the  fixed cost in an industry as capital is expended for pollution abatem ent 
equipment. The installation of scrubbers in smoke stacks is a good example of this. And a 
longer-term  possibility is tha t it leads to changes in production processes and stimulates 
the creation of new and cleaner products. The growth of the recycled paper immediately 
comes to mind here. Given our definition of growth - expanding product variety - we focus 
on the change in input mix and the creation of new products. As indicated above, new 
products are the result of research and development. Research occurs in both the 
environmentally friendly and environmentally unfriendly sectors. Since research activity 
is profit-m otivated, arty expected intervention in the use of dirty products will have an 
impact on the flow of new products and therefore, an impact on growth.
If pollution is a negative externality in the economy, then achieving a social optimum 
would require government intervention. Research on environmental economics has yielded 
a body of literatu re  concerned with the types of economic instruments used for 
environmental protection. These instruments differ across countries, pollutants, media and 
industries. The most frequently documented instruments include charges, subsidies, tax 
credits, penalties, quotas and permits. In our model, the government can affect growth 
through four channels. First, by taxing the royalties to innovation, it can alter the 
profitability of innovating. Second, by placing stringent emission standards on firms, it can 
force producers to install pollution abatem ent equipment which would increase their fixed 
or marginal costs and lowers the willingness to pay for the right to produce for the new 
product. Third, by expanding or limiting the m arket for new products, it can a lter the 
profitability of research and development and thereby control the number of firms wishing 
to engage in research and development. Fourth, by encouraging the transfers of ideas, it 
can increase the to tal knowledge base which in turn would increase the probability
of successful innovation.
Our analysis here shows that the balanced growth equilibrium is an unstable one. The 
only stable equilibria are those of unbalanced growth where either the clean or dirty sector, 
but not both, are growing. We compare the steady s ta te  growth rates in five different
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equilibria: the m arket equilibrium with clean sector growth; the market equilibrium with 
dirty sector growth; the social optimum with no concern for the environment; the social 
optimum with disutility resulting from pollution and with positive growth in the dirty sector 
and the social optimum with disutility resulting from pollution and with positive growth in 
the clean sector. The differences in growth rates between these five cases are the result 
of the degree to which environmental degradation is a negative externality, the imperfect 
competition in the interm ediate clean and dirty sectors, and the differential costs 
associated with clean and dirty technology.
If consumers and the government do care about environmental conservation, then 
starting from a dirty growth equilibrium, one would expect tha t there is a social optimum, 
which optimally trades off between growth against current consumption. At the same time, 
it is also possible to imagine the economy moving off of this steady s ta te  path and into a 
b e tte r social optimum with positive growth only in the clean sector.
This chapter covers our preliminary findings on how consideration of pollution costs 
can affect our standard predictions about growth. The remainder of the chapter is 
organised as follows. Section II contains a description of our artificial economy. In Section 
III we compute the balanced and unbalanced growth equilibria of this economy. Section IV 
is concerned with the potential growth effects of environmental policy, in particular when 
environmental externality affects resource constraint. A few concluding remarks are 
contained in Section V.
n. The Model
The physical set-up of our representative economy builds on the models of Romer 
(1990), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Hung (1993). There are three sectors of 
production: a final goods sector in which a single consumption good is manufactured; a 
producer goods sector in which a range of interm ediate inputs is produced; and a research 
and development sector in which designs for new intermediate goods are created. A 
producer good can be either of two types -an environmentally friendly (clean) type and an 
environmentally unfriendly (dirty) type. In this section, we abstract from the environmental
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9im pacts on the resource constraint. A constant population of infinitely-lived agents make 
up a dynastic household sector. All markets are characterized by price-taking except the 
m arket for each producer good which is characterized by monopolistic competition. The 
numeraire of the economy is the final consumption good.
I. Producers
A. The Final Goods Sectors
Final output Y , is produced using human capital, Hq, the set of environmentally 
friendly interm ediate inputs Xq  = {xQ(i)\i e [0, Mq], Mq  <=■ and the set of 
environmentally unfriendly interm ediate inputs X q = {x^(i)\i e [0, Mq ], Mq  c  M+}, 
according to the function f: Bt+ x  S f ^ ^ +x  ^ ^ +.^We choose the continuous index i on the 
non-negative real line so as to avoid complications associated with integer constraints. The 
quantity xs(i) (s=C,D) is understood to be the amount of s-type producer good i employed 
in final production. Both types of interm ediate input are non-durable goods. The number 
Mq  + Mq  represents the to tal range of producer goods available for current production. 
Following Ethier (1982), we think of greater product variety as generating efficiency gains: 
an increase in the number of varieties of differentiated interm ediate inputs leads to an 
increase in to tal factor productivity in final manufacturing. Thus, technological progress 
is represented by the invention of new types of producer good which shows up as an 
increase in Mq  and Mq . We specialize the production function to the constant return to 
scale Cobb-Douglas technology,^
2 An im portant issue concerns about the environmental impact on renewable resources, 
subsequently affecting the prospect for further growth.
o
We abstract from labour effort for simplicity and leave out the tim e index to 
minimize on notation.
^ Further work is needed on more general forms of production function, such as 
functions which allow different elasticities of substitution between clean and dirty producer 
goods.
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M q  M q
(III)y  = h 1f “ [ /  x £ f  m  + f . x D(oB <fi]
where at e (0 ,1).
The representative producer of final output hires human capital from household a t the 
wage w and buys clean and dirty interm ediate inputs from the producer goods sector a t the 
prices Pq (0 and Ppti) respectively. Both w and ps(i) (s=C,D) are taken as given, as are the 
numbers of existing interm ediate goods, Mq  and Mq . The producer maximizes
Mq Mq
n  = h ' f ° [ f  x c ( i)°d i + /  x D( j y d j i  -  w H r
0 0 (11.2)
Mr Mr
-  f  f  PDXD ^)‘ di
by choosing XQ(i), xq(j), i e [0 ,M q ]  and j  e [0,Mp] and Hp. Solving this problem delivers the 
following derived demands for human capital and interm ediate inputs:
H  = (1 -q  )Y  
F w
_ t Y p ^
XCV> p  » XD p
Me a Mq a
where P = J  p c(i) Ua di + J  p D(j) l~adj
B. The Interm ediate Goods Sector
Each Firm in an s type producer goods sector needs ys units of the final good to 
produce one unit of interm ediate input. An interm ediate input embodies a design created 
in the research and development sector. To use a design, a firm must acquire a perm it from 
the owner of it. This is the institutional structure of our economy: there is a paten t law 
which prohibits any firm from manufacturing an interm ediate input without the consent of
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the paten t holder of a design. We assume tha t the patent holder of a design for s type good
Interm ediate goods firms are monopolistically-competitive producers of differentiated 
products which are sold to final goods producers and other interm ediate goods firms at the
firm ’s share of to tal demand is measure zero), then any feedback effect from P will be
^ J  small and so may safely ignored. The Bertrand equilibrium is then characterized by the 
standard constant mark-up rule, aps(j) = ys (s=C,D). In addition, given free entry and no 
collusion, competition amongst firms and designers will bid up the price of each permit 
until all the profits of each firm have been extracted.
Now given the symmetry in the model, the prices of inputs of the same type will be 
equal: ps(j) = ps (s-C,D). Consequently, the demands for inputs of the same type will be 
equal as well: x s (j) = x s  (s=C,D). As a result, total final output Y  can be written as M q y q  
+ M q  y q , where y q  = x q  H p ~ a and y q  = *Q a H ^ ~ a . It follows th a t the prices of all s- 
type perm its are the same, being given by qs = a (l-a )ys (s=C,D).
C. The Research and Development Sector
Growth occurs from the accumulation of new designs represented by increases in M q  
and M q . Each period, there are N q  and N q  firms engaged in environmentally friendly and 
environmentally unfriendly research activities. The product of each activity is a design, or 
blueprint, for a new interm ediate good. Research is conducted using human capital and 
previously accumulated, generally available knowledge. We denote by h ^ s(k) (s=C,D) the
** The patent, or property right, provides the necessary excludability condition for 
protecting a designer’s monopoly profits and preserving the incentives to innovate.
j  licenses the design to a m anufacturer for a fee qs(j)S*
profit maximizing monopoly price ps(j) (s=C,D). Given qs(j), each of these firms faces the 
following decision problem
max ic JJ) = p s(f)x jj) -  y sxs(f) -  qs(f), (s = C,D) 
Ps(f)
(II. 4)
where xs(j) is the derived demand given above. If M q  + M q  is sufficiently large (or if each
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amount of human capital employed in the kth s-type research firm and approximate the 
existing quantity of disembodied knowledge available to this firm by the existing stock of 
s-type designs, Ms. Each s-type firm then has Afghfi 5efficiency units of input with which 
to  innovate. We assume th a t an innovation occurs with some finite probability which is 
given by the function X: -  [0,1], where X > 0 and X"(M^ig s (k)) < 0. As in j
other models, therefore, the creation of new designs depends (positively) on both rival and '  ,\
non-rival, excludable and non-excludable inputs. But in contrast to other models, this 
research technology is concave rather than linear. The justification for this is discussed in 
Hung (1993). It captures the idea tha t a doubling of research effort need not result in a 
doubling of research output because some of the research effort may be redundant.
Another departure from existing models is the inclusion of a fixed research cost, ks  
(s=C,D). Together with the concave technology, this allows us to separate the marginal 
condition for allocating human capital across different sectors from the zero profit 
condition of research firms.
There is free entry into the research and development sector. Once a firm innovated, 
it  can s ta r t  to auction the right to use its new design in the next period. Hence each 
designer will expect to collect revenue from next period onwards. Therefore the present 
discounted value of future revenue is
x
~[riv)dv
Qs(k) = /  qjfox) e ' dx (s = CJ)).
t
where r(t) is the instantaneous interest ra te  and qs(k,r) = qs(x) in equilibrium from above. 
The decision problem for each designer is to maximize the expected present discounted 
value of profits from a successful innovation. We write this problem as
In general, the quantity of disembodied knowledge available to each firm would 
include both M q  and Mq. For example: the quantity of such knowledge available to a C- 
type (Z>type) firm could be approximated by M q  + SM q  {Mq  + SM q ). Allowing for this does 
not a lter the main results of the paper.
max Vs(k) = XlM JtgJft] Q,(k) -  wh^Qc) -  k s ( s = CJ)). , g .
A *,®
A t the margin, a designer will equate expected marginal revenue with marginal cost. In
7
addition, given free entry, expected equilibrium profit will be zero. Hence,
Mc X'[Mc h^c (k)]Qc (k) = = w
X[Mc h^c m Q c {k) = w h ^ lc )  + k c (tt.7)
W M o h ^ m Q o ik )  -  + k d
In general, clean and dirty producer goods are distinguished by their production and 
development costs.
2. Consumers
The representative consumer of final output choose plans for consumption C, and asset 
holdings, A, which solve the following problem:
max U(t) = f  e ' p(r~0 u(?)dx
C (t)M ) t
Mf  '  ) x ^  (II.8)
k(t) = logC(t) -  Plog[ j  z [x D(i,T)]di] /
s.t. A(t) = M t)H  + r(t)A(t) -  C(t)
where p denotes the subjective ra te  of tim e preference. We assume a momentary utility 
function u: Bt+ x  -* 9t+i which displays an externality from dirty producer goods.
Specifically, we assume tha t x  units of production of these goods causes z(x) units of 
environmental damage where z f 2  0 and measures the marginal disutility from
7
In this product variety model, the optimal strategy of each R&D firm is to conduct 
different kinds of research.
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o
environmental damage. The faster these goods grow and the more they are used to 
produce final output, the more disutility to the household. Each consumer is endowed with 
a fixed stock of human capital, H, which earns the ra te  of return w. The single asset, A, 
represents ownership claims on the patent right and earns the ra te  of return r. Changes in 
asset holdings denote savings.
Along the optimal consumption path,
where gc  is the growth ra te  of consumption. Equation (II.9) shows the usual positive 
relationship between the ra te  of growth and the ra te  of interest: a higher ra te  of growth 
makes current consumption more valuable relative to future consumption so tha t consumers 
are more willing to borrow at a higher ra te  of interest.
III. Steady S tate  Equilibrium
The m arket equilibrium for this model will be paths for prices and quantities such that 
(i) all participants are optimizing, (ii) all markets are clearing and (iii) all non-stationary 
variables are growing a t the common growth rate, g. The underlying source of growth is 
the increasing number of firms engaged in research activities. As the economy grows, the 
concentration of research activities amongst a constant number of firms would induce more 
and more inefficiency in the research sector. In order to reduce this inefficiency, it is 
essential th a t research activities are diversified. This is made possible by the increasing 
availability of resources which can be used to finance new research activities. In this way 
the economy can maintain a constant growth ra te  of designs by dividing the human capital
Q
We consider only the flow of pollution and not the cumulative effect of pollution.
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Q
amongst the N q  + Nq  research firms. 
In equilibrium, we have
x Y —= ( l i ) * - 1, s = CJ>.
» F «*
2L = ( i - 0) [ i^ £ ( l£ ) « - i  +
M  M  a 2 M  n 2
x c  _
x d  Y d  Y d
Let m  = Mq /M, and w = w/M = W(m), where Wr < 0 for y q  > Y p  Let dq  * N^/M^-and /i£> 
* M p/M o, being measures of the potential flow of new designs relative to the stock of 
existing designs. Finally, le t vq  » A f^ /j^ ^ a n d  vq  -  Mq  hj^Q, being the efficiency units 
of inputs to research and development. Then H ^ q = riQ v ^and  H ^ q  = nD vDm
In a balanced growth equilibrium, where m e (0,l)y Qs = a i l -a iy ^ r  or a(l-a)M ^rs 
X ’(vs)/r=  w (s=C,D). Hence,
" T " ^  = (^ )(~ } = (— )(— ) “ * A. (v D) M c  y c  m  y c
(III. 2)
From (II.7), we obtain
X(vc) -  V(vc) v e w* =
- =KC (lll3) 
r X(Vp) -  A./(v0) v 0i w« _
X \Vfl) l “m
Since equilibrium in the human capital m arket requires H = H p + Hr  q  + H ^ q , the
^ If research activities required some minimum level of human capital, then there 
would be a limit to growth. For growth to be sustained, one would have to allow for human 
capital accumulation. A model which does this is presented in Hung, Pozzolo and Blackburn
(1992).
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allocation of human capital to the research and development sector must satisfy
rx  r r 1 1 n
^ C^C ^ D^D ~ t / + / 1
“ X'(VC) X 'iv J
(III. 4)
Along the balanced growth path, consumption, output and the number of designs all grow 
a t the ra te  g:
e  = e  = — = = (W.5)
8c Y  M c  M d
Given th a t the probability of a successful innovation is independent across firms, the law 
of large numbers allows us to write the expected flow of new designs as A‘4S = X(vs)Ns 
(s=C,D). Thus, since steady s ta te  growth occurs a t the ra te  (Mq  + Mq )/(Mq  + Mq ), we have
k ( y  c ) N c  + w \  W \ / 1  \  (TTT R)g =       = X(yc)ncm + \ ( y  J n D(l-m ). W .6)
M c + Md
But since Mq /M q  = Mq /M q  in the balanced growth equilibrium,
*  = i f  " T T  *  = X (v° )n»  illU )
Together with equations (11.9), (III.2), (III.3), (III.4) and (III.6), we can compute the balanced 
growth ra te  g  and the stationary variables m, v q  vq, dq and dq {Hjr, x q  and x q  can be 
determined from these variables).
Proposition 1: Given (i) X ’( v) > 0 and X"(v) < 0, (ii) X(v) > v X '(v), (Hi) limm ^Q X'(v)
= constant < 00 and (i) v* is large, where aH X (vh  = p, 3  a unique
4c 4c 4c 4c 4c 4c
steady s ta te  equilibrium (g , m , v q  v q ,  n q  n q }  which satisfies 
equations (II.9), (III.2), (III.3), (III.4), (III.6) and (III.7).
Proof:
Substitute W(m) into equation (III.3) and express vq  = f(j[m) and vq  = fQ(m) where P q  >
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0 and /  £> < 0. In equation (III.2), the LHS is a monotonic decreasing function of m  and the 
RHS is monotonic decreasing function of m. Let A  = (Yd /Y q ^ ^ * ^ '  Given limm ^Q f^(m )
t^
= v j j <  °° and limm _o X f(fQ(m)) -  constant < °°, we have limm ^Q A(1 -m)/m > limm ^Q X f(v q )
sfc
/X  Yvq ). In addition, given fr fm )  = v q < «> and X ’(fpfm)) = constant < °°>
we have X ’(vq) /XHvq). m  is defined in [0,1) and 3  a unique
sfc sfc ijc sfc sfc
m  which satisfies A (l-m  )/m  = X'ffQfm ))/Xr(fp(m  )). Computing v q  and v q  and
ife sfc ijc
combining with equations (II.9), (III.4) and (III.5), n Q,n q  and g  can be found. Q.E.D.
If there is no difference in the production and development costs of clean and dirty 
interm ediate inputs (i.e. if Y c ~  YD = Y> KC = KD = t i^e r a t*° M ^/M ^equals one in the 
balanced growth equilibrium. Given that there is no additional cost for the economy in 
using all clean products, the only factor which m atters in developing the product is the 
existing knowledge M q  and M q . If the disembodied knowledge is the same across the 
research sectors, both types of research are equally efficient and both will produce designs 
a t the same ra te  maintaining the balanced growth path. In the case where k q  =  K q  =  k  but 
Y q  > Yjy  the balanced growth equilibrium will require a higher efficiency in clean research 
and development, (i.e. a higher M q /M q  ratio) so as to compensate the lower expected 
profit. A similar result holds for the case where y c  = Y d  = Y hut k q  > k q .
Any temporary deviation from the balanced growth ratio m  will shift the comparative 
advantage of different type of research. The knowledge spillover effect in the research 
sector will push the economy away from the balanced growth equilibrium to an unbalanced 
growth equilibrium where only one type of research (clean or dirty) can survive (i.e. where 
either nQ= vq =  0 or nQ = v q  = 0). Whichever steady s ta te  survives will depend on the 
initial value of M q /M q
In the unbalanced growth economy with n Q  =  v q  = 0 ( n Q  = v q =  0), the steady sta te  
growth ra te  is determined solely by the level of H, y d  anc* KD ^  YC anc* KC^
^  Of course, expectations can play a role is bringing the steady s ta te  to a cleaner 
environment. If everybody believes that the government will phase out all the dirty 
products. Designers may move out of dirty research and development in anticipation of the 
fall in future profit.
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equilibrium can be formulated as follows:
Proposition 2: Given (i) X r(vs) > 0 and X"(vg) < 0, (ii) X(vs) > vg X r(vs) and (iii) a v*s
< v 1 s, where aH X (vh  = p and w*S[X(v*s)-v*si '(v *S)]/X'(v*s) = ks, 3  a 
steady s ta te  growth ra te  g  s -  g^y^K ^H )  where
A > 0 ,  A . < 0 , i S - < 0  (s=CyD'). (111.8)
dH d y , 3k,
Proof:
Given m  < m  , we have nq  = vq  = 0 and m  -  0. Hence (111.4) becomes
H  -  VOnD =  f   <m -9>
and w [X(vp) - vpX r(vp)J/X r(vp) = Kp. Together with (II.9), we obtain
Xf(v J  cl H  -  p
»D - ----- — --------------- - nD( v D,H) m . 10)
Provided lim v^Q X r(v)aH > p, 3  a v ^  > 0 such that X '(vhaH  = p. Given X"(v) < 0, then
1 $ d n p /d vp  > 0 V v p  < v . Since lim v_tco X'(v) -  0. 3  a v = v (k) > 0 which satisfies
w*[X(v*p) - v* p  X ,(v*p)J/X,(v*p) = Kp. Hence, 3  a g* = X(vp) np(vp,H ) > 0  V v* < v^.
With X'(v) > 0 and X"(v) < 0, the functions np(vp,H ) and vp(yp,K p) satisfy d n p /d vp  < 0,
drip/dH > 0, d v p /d jp  > 0 and dvp/dKp. Thus, the growth ra te  g(yp,Kp,H) satisfies (111.8)
Q.E.D.
Any increase in the costs ys and ks, will lower the inflow of new firms to the research 
sector, lower the ra te  of innovation and so lower the ra te  of growth. Any increase in the 
human capital stock can support more research activity and so support a higher ra te  of 
growth. The model shares some implications of other product variety models of growth. In 
particular, economic integration which allows the sharing knowledge (adding Ms or H) and
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avoids research redundancy. All these will increase the productivity of research activities 
and have a positive e ffec t on growth. An implication of the model which is not shared by 
others is the positive growth effect of trade liberalization in the producer goods sector 
only. Such liberalization would expand the market for new designs such that firms engaged 
research would begin to operate a t a positive expected profit. This would encourage new 
firms to  enter the research sector. Whilst each firm, individually, would cut backs on its 
scale of research activity, the world, as a whole, would experience an increase in research 
activity. Consequently, each economy would experience higher steady sta te  growth. The 
positive growth effects of economic integration and trade liberalization may have adverse 
effects  on the environment if some of the new designs are for dirty producer goods.
In this model, the government can formulate trade policy to fulfil its environmental 
objectives. Suppose th a t the government was to restric t trade in dirty products whilst 
encouraging trade in clean products and encouraging transfers of clean technology 
knowledge. Then m  would be lowered, making it easier to transfer production to clean 
sector. Nevertheless, achieving environmental objectives and promoting growth are not 
separate issues. In the following section, we will try  to assess the impact of environmental 
policy on growth and discuss the optimal policy when environmental considerations are 
taken into account.
IV. Environmental Policy and Growth
The damage caused by the externality from environmentally unfriendly producer goods 
may be reduced by imposing a tax on the dirty sector or granting a subsidy to the clean 
sector. However, since the cost of production affects the ra te  of growth, any such 
environmental policy will have a side effect on growth. In order to clarify the analysis, two 
im portant points should be noted. First, it m atters considerably where the economy starts  
off at. Even without any externality from the dirty technology, the market equilibrium is 
still sub-optimal. This is due to the im perfect competition in producer goods m arkets and 
the knowledge spill-overs in research and development sectors. A policy which corrects for 
sub-optimal growth and the environmental externality will bring the economy to the first
best solution. A government tha t ignores the pollution problem will be following a policy 
aimed a t achieving the second best equilibrium. This second best solution may not be a 
welfare improvement on the m arket outcome. The effects on growth will depend on 
whether the economy sta rts  a t the second best equilibrium or the market equilibrium.
The second point of in terest concerns the steady sta te  of the economy. Since clean 
interm ediate inputs do not give rise to any pollution problem, replacing the dirty 
technology by the clean one will surely be welfare improving unless there is differential 
costs in the technologies. A government may have to choose whether to adopt a policy to 
promote the use of clean technology or just regulate the existing dirty technology. Given 
that their cost structures are different (y q  2  y q  and Kq £ Kjjt policies which substitute 
growth for environmental improvement will be different.
Let us assume th a t the economy starts  out in steady sta te  equilibrium with dirty 
technology. Our welfare analysis is concerned only with the steady state, not with the 
dynamics towards the steady state . In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that z(x) 
= z  (a constant). Therefore we do not need to study the relation between the level and 
growth of pollution. This section focuses on the tradeoff between economic growth and the 
environment. If we assume tha t the social planner acts as the representative agent, using 
equation (II.8), the first best solution, denoted by ( i / s, v^s) will equal to argmax v n p log 
C q  + (l~p)g, the optimal choices of the representative agent. In contrast, an 
"environmentally-uncaring" government/social planner will maximize just p  log C q  + g. We
called this solution the second best solution and denoted by (nss, vss). And let denote
market equilibrium as rF1, vm . Both the first best and the second best problems are subject 
to the physical constraints on human capital and consumption:
C0 + me + yx  = Hp'ax a (IVj )
HF + Hr = Hf + /iv = H
We compute the first best growth ra te  and the second best growth ra te  as follows:
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s f  =
g f  =  X'(V $ H  -  p
(IV.2)
where X(vss)/X'(vss)-vss = and <f>' < 0 (s=C,D). The market equilibrium growth rate
is given by:
„ a X f f y ^ H -  p
+ 1
(1V.3)
where X (vm s)/X '(vm s)-vms = Ks/w *(ys) and w* 1 < 0 (s=C,D). Like (g/77s, both g^ss and g ^ a r e
social productivity and m arket productivity of final goods for a given level of human 
capital). The m arket allocates too much human capital to the research and development 
sector, thereby generating too much growth which is not socially optimal. But in cases 
where y  is large, the m arket equilibrium growth rate  is lower than the first best growth 
ra te  and the second best growth rate . Therefore, a better environment does not necessarily 
reduce growth if the economy starts  out a t a sub-optimal m arket equilibrium. Of course, 
with small y , it is likely tha t the economy will have excess growth. Adding environmental 
considerations will certainly result in a greater adverse effect on growth.
However, given kq  z Kp and y q  z  yp , f f S(yp,Kp) > ^ S(y q Kq ). The question is why 
the government is not implementing the second best policy to reach the fast growth rate  
in the first place. Any environmental policy may result in lower growth. The remaining
decreasing with respect to ks and ys, (s=C,D).
For any v and k, g^s < ^ ss. With some regularity conditions and without considering the 
non-negative constraint on consumption lim ^Q  gm < limK^ Q g^s < lim K^ o Given the 
same v, a small value for y, we find a k^Sj ,  k55  ^and iF 1}, where the optimal choices of i f s , 
n55and rF1 are zero, such th a t iF j > > j/ s j . This means that the function g772 will cut
/ s and a t some k. In turn, this implies tha t the market equilibrium may have excess 
growth compared to the social optimum. (The smaller is y f the larger the gap between the
choice is between the low growth equilibrium with clean technology and the low growth 
equilibrium with regulated dirty technology. A higher fi, a lower kq/kq and a lower Yq /Yq  
will increase the ratio  of steady s ta te  utilities associated with clean and dirty products, and 
increase the ratio  g^S(Y o KC ^ ^ S^ D fKd '  This the move to a clean environment less
costly in term  of growth even if the economy is starting a t a second best equilibrium.
There are two possible cases where the economy can achieve faster growth with clean 
technology even from a second best equilibrium. The first case is when there is some 
explicit cost for clearing up the environment. We assume th a t the clean-up cost is related 
with the flow of consumption of dirty producer goods, xp . The resource constraint (IV. 1) 
becomes
Cq +  h k  +  ( y  + i | i ) x  = <I V - 4 >
Even if the social planner does not care about the pollution (($=0), he/she needs resources 
to clean up the damage. The to tal (social and private cost) marginal cost of dirty products 
increases. If y d  <  ^ < (Yd+^ ^ C ^  an(* KC ~ KI> *he second best equilibrium growth 
ra te  with dirty technology can be lower than the second best equilibrium with clean 
technology: ^ s (y q ,K q , x q ^ 0 )  < g5s (y c >k C >x D = 0 ) .  However, in welfare terms
Uss(YDt*D,X]j*0) > Uss(y q ,kq,x q -0). As a result, an "environment-uncaring" government 
will not pursue the high growth equilibrium because it is not welfare maximizing. 
Nevertheless, there are some values for parameters which give ^ ( y^ K q ^ q ^O) < 
/ s (Y o Kd < 8ss(y c >ko xd =°)' Thus> an "environment-caring" government (where ($ *0) will 
select the higher growth equilibrium because it is welfare maximizing {U^s(y q Kq Xq =0) > 
Ufs (YD,KD,xD *0)).
Another possible case is when the environment is treated  as a factor of production. 
Under such circumstances, environmental degradation would ultim ately drive resources out 
of production and research activities, leading to a lower growth, as the stock of this factor 
of production diminishes. The simplest way to include the environment in production is to 
tre a t it as a public good in final production.
where E  is the environment. The environment can also be a source of information for new
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Mc Mq
Y  = E  H)r‘ [ /  XcOT <*' + /  V O * <*'] (nr-5)
0 0
designs,** in which case A is a function of E, A(M E hp) say. Suppose tha t the ra te  of 
environment degradation is proportional to the growth of dirty products:
I  = - W B . < IV - 6>
We calculate the steady s ta te  m arket equilibrium growth ra te  with dirty products as
« i ' ( v 5 i r -  P
go  = ( 1 - X )
q y ^ y g )  a  (IV-7)
*(vS>
where A(vm ^)/A  f(vm o)-vm p  = k ^ /w  (ye))- With a sufficiently high it can be shown that 
^ ( Y C ’K d  > Similarly even when fi=0 > there exists a x> suc^ that S(Y q kC^
> / s (Yd ,^ d> where
g g  = ( l - X ) [ X ' ( v I0 ) f f - p ]  ( IV8)
and A(vss)/A'(vss)-vss = ks/4>(ys), <f>' < 0 (s=C,D).
In general, without any explicit cost of environment damages, taking care of the 
environment is costly to growth but is welfare improving no m atter where the economy 
starts  from. However, we believe that the conservation of the environment is crucial for 
maintain an economy’s production frontier. Moving away from the steady s ta te  with dirty 
products may be both welfare improvement and growth improving. Given the knowledge
** Those assumptions can be supported by the fact tha t the proponent of biodiversity 
argues th a t genetic information, species and ecosystems of the environment provide 
m aterial and im portant information in the form of food, fibre, medicine, and inputs into 
industrial processes.
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spillover in the research sector, it is difficult to think of any automatic mechanism for
moving from dirty production to clean production. In principle, however a government that
commits itself to clean up the environment and abandon all dirty inputs, might change the
expectations of designers, such th a t research activity eventually becomes devoted solely
12
to clean innovations. In the absence of this, market type policies may not be sufficient 
to establish the clean environment with higher growth. The economy may be stuck with a 
regulated dirty technology a t the expense of our growth.
V. Conclusions
This chapter has presented our preliminary findings on how environmental 
considerations can affect our standard predictions about growth. In general, it does not 
appear to be the case tha t pollution control is necessarily a depressant on growth. There 
are several important issues ignored in the chapter including (i) the dynamics of moving 
from the steady s ta te  with dirty technology to the steady s ta te  with clean technology, (ii) 
the implications of different elasticities substitution between clean and dirty products, (iii) 
a com plete welfare analysis associated with the optimal growth path and (i) the 
com petition between cost-improvement and environmental quality research activities., 
These and other issues lie on our agenda for future research.
• J y ^
r  
y -
^  L -W
^  Krugman (1991) and Matsuyama (1991) have found tha t both history and 
expectations are im portant in determining the steady s ta te  of a multiple equilibrium (ffc y 
economy like our model. 0
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CHAPTER 5 GROWTH AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
A b s t r a c t
We d e v e l o p  a t h e o r y  o f  g r o w th  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d ia t i o n .  The m ech an ism  o f  
g r o w th  i s  i n c r e a s i n g  p r o d u c t  v a r i e t y  a r i s i n g  from  r e s e a r c h  an d  d e v e lo p m e n t.  
R e s e a r c h  i s  r i s k y  a n d  d e s i g n e r s  o f  new  p r o d u c t s  r e q u i r e  e x t e r n a l  c a p i t a l  t o  
f in a n c e  t h e i r  r e s e a r c h  v e n t u r e s .  P r o b le m s  o f  m o ra l h a z a r d  d i c t a t e  t h a t  an o p t im a l  
lo a n  c o n t r a c t  m u st i n v o l v e  m o n i to r in g  w h ich  i s  c o s t l y .  A c c o r d in g  t o  th e  t y p e  o f  
c o n t r a c t ,  m o n i to r in g  may b e  c o n d u c te d  e x  a n te  o r  e x  p o s t .  L e n d e r s  h a v e  th e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a f i n a n c i a l  in t e r m e d ia r y  t o  a c t  on t h e i r  b e h a l f .  We 
co m p a re  th e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  d i r e c t  a n d  d e l e g a t e d  m o n i to r in g ,  an d  e s t a b l i s h  th e  
c o n d i t i o n s  u n d e r  w h ich  th e  l a t t e r  i s  p r e f e r r e d .  Our m ain  f i n d i n g s  m ay b e \ 
su m m a r ize d  a s  f o l l o w s :  ( i )  t h e r e  i s  a p o s i t i v e ,  tw o -w a y  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e tw e e n  g r o w th  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  d e v e lo p m e n t;  ( i i )  d i f f e r e n t  e c o n o m ie s  may e v o lv e  
to w a r d s  d i f f e r e n t  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m s  d e p e n d in g  on c r o s s - c o u n t r y  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  th e  
r e l a t i v e  c o s t s  o f  th e s e  s y s t e m s ;  ( H i )  th e  m a rk e t may c h o o s e  a f i n a n c i a l  s y s te m  
w h ich  d o e s  n o t  g e n e r a te  t h e  f a s t e s t  g r o w th . - \ u P
I. Introduction
i
There is overwhelming evidence that the financial regimes of economies m atter for 
growth. The stylized facts are tha t financial repression impedes the growth process.^ 
These facts are important since the extent of financial maturity is, in part, m atter of 
policy choice. Thus, governments have the potential either to retard or promote growth by 
adopting policies which either restric t or encourage financial innovation through regulation. 
This chapter presents a theoretical analysis of the causal links between economic growth 
and financial development.
Our original motivation for the chapter was the view that cross-country convergence 
(or divergence) in growth ra tes  has as much as to do with similarities (or differences) in
* The empirical relationship between growth and financial development has been 
studied by Fry (1982, 1988), Goldsmith (1969), Jung (1986), Mckinnon (1973, 1986), Roubini 
and Sala-i-M artin (1991), Shaw (1973) and the World Bank (1989).
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national institutions as it has with distribution of human capital and technology across 
countries. It is the institutional structure of an economy which provides the incentives to 
engage in education and training, research and development. Economies with similar 
endowments, similar technologies and similar knowledge may exhibit dissimilar rates of 
growth because of differences in institutional arrangements which affect growth incentives, 
by the same token, any single economy may experience changes in its growth ra te  over 
tim e according to developments in its own institutions. The institutional arrangements that 
we consider in this chapter is the financial arrangements.
We ask the following questions:
1) what is the relationship between economic growth and financial development?
2) how might difference economies evolve towards different financial systems?
3) will the m arket choose the financial system which generates the fastest growth? 
To answer these questions, we develop a model which combines theories of endogenous 
growth and financial intermediation. The model describes a dynamic stochastic economy 
in which there are three sources of inefficiency: imperfection competition, knowledge 
externalities and asymmetric information. The answers we obtain are
1) growth is both encouraged by, and encourages, financial development;
2) different economies may evolve towards different financial systems depending on 
cross-country differences in the relative costs of these systems;
3) the m arket may choose a financial system which does not generate the fastest 
growth.
Before outlining the remainder of the chapter, we indicate how the chapter relates to 
the existing theoretical literature on growth, finance and trade. Modern accounts of the 
relationship between growth and financial development emphasize the role of financial 
interm ediation in improving the allocation resources. In Bencivenga and Smith (1991), 
financial interm ediation allows agents to pool idiosyncratic liquidity risk. This has the 
e ffec t of stim ulating capital accumulation and growth through an improvement in the
n
Aghion and Bolton (1991) and Tsiddon (1992) introduce other finance considerations 
(debt overhang and moral hazard) into the theory of growth.
allocation of saving between risky (illiquid and high expected return) investment projects 
and safe (liquid and low expected return) deposits. In Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), 
allocations are distorted because of im perfect information arising from an unobservable 
shock. Growth performance is improved by the establishment of a financial intermediary 
which conducts research on the shock and sells its information to agents. Saint-Paul (1992) 
considers the case in which improvements in growth require the use of more specialized and 
riskier technologies. Financial development allows this to occur by expanding the 
opportunities for diversification. A basic insight of this literature is that the relationship 
between growth and financial development is two-way causal: growth is both encouraged 
by, and encourages, financial m arket participation and innovation.
Liquidity, information efficiency and diversification are three important aspects of 
financial intermediation. A forth, which has yet to be studied in connection with growth, 
is monitoring. This chapter presents such a study. The theory of monitoring, as developed 
by Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986), is concerned with the 
efficient resolution of incentive problems between potential creditors and potential debtors 
who negotiate optimal loan contracts in the presence of asymmetric information. Loan 
contracting takes place within a hierarchical financial structure which ranges from 
ultim ate lenders to ultim ate borrowers. At each point in the hierarchy, lender cannot 
observe the s ta te  th a t borrowers are in. It is possible, however, for the lenders to spend 
resources on monitoring borrowers. Problem of costly s ta te  verification dictate that any 
contract must involve monitoring - otherwise, borrowers would always claim to be in a bad 
s ta te  in an a ttem pt to avoid paying back loans. In addition, lenders can always obtain a safe 
ra te  of return  on some riskless asset. An equilibrium contract must be optimal (minimize 
the cost of monitoring), incentive compatible (ensure the truthful revelation of private 
information) and yields an expected return at least equal to the safe rate.
One type of contracting arrangement is for ultim ate lenders to monitor directly 
ultim ate borrowers. Another is for a third party - an intermediary - to be delegated this 
task of monitoring. D irect monitoring may be very costly if there are many ultim ate 
lenders, each whom monitors. By eliminating the duplication of monitoring effort, 
delegation may be preferred. In this case, lenders write loan contracts with the
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intermediary which write loan contracts with borrowers, but this means that if lenders 
cannot observe the s ta te  of the intermediary, there are two agency-incentive problems 
which must be resolved . The contracts between lenders and the intermediary must ensure 
th a t the intermediary has incentives to monitor borrowers' information, to make proper use 
of tha t information and to make sufficient repayments to lenders, the costs of providing 
these incentives are referred to as delegation costs and must be netted out of any 
monitoring cost saving from delegation. If monitoring cost savings exist and exceed the 
expected delegation costs, then financial intermediation pays.
Diversification within the financial intermediary is the key to understand why 
delegated monitoring can have a net cost advantage over direct monitoring. Diversification 
is im portant even when there is universal risk neutrality. By increasing the probability that 
the intermediary has sufficient loan proceeds to repay the debt claims of the depositors, 
diversification among independently distributed risky loans reduces the delegation costs.
In the limit, as the number of loans grows without bound, delegation costs approach zero 
and each ultim ate lender is assured a ra te  of return equal to the safe ra te  of return. This 
eliminates the need to monitor the intermediary. With zero delegation costs, the total cost 
f\l of interm ediation is just the (induplicated) physical cost of delegated monitoring which less 
than the (duplicated) physical cost of direct monitoring.
We believe th a t the foregoing theory of financial intermediation can be used to yield 
insights into the relationship between growth and financial development. In all previous 
studies of this relationship, the mechanism of growth is the Romer (1986, 1987Unechanism 
of increasing returns to capital due to production externalities, We depart from tfiiS'^hy 
contracting a model of growth based on increasing product variety similar to chapter 3 and j ^ 
4 of the thesis (modified from Grossman and Helpman 1989; Judd 1985; Romer 1990).^ 
Growth occurs through the generation of new ideas which expands the set of intermediate 
inputs and so increases the efficiency of other inputs in final production.
Designs, or ideas, are created  through research activities. Researchers and developers 
are risk-neutral entrepreneurs who require external funds to finance their risky design 
projects. Capital is raised from risk-neutral investors, either directly or indirectly through 
an intermediary. Since all agents are risk-neutral, a complete description of the optimality
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of any feasible se t of loan contracts is given by the sum of expected monitoring costs, we 
consider two types of loan contract which is differ in their specifications of monitoring 
activity. The first type prescribes ex post monitoring which we shall refer to as 
verification. This con tract is standard debt contract under which the sta te  is observed if 
and only if the borrower claims bankruptcy. An example of this is when creditors appoint 
an auditor to investigate a bankruptcy-declared firm. The contract requires that the 
borrower makes a fixed payment when solvent, that the borrower is declared bankrupt if 
the fixed payment cannot be m et and creditors recoup as much of the debt as possible from 
the borrower's assets in the event of bankruptcy. The second type contract prescribes ex 
ante monitoring which we shall refer to as just monitoring. This contract also requires the 
borrower to make a fixed repayment when solvent but does not require lender to wait for 
bankruptcy to be declared before they investigate the outcome of research. An example 
of this is when creditors appoint representatives to act as supervisors on a firm's board of 
control. Both types of contract must depend only on observable variables and offer lenders 
an expected safe ra te  of return. In each case, the observable variables are the fixed 
repayment of borrowers and inputs of the research. The most important difference between 
the contracts is th a t the cost of verification is s ta te  dependent but the cost of monitoring 
is state-independent. Verification costs will change if the probability of successful 
innovation changes which might occur as a result of specific actions taken by an 
entrepreneur in response to contract negotiations. This feedback effect is generally ignored 
in the literature which trea ts  the probability of each s ta te  occurring as exogenous. 4 
Our model is able to explain the positive relationship between growth and financial 
development. The explanation draws attention to the two-way causality in that relationship. 
The model is also to explain why different economies might evolve towards different 
financial systems. There are five sections in the chapter in addition to this introduction. 
Section II sets up the model. Section III contain a description of alternative financial 
arrangements. An arrangem ent may involve either direct or delegated loan contracting, 
either with monitoring or verification. Section IV is devoted to the study of alternative 
balanced growth equilibria. We compare and contrast these equilibria, each of which 
corresponds to a d ifferent financial system. Section V offers some concluding remarks. We
represent our main results as a series of propositions. The proofs of these are contained in 
an Appendix.
II. The Model
The physical set-up of our representative economy builds on the models of Grossman 
and Helpman (1989), Hung (1993), Judd (1985) and Romer (19 There is a constant
population of infinitely-lived consumers. Productive activity tak< hree sectors: a final 
goods sector in which a single consumption good is manufactured; a producer goods sector 
in which a range of interm ediate goods are produced; and a research and development 
sector in which designs for new interm ediate goods are created. All markets are 
characterized by price-taking except the m arket for each producer good which is 
characterized by monopolistic competition. The price numeraire of the economy is the final 
consumption good.
1. Consumers
o
Our preferred way of modelling consumers is to allocate them into two groups. Both 
groups discount the future at the ra te  0 , substitute consumption intertemporally with unit 
elasticity , have access to a com petitive capital m arket in which there is a riskless asset, 
ap paying the safe ra te  of return, r f, and representing ownership claims on patent rights. 
Agents in the first group, of whom there are many, suppliers of a fixed amount of human 
capital, //, which earns the ra te  of return, Wp Agents in the second group, of whom there 
are / ,  are risk-neutral investors who are indifferent between investing the riskless and risky 
assets. The risky asset, A p  pays the random ra te  of return, R p  and represents a loan to
Product development in our model is conducted using the research effort of agents, 
if agents are able to observe whether a project is successful, and if the same agents are 
also the investors in product development, then problems of asymmetry information would 
disappear. Accordingly, we assume th a t suppliers of research effort are not suppliers of 
research funding. An alternative to this is to assume that product development requires 
many suppliers of research effort, each of whom is delegated a particular task and none 
of whom can observe the outcome of their joint effort.
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entrepreneurs engaged in product development.
Given the above, equilibrium in the capital market implies
r r + 1  "  E tRf+l (III)
(11.2)
where Ct  denotes consumption and Et  is the expectations operator.^ Equation (1) is the
arbitrage condition between the riskless and risky asset. Equation (2) defines the 
intertem poral optim ality condition for consumption.
2. The Final Goods Sector
Similar to the set up in chapter 3, the representative firm of the final goods sector 
maximizes its profit, taking the prices of producer goods Pf.fi), the wage ra te  and the 
number of existing producer goods as given:
services employed in the final goods sector. Given the firm ’s maximization problem, we can
where x t (j) is the quantity of the j  input in final goods production (we assume away any 
time-to-build problem in order to avoid dynamics) and tF c'is the amount of human capital
solve for the derived demands for human capital services H p  and each of the inputs x(i) as:
^ For simplicity, we use the approximation log(l+x) « x  for small x.
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H  = (1' a )7  
F w
M a (IL4)
x(i) =  , where P  = p(i) 1_a
D i=0P
where y t  is the volume of final goods
3. The Interm ediate Goods Sector
Each producer good is manufactured using the same technology and inputs as in the 
final goods sector. Thus if z(j) is the to tal production of intermediate good j, then
z,(j) (IL5}
\  /  1=0 
i? \ - 7.
t r ^ r "
where h t (j) and x t (i,j) denote, respectively, the amounts of human capital and producer 
good / employed in the producer good j  industry. Cost minimization produces the following 
derived demands for human capital services hf^j) and each of the inputs x t (i,jh
u i ^  Y,(/)(!-<*)*,(/) nt (j) = -------------------
. <IL6)
Y Pfi> l -  t , ,  P,X,{1 J) = ------------   , where y,(/) =
P, «a( l - o) 1-*
Yt (j) is the marginal cost.
An interm ediate input embodies a design created in the research and development 
sector. To use a design, a firm must acquire a perm it from the owner of it. In other words, 
there is a paten t law which prohibits any firm from manufacturing an interm ediate good 
without the consent of the patent holder of a design. We assume that the patent holder of
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a design for good j  licenses the design to a manufacturer for a fee q^j).^
Interm ediate goods firms are monopolistically -competitive producers of differentiated 
products which are sold to final goods producers and other interm ediate goods firms a t the 
profit maximizing monopoly price Pj.(j). Given qt (j), each of these firms maximize JUjijh
max *{(/) = -  Y ,(j)x,(I) ~ ?,(/) (II. 7)
P,(J)
s .t. z(j) = x(j) + 2 jx (j,i) , (II.4) and (II.6). Since the solution can be found in the appendix of 
Chapter 3, we omit it here.
4. The Research and Development Sector
Each period, there are N t  risk-neutral firms engaged in research activity. The product 
of each activity is a design, or blueprint, for a new interm ediate good. Research is 
conducted using human capital and previously accumulated, generally available knowledge. 
We denote by t P t (k) the amount of human capital employed in the Ath design firm and 
approximate the currently available quantity of disembodied knowledge by the existing 
stock of designs, Mt . Each firm then has e t, which equals M fhPp  efficiency units of input 
in period t  with which to innovate and produce a design in period t+1. As in previous 
(J chapter^ the creation of new designs depends (positively) on both rival and non-rival, 
excludable and non-excludable inputs. But as we indicated earlier, we depart from those 
models by assuming a concave, rather than linear, research technology. This technology 
sta tes  th a t an innovation occurs with some probability which is given by the function X(e) 
defined on [0,1], where X '(et) > 0 and X"(et) < 0.
Each designer is assumed to have zero wealth, consequently, each designer lacks 
resources to undertake research and development unless he turns to investors for external
cr
The patent, or property right, provides the necessary excludability condition for 
protecting a designer’s monopoly profits and preserving the incentives to innovate.
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e
finance. The decision problem for a designer is to maximize the expected present 
discounted value of profits from a successful innovation. If investors cannot observe 
directly whether a project is successful, this problem must be solved as part of the solution 
to an optimal incentive-compatible loan contracting problem. From our previous discussion, 
we know th a t any optimal contract (whether enforced by monitoring or verification) will 
require the designer to make a fixed repayment to investors if an innovation is successful. 
Let us denote this fixed repayment by rim t (k)in case of monitoring and r)v t (k)in case of 
verification. Then if l t (k) is the amount of loans th a t a designer receives, the expected 
present discounted value of profits is
*? (* )  = X(et) [<?,(*) -  wth'D(k) + lt(k) (II.8)
for i=v,m, and where Qf-(k) -  $ s=l Qt+s^)* The designer will maximize
equation (II.8) subject to the constraints imposed by the loan contract.
III. Optimal Loan Contracting
Risk-neutral investors lend to risk-neutral designers either directly or indirectly 
through an intermediary. In each case, either monitoring or verification may be used to 
enforce the optimal contract.
1. D irect Lending
We assume th a t each project is financed by J f <. J  investors. Since investors can invest 
in a riskless asset, they must be convinced that the ra te  of return on the risky project is 
a t least equal to the safe ra te  of return. Thus, an optimal loan contract will maximize the
Hall (1992) presents empirical evidence on the importance of internal finance for 
funding research and development. A potentially rewarding avenue for future research is 
to model explicitly the link between growth and different methods of financing.
^ Without loss of generality, we set the designer's reservation wage equal to zero.
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designer's expected profit, given a minimum expected return to lenders of a t least r^+j.
A. Monitoring
Let fim (k)be the per-project monitoring cost incurred by investors. This cost is incurred 
during the design stage, being independent of the project's outcome. The decision problem 
for a designer is to maximize equation (II.8) subject to the m arket constraint which 
incorporates the cost of monitoring
*(«,(*)) 1 m(*) -  (1 + r,tl)V-m(.k) = (1+ rul)l,m(k) <HkI>
At the margin, the designer will equate expected marginal revenue with marginal cost. In
Q
addition, dynamic free entry will drive expected equilibrium profit to zero. These two 
conditions may be w ritten as respectively,
M ,\'{et{k))Qt(k) = w, (HI-2)
He,(k))Qt(k) = w,h,D(k) I dll-3)
The appearance of \im (k) in equation (III.3) acts like a fixed cost in research and 
development. The existence of
<
growth effects of trade policy.*
 such a cost has important implications for the potential
9
B. Verification
Q
If expected profits were positive, them new firms would be encouraged to enter the 
design sector, increasing the competition for human capital. This would increase the wage 
and a ttra c t human capital from manufacturing sector. At the same time, each designer 
would cut back on human capital, leading to a fall in final output and a fall in the license 
fee. The equilibrium outcome is th a t the wage remains at its initial level, th a t each 
designer operates a t a smaller scale but th a t the design sector, as a whole, employs more 
human capital. Positive expected profits implies re-allocations which do not occur in 
equilibrium.
Q
The relationship between financial development and trade is studied separately in 
Blackburn & Hung (1993).
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Let p v(k) be the per-project verification cost incurred by investors. This cost is 
incurred only if the designer declares bankruptcy which occurs with probability 1 - X(.). The 
cost of verification and m arket opportunity cost combine as a constraint
\ { e t(k)W (k) -  [1 -  *(«,)] v.\k) = (1 +rM)rt (k) (UI.4)
The marginal and zero-profit conditions are, respectively,
Mtk(et(.k))\L\k) \
w  i # *  [1-*(«,(*))] Hv(*)k(e,(k))Q,(k) = wth, (k) + --------- ! ------------- m -o)
* +rf+l
The difference between verification and monitoring is reflected in the designer's 
equilibrium conditions. First, from equations (III.3) and (III.6), we see that the cost of 
verification is discounted while the cost of monitoring is not discounted. This is because 
verification takes place ex post whereas monitoring takes places ex ante. Second, from 
equations (III.2) and (III.5), we see that the designer's expected marginal cost is lower under 
verification than under monitoring. This is because of the state-dependency of verification 
costs. Whichever scheme is adopted, the designer can reduce the probability of bankruptcy 
by increasing research input. But only under verification does this marginal decision affect 
the repayment to investors who anticipate a lower probability of the need to verify and 
who are therefore more willing to accept a lower repayment. In other words, only under 
verification is the cost of capital affected. We refer to this as verification with feedback.
Now, if the designer was to take the expected verification as given, then the above 
result would not apply. This would occur when each investor lends to a large number of 
firms and conditions each contract on the average firm. Under such circumstances, an 
individual designer expects to make a repayment which depends on the average probability 
of bankruptcy determined by the average amount of research input. This means tha t each 
designer has an incentive to free ride off others. The Nash equilibrium is one in which no
action is taken to reduce the probability of bankruptcy so that each designer faces a 
param etric verification cost. In this case, the marginal condition is equation (III.2) and the 
zero-profit condition is equation (III.6). We refer to this case as verification without 
feedback.
2. Financial Intermediation
When investors delegate the task of monitoring or verification, the cost of this task 
is not duplicated. On the other hand, the delegated institution must, itself, be monitored 
or verified. For simplicity, we assume th a t the number of depositors with the intermediary 
is J ' £ J, the same as the number of investors in each project in the case of direct lending. 
We also assume th a t depositors enforce loan contracts with the intermediary through 
verification, le t / ivyr,be the cost of this verification. Let p 1(Nt){i=m,v) be the average net 
repaym ent from designers to the intermediary and R^c+j be the average repayment from 
the interm ediary to depositors. Finally, le t F(p1(Nt))be the cumulative distribution function 
of p^Nf.) {i=m, v). Depositors with the intermediary must expect a ra te  of return equal to 
the safe ra te  of return:
   E W  = + I x d F N(x) ----
Nt *=i o t
(III. 7)
where F ^ x )  * Prob [p1(Nt)< x] for i=m, v. A t the same time, the intermediary must expect 
average net repayments from designers to cover its own average repayments to depositors:
E ( p * R ,°i (!IL8)
for i=m.v. With free entry to the intermediation market, equality holds in equation (III.8).
A. Monitoring
The per-project cost of delegated monitoring is now p m (k)- p m (k)/J'. The average net 
repayment to the intermediary from designers is
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*=1 /i . _ X *= 1
where £(k) is a Bernoulli random variable with mean X(.). A designer will maximize 
equation (II.8) subject to equations (III.7), (III.8) and (III.9).
A. Verification
The per-project cost of delegated verification is fiv(k) = n v(k)/J '. The average net 
repaym ent to the intermediary from designers is
and the decision problem of a designer is to maximize equation (II.8) subject to equations 
(III.7), (III.8) and (III. 10).
3. Delegation Dominance and the E ffic ien t Contract
expected delegation cost project of providing incentives to the intermediary. This cost is 
defined by
E n’wew E a w 1 - ?(*» (III. 10)
It is possible to establish conditions under which financial intermediation will always 
be preferred to direct lending and borrowing. To do this, denote by i^(N t) for i-m ,v t the
With equation (III.9), ifr1 is equal to
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w,
V-), + ( l + V i ) S  V * )
[ ------------------ r— ^ -------- ] F ( 0  -  /  p ' ^ d F t p ' ^ p )  (m .12)
* <  ^  2-------------------------
[ l - F ( 0 ( l + ^ i >
for i=m,v. The first term  in the numerator of this expression is depositors’ expected 
verification cost for the intermediary plus expected opportunity cost of the loan. The 
second term  is depositors' expected residual receipts from the intermediary in the 
bankruptcy s ta te . The discount factor in the denominator includes 1 - F(.) because the 
compensation to depositors can be payed by the intermediary only in the non-bankruptcy 
s ta te .
The sum fim (k)/Jt + is the to tal cost per project of delegated monitoring and the 
sum [1  - A(.)]fiv(k) / [ ( 1  + r t+j ) J ']+ ijrv(.) is the expected (discounted) total cost per project 
of delegated verification. Delegation pays if
a to  { ♦ * ”(.) , v - w m  + r Q  } s min { r ( *) , )
J' (1 +r,.1)J/ 1 +rt+i
Clearly, if J '  = 1 and > 0 for i=m,v, then delegation will never be preferred since its 
only e ffec t is to introduce additional delegation costs. For J '  > 1, however, delegation 
brings benefits in the form of reduced monitoring or verification costs which are no longer 
duplicated. Given tha t J f > 1, we can appeal to the following result which establishes the 
condition for the unambiguous dominance of delegation:^
LEMMA 1: (Nt) = 0 for i=m,v.
With the law of large number, the probability of insolvent s ta te  of the intermediary is
^  We assume th a t contracts w ritten between the intermediary and designers are same 
type. Given the symmetry assumption, we may even possible to show that it is an 
equilibrium arrangement.
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converging zero. With sufficient large number of independently distributed projects, there 
is an inverse relationship between the expected delegation cost per project and the number 
of projects. In the limit, as the number of projects grows without bound, the expected 
delegation cost approaches zero and the to tal cost of delegation reduce to just the physical 
cost of monitoring or verification. This cost is less under delegation than under direct 
lending because of the elimination of duplication.
The equilibrium arrangement when -  <» is for all project funding to be provided by 
a financial intermediary which writes large numbers of contracts with designers, earn zero 
profits and writes contracts with depositors who are guaranteed a competitive ra te  of 
return, th a t is the safe ra te  of return. The equilibrium (marginal and zero-profit) conditions 
for a designer are unchanged from the case of direct lending and borrowing, except that 
fim (k){fiv(k)) is replaced by fim (k)/J' in v(k)/J'). Whether or not delegation dominates, the 
choice between monitoring and verification is determined according to the same efficiency
namely, min {^m (k)Jl-X(.)}^v (k)/(l+rt+ih . |
IV. Balanced Growth Equilibria
A steady s ta te  equilibrium of the economy is one in which (a) all participants are
optimizing, (b) all markets are clearing and (c) all non-stationary variables are growing at
the common ra te  g. Our first step in computing such an equilibrium prices and quantities
$
will be the same across all firms in each sector. We also define w = the constant
growth adjusted wage), n = Nt/M f (the constant ratio  of the potential flow of new designs 
to the stock of existing designs), / /  = M ^ ^ f th e  constant total amount of human capital 
employed in the interm ediate goods sector), f P  = N ^ P the constant to tal amount of 
human capital employed in the design sector) and e = Af£/r^ t= M ^ P  the constant total 
number of efficiency units of inputs in research and development). Our solution then 
proceeds as follows**:
11 ^The constancy of w , which is a function of a , the proof can be found in the
appendix of Chapter 3.
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Using Z t  = MpZ and Pt  -  Mt p a^(a~ ^ i where p -  y /a  is the constant mark up of price
competition, we can calculate z = a ^ Y t/[(l-<z^)yM^]. A fter some manipulation, / /  =
a Y t/[(l+a)w Mf] and q = a Y t/[(l+a)Mt:]. Using the equation (II.4) and human capital m arket
equilibrium condition (H = h f  + h f  + f f t ) ,  we obtain the allocation of human capital to
research sector and development as H - ne -  q/(aw  ). Given tha t the probability of a
successful innovation is independent across designers, the expected flow of new designs is
Ai t +l~ = X(.)Np Thus, since steady s ta te  growth occurs a t the ra te  _ M ^/M p  we
12have g = X(.)n. Finally, we note that Q = q/r.
1. D irect Lending
The balanced growth equilibrium under each type of financial arrangement is 
summarized in Table 5.1:
LEMMA 2:
LEMMA 3:
Given (i) X ’(e) > 0 and X"(e) < 0, (ii) X(e) > e X'(e), (Hi) lime^Q X ' -  constant 
< oo and (iv) an em  = em (pm ) < e^, where aH X (eh  = 6  and em satisfying  
w*[X(em) - emX t(ern)]/X’(em). 3  a unique balanced growth equilibrium with 
growth rate gm  = g^O f, p m ) > 0, such that dgm (.)/dH > 0 and
Given (i) X'(e) > 0 and X"(e) < 0, (ii) X(e) > e X '(e), (iii) X '(e)+eX "(e) < 0 and 
(iv) lim e^Q X ' -  constant < (v) Given f(e) * aHX f(e)+6 [X(e)-eX ’(e)], lime_Q
f(e) > 6  and (vi)
lim y y ' i m - e k ' j e ) ]  >
X'iA l+ i
(IV. 1 )
'(e) l +9
where f ( e h  = 6  such that 3  at least one ev = ev(H,pv), where ev e (0,eh- 
With some regularity conditions, 3  a unique e v, dev/dH  < 0 and dev/S p v > 
0  and a balanced growth equilibrium with growth rate g v = gv(HIpv)  > 0 ,
^  The constancies of n, / / ,  f f l  and e follow from the steady sta te  equilibrium 
condition.
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such that dgv(.)/dH > 0 andfdg
LEMMA 4: Given (i) X '(e) > 0 and X"(e) < 0, (ii) X(e) > e X '(e), (iii) X ,(e)+eX"(e) < 0 and
(iv) lim ^Q  X ' -  constant < °°, (v) an eF1 = em (ym ) < e^, where aHX(e^) = 0 
and
lim i w > _!il_ (iv.2)
■ *- A/(»[l -  \(e)] 1 + 6
and with some regularity conditions, 3  only one ev = e v(H,fiv), where ev e 
(0,eb, dev/3H  < 0, dev/ 6 ^v > 0 and a balanced growth equilibrium with 
growth rate g v(H,nv) > 0, where dgv/dH > 0 and^ ^ /d y . j
As explained earlier the mechanism of growth is the increasing variety of interm ediate 
inputs associated with the increasing number of firms engaged in research and development. 
Growth is sustainable despite the concave research technology because the number of 
efficiency units of research input, e = M f h P remains constant. As the economy grows, the 
increasing number of research firms intensifies competition for human capital in the 
research sector. This results in each firm, individually, cutting back on its human capital 
input. The allocation of human capital across sectors remains the same but aggregate 
research activity increases. As more resources become available to finance research with 
technological improvement with Mt, the economy can sustain a constant growth ra te  of new 
designs. Moreover, An increase of human capital endowment and a decrease of the cost of 
monitoring or verification can speed up the economic growth.
2. Financial Intermediation
Let Nf. -» <». Then, as indicated earlier, the balanced growth equilibrium under 
delegated monitoring (verification) is just the balanced growth equilibrium under direct 
monitoring (verification) with y m  (p.v) replaced by y m  = y m/ J f [yv = y v/ J 0.
PROPOSITION 1: Given Lemmas 2,3 and 4, steady sta te growth is always higher under
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financial intermediation than under direct lending and borrowing.
The e ffec t of financial intermediation is to reduce the cost in research and development.
As design firms begin to operate a t a positive profit because of lower cost, new firms are 
encouraged to en ter the research sector. Following the previous argument, this results in 
each firm, individually, operating a t a smaller scale but the economy, as a whole, 
experiencing an increase in research activity. A more extreme version of Proposition 1 is
PROPOSITION 2: For each financial arrangement, 3  a J 'q > 1 such that the growth rate
is zero under direct lending and positive under financial 
intermediation.
If each project requires a large number of investors, then the costs of direct monitoring 
or direct verification may be so large as to discourage any research and development. By 
eliminating duplication,intermediation can resolve this problem.
Proposition 1 and 2 imply tha t the direction of causality in the positive relationship 
between growth and financial development runs from the la tte r to the former. The 
converse result can also be established and is stated  as
PROPOSITION 3: L e t J ' < J ' q  in an initial equilibrium with direct lending and borrowing.
Given lemma 1, 3  an Nf. a t which direct lending and borrowing is 
replaced by financial intermediation.
As the economy grows, the delegation costs of intermediation fall, Sooner or later, these 
costs will be more than offset by the monitoring (or verification) cost saving from 
intermediation.
As implication of the results obtained so far is that some countries could become 
trapped in a vicious circle of low economic growth and low financial development. In the 
absence of institutional reforms, economies which are initially stagnant and financially 
repressed might forever remain in stagnation and repression, reforming the financial sector
^ 7  ;v
of an economy is one way of escaping from this trap and establishing a virtuous circle of 
growth and financial development. Reforming international arrangements is another 
possibility th a t are studied in a separate paper.
3. Monitoring Versus Verification
The foregoing analysis related growth to one aspect of financial system - the choice 
between d irect lending and financial intermediation. We now relate growth to another 
aspect - the choice between monitoring and verification.
LEMMA 5: Given the same endowment H and n m > f iv. Economy can have higher growth
and less costly with financial arrangement o f verification.
Given the lemma 5, we can show _
greater than the growth rate under verification but verification is less 
costly than monitoring.
In other words, a m arket economy might choose to be in a relatively low growth 
equilibrium because of lower cost of verification financial arrangement. Alternatively, an 
economy might saddle itself with a costly financial system if the objective is to promote 
growth.
V. Conclusions
This chapter has been motivated by the overwhelming evidence that economic growth 
depends on the financial regime of economies. The evidence shows clearly that growth is 
impeded by financial repression. At the same time, there are reasons to believe why the 
financial arrangem ent may be affected by the growth process. Thus, cross-country 
differences in institutions may explain, to be explained by, cross-country differences in
growth rates. The structure of institutions cannot be taken as given when considering the 
dynamic evolution of economies. Rather, one must conduct a general equilibrium analysis 
of the joint endogenous determ ination of economic and institutional development.
In this chapter we have sought to construct a theory of economic growth and financial 
development in order to explain the relationship between these activities. The theory has 
been based on a cross-fertilization of ideas from the literature on endogenous growth and 
financial intermediation. Our reading of these literature suggest several other potentially 
rewarding avenues for future research. Included amongst these are the issues of internal 
versus external finance for research and development (Hall (1992)), strategic intertemporal 
price setting and collusion between researchers and developers, and financial 
intermediation as a form of commitment in funding research and development (Hellwig 
(1990); Mayer (1988)). We hope to address these issues in future.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma I
Given equations (III.17), (III. 18) and (III.19), ijr* is equal to
■V,
ti;, + l l * r ctl) Y , «,»,
[-----------------  lF ^ R f .0  -  f  x d F „(x) (A. 1)
=   -  2__________________
[l-F^F^)] (1 + rt+1)
for i=m, v. We omit the tim e subscript to simply the notation. With symmetric projects, and 
by using integration by part, ijr1 can be expressed
jn R °
[-^ + (1 + r) 1 -  R d] FjfiR13) + f  F„(x) d x  (A 2 )
 ^ =   2----------------------------
[l-F^F1*)] (1 + r)
Since R D = E[p*(N)]t and V p(N) < E[p(N)], l im ^ ^  F[p(N)] = 0, it implies lim ^ ,,, ifr* = 0.
Q.E.D.
B. Proof of Lemma 2:
Use the expressions in Table 5.1 to to write n as
otHk(e) - 0 /, ,,
n (H' e > -  ~ r r \----- T1TT ( A . 3)a (e) + a el'(e)
where dn/dH  > 0 and dn/de < 0. Provided lime^Q aHA'(e) > d, 3 an > 0 such that 
aH A 'feh  = 6 . With lime_Q w*[A (e)-e A f(e)]/A '(e) < p m  and A(e) - eA '(e) > 0. If ^ s a t i s f i e s  
w*[A (em )-emA r(eFjJ/A '(eF1) = pF1 and > em , g723 = ^ (H fp F 1) = XleF1^ 171) ] ^ ^ ^ ^ 111)] > 
0 and djf^/dH  > 0 and d ^ /d p F 1 < 0. Q.E.D.
C. Proof of Lemma 3:
Use the expressions in Table 5.1 to to write n as
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n (H e) = + 6 [X (e) -eA/(e) ] - 6 (A.  4)
X( e) [1 - X (e) + eX (e)  ] + a e X' ( e )
where dn/dH  > 0. Let f(e) -  a HA '(e)+6 (A(e)-eA '(e)]} provided lime_g f(e) > 6  and given f(e) 
< 0 for e < a H /6 . 3 an e (0,aH /6 ) where f ( e b  = 6 . Let g(H,e) ■ A(e)n(H,e), given A(e) 
> eA '(e) and A f(e) + eA"(e) <. 0, it implies dg/de < 0. With
lim y*[X(e) - eA/ (e) ] < ______  (A 5)
A/(e) l+0 + Me)ji(fffe)
and
lim w*[X(e)-eA/(e)] v pv
l l I W  ------XUej  1^0  ( }
3 a t least one ev = ev(H,pv)t where e v e (0,eb, dev/dH < 0, dev/d p v > 0, which satisfies
w* [A. (e) - e X ' j e ) ] _ _______£   _ Q (a  7)
X'(e) 1 + Q + X ( e ) n { H , e )  ~ '
With addition regularity conditions: (i) Am < 0 and (ii) V e e (0,e^), 1+6 * [2g'(e) - 
g(e)g"(e)]/g"(e). With (i), the first term  of equation (34) is convex in e and with (ii), V e e 
(0,e^), there is no point o f  reflection  in the second term  of equatiom (34). As a result, 3 
only one ev satisfies equation (34) within the interval (0 ,eb . Since ev < e b  g v = g v(H,pv) 
= A[ev (H ,pv )Jn[H,ev (H ,pv )] > 0, where dgv/dH  > 0 and dgv/d p v < 0. Q.E.D.
D. Proof of Lemma 4:
Use the expressions in Table 5.1 to to write n as
n( H, e ) = — (a . 8)
A. (e) + a eXy (e)
where dn/dH > 0 and dn/de < 0. Provided lime_Q aH Af(e) > 0, 3 an e^ > 0 such that
aH A '(eb  = 0. Let g(H,e) -  A(e)n(H,e), if A f(e) + eA "(e) <, 0, it implies dg/de < 0. With
n  w* [ X ( e ) - e X ' ( e ) _] < n  ( A . 9)
e0 X'(e) [1 - A. (e) ] 1 + Q + X(e)  n ( H, e )
and provided th a t
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I i  y [ M e ) - e V (» ) ]  > JtL (A.  10)
k ' ( e )  [ l - X ( e ) ]  1 + 0
and with similar regularity conditions from above, 3 only one ev = ev(H,nv), where ev e 
(0,eb, dev/dH  < 0, dev/d p v > 0, which satisfies
w* [X (e) -eA/(e) 1 _ _______£ ______  = n (a  11)
X'(e) [ 1 — A. (e) ] 1 + 0 +A,(e) n(H,  e)
Since e v <■ e^, g v -  g*(H,\iy) = A[ev (H,fiv )]n[H,ev (H,pv )] > 0, where dgv/dH  > 0 and 
dgv/d fiv < 0. Q.E.D.
E. Proof of Proposition 1:
From Lemmas 2, 3 and 4, Sgm (.)/Sfiin < 0, dgv(.)/dy? < 0. Under intermediation, / iv 
(fiv) is replaced by = /i722/ / '  (fxv = f iv/J'). It follows that < gm (H,fim / J ,)i
g v(H,fiv) < g v(H,nv/J ')  and g v(H,fiv) < g v(H,fiv/ J t). Q.E.D.
F. Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider the case of monitoring, Set g722 = 0 and use the equation (A.3) which e = e(iim ) 
which is derived from w*[A(e) - eA r(e)]/A f(e) = /im  and de(.)/dfim > 0. Observe that g722 = 0 
when fl722 = 0 and recall tha t /i722 = /i722 J '. Then provided that lim.yr,^ H aA ,[e(fiJ,)J > d, 3 
a J'q  > 1 such th a t Ha A ,[e(nJ’)]= 6 , implying g722 = /j722 = 0. Under intermediation, 3 no such 
J'q  since fim  is replaced by n m .
A similar proof can applied to the case of verification. Q.E.D.
G. Proof of Proposition 3:
Suppose min{tim /J'+ilr(NQ),[l-A(.)fAv/[J ,(l+r2 )]+iJr(N0 )}> min{nm,[l-A(.)fiy/[J'(l+r])]\ a t 
time 0. Given J* < J'q, by proposition 2, gm (H,finijf)> 0. Therefore N t grows. With lemma 
1, ilr* -  0, for i=m,v. 3 a such tha t
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min { J if + i|r“(.) , pyU) + ( _) } ^
J  + f c+1) (A.  12)
min { p"(Jc) / }
l  + ^ t+i
Q.E.D.
H. Proof of Lemma 5:
Define gm (H,e) * X(e)n(H,e) from n(H,e) of equation (30) and similar for g v(H,e) from 
n(H,e) of equation (31).
V H, e, gm (H,e) < g v(H,e). And let A(e) -  w*[X(e)-eX f(e)]/X '(e), given ^ TUq > h vq (which 
fF 1 and g v are both positive), e v < em  (v AfeP1) = fim Q> fiv(/(l+0+gv) = A(ev)). Hence with 
dg^/de < 0 (i=m,v), gm [H,em (iim  q)1 < gm [H,ev(fiv q)] < g v[H,ev(fiv q)]. Obviously, since X(ev) 
> 0, {l-X[e(fiVQ)J}fiVQ < fim Q. Q.E.D.
I. Proof of Proposition 4:
3 fim Qand n vq which gm [H,em (/im Q)J < g v[H,ev(H,nvq)], with lemma 5, this implies 
Hm Q < f iVQ. Provided e v(H,fivg) > e* defined in lemma 3, 3 H, such that X[ev(H,fivq)] is 
large enough for [l-X[ev(H ,nvq)J}/i vq < p m (y Q.E.D.
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Table 9; Balanced Growth Equilibria Under Alternative Financial Arrangements.
Monitoring
m m g = r  -  0
m ~ f m. m g = Ate )n
m
mm H -  n e  =
<xA7 i e m)
\ f ^  A i f  ^  \Ate J - e A (e )
A7(em)
w* = nm
Verification
With Feedback Without Feedback
g = r  -  0
g = A(e )n ~v ,~v,~vg = Ate )n
H - v  v  n e =
aw’ A7(eV) 1 + r
„ ~v~v  H -  n e =
~vr
aA'(iV)
Ate ) - e A (e )
A7 i e V)
w* -
1 + r
A(eV) - i V  i e V )
A7(e')ll - Ate')]
w =
1 + r V
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